

Millennium Development Goals Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Country Report 2005



Vision 2020





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Message from His Excellency Hamid Karzai

President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan



In the Name of Allah, the most Merciful, the most Compassionate

In September 2000, when the Millennium Summit was held at the United Nations General Assembly in New York, Afghanistan was still suffering from war and, hence, could not participate in the formulation of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Since then, with the help of the international community, Afghanistan has started its recovery from protracted violence and achieved significant gains in building democratic institutions, providing basic public services to its people, and reviving its economy. We have convened two Loya Jirgas, adopted a new constitution, and held presidential, parliamentary and provincial council elections. We have demobilized and begun the reintegration of 60,000 former combatants while building a professional army and police to provide safety and security to all Afghans. We have also enrolled more than four million children in school and welcomed four million refugees back to their homes.

In March 2004, I informed Secretary-General Kofi Annan that Afghanistan was ready to join the community of nations that have committed to the MDGs. The Afghan Government has now launched this national Millennium Development Goals Report, which is the product of intensive work by a wide range of actors within the Afghan Government, assisted by partners from the United Nations and the international community.

Despite achieving major progress over the past four years, the report shows that the Afghan people have a long way ahead. After decades of war, Afghanistan is one of the poorest and least developed countries in the world. But we are committed to build a better future and mobilise as much of our own resources as possible to meet the MDGs. We know, however, that years of conflict have depleted our resources, necessitating the commitment of the international community to contribute to Afghanistan's development for an extended period. Therefore, in implementing the goals set out in this report, Afghanistan will rely heavily on partnership with, and contributions from, the international community.

Afghanistan is currently preparing its National Development Strategy, which will set out Afghanistan's development benchmarks and our strategies for reaching them. The MDG Report will provide targets for this national strategy.

Finally, I thank the Oversight Committee and the Working Group of the Afghan Government and the international support team for preparing this report. Afghanistan looks forward to working together with the United Nations and its member states towards the fulfilment of the millennium vision and achievement of our shared goals.

Hamid Karzai
President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

Message from the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General



Since December 2001, Afghanistan has been engaged in establishing a democratic system of government under the Bonn agreement. With the election of the President and the parliamentary and provincial council elections in September 2005, the people of Afghanistan have demonstrated that they can and want to live in a democratic society. They want to focus on building their state after years of devastation and they want to improve their well-being.

The international community is working with the people of Afghanistan and the Government to meet the challenge of security, which still remains huge, and help in the reconstruction of the country, while continuing to meet the humanitarian and rehabilitation needs. But it is now time for the people to assess the development challenges that they face and with the international community set a path for overcoming them. This Millennium Development Goals (MDG) Report is yet another signal of the Government's commitment to move Afghanistan on the development path and away from the destruction of the last two decades.

The MDG Report makes for sombre reading but it also is imbued with immense hope of what the Afghan people can and must achieve. Judged against the situation of other countries, Afghanistan has a long way to go to meet the minimum set of goals and targets that it has set for itself. Even in comparison to other conflict-affected and landlocked countries, Afghanistan ranks low. There is an immense task ahead but if the last few years are any indication of what can be achieved when the energies of the Afghan people merge with the support of the international community, we can be hopeful that progress will continue. But the commitment of the Government and people of Afghanistan on the one hand and that of the international community on the other hand will be needed for some time to come as this Report very clearly articulates.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Jean Arnault', is positioned above the printed name.

Jean Arnault
United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary General for Afghanistan

Message from the Oversight Committee for the Preparation of the Afghanistan Millennium Development Goals Report



In the Name of Allah, the most Merciful, the most Compassionate

The Afghanistan Millennium Development Goals Report is a reflection of the commitment of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to improve the well being of our people and to meet our obligations towards achieving this goal.

This Report shows the immense distance that we have yet to traverse to provide the Afghan people with a better standard of living. We are committed to fully meeting these MDG targets, which we have adapted to the specific challenges facing our nation. There is a long way to go. But by recognizing where we currently stand and monitoring our progress, the Government and the Afghan people will work to meet these goals and enrich the lives of our children. The international community has given its firm support to us in this endeavour, which will be critical if we are to meet our goals and the expectations of our nation.

This Report has been developed through a process of extensive consultations within the Government and with the international community over the course of nine months. Its preparation has been directed by the Oversight Committee, which has reviewed various drafts and provided inputs. The Report has been ratified by the Cabinet and is now an official government document. We are pleased that this report is also available in Dari and Pashtu, our national languages. This will enable us to share and disseminate its message widely as our nation works to attain the Afghanistan Millennium Development Goals by 2020.

Ahmad Zia Massoud
First Vice-President
Co-Chair

Dr. Ishaq Nadiri
Senior Economic Advisor to the President
Co-Chair

Dr. Abdullah Abdullah
Minister of Foreign Affairs

Dr. Anwar-ul-Haq Ahady
Minister of Finance

Dr. Amin Farhang
Minister of Economy

Dr. Zalmay Rassoul
National Security Advisor

Haneef Atmar
Minister of Rural Rehabilitation
and Development

Acknowledgements

In the Name of Allah, the most Merciful, the most Compassionate

This report was prepared under the overall guidance and supervision of the Millennium Development Goals Oversight Committee appointed by H.E. President Karzai, co-chaired by H.E. First-Vice President Ahmad Zia Massoud and H.E. Dr. Ishaq Nadiri, Senior Economic Advisor to the President. The Oversight Committee included H.E. Hedayat Amin Arsala, Senior Advisor to the President and Minister of Commerce, H. E. Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, Minister of Foreign Affairs, H.E. Dr. Anwar-ul-Haq Ahady, Minister of Finance, H.E. Amin Farhang, Minister of Economy, H.E. Haneef Atmar, Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development and H. E. Zalmi Rassoul, National Security Advisor. The Oversight Committee was instrumental in setting the thrust and direction of the report.

Ameerah Haq, United Nations Resident Coordinator, initiated the preparation of the MDG report with the Government and ensured that it was an Afghan-led process. She has been a constant source of guidance and support.

National consultations took place through Technical Working Groups (TWGs). The Chairs of these TWGs included Dr. Ishaq Nadiri, Senior Economic Advisor to the President, H.E. Haneef Atmar, Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, H.E. Masouda Jalal, Minister of Women Affairs, H.E. Dr. Faizullah Kakar, Deputy Minister of Health, H. E. Dr. Mohammad Haidar Reza, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, H.E. Noor Mohammed Qarqeen, Minister of Education, H.E. Dr. Zalmi Rassoul, National Security Advisor, H.E. Dr. Sediqa Balkhi, Minister of Martyrs and Disabled, H. E. Wahidullah Shahrani, Deputy Minister of Finance, H. E. Noor Delawari, Governor of Central Bank, and H.E. Mostapha Zaher, Head of the National Environmental Protection Agency. These chairs and participants helped define a consensus on revising MDG targets and indicators for Afghanistan.

The draft report was prepared by a team led by Ashok Nigam and Saurabh Sinha and supported by Verena Linneweber with invaluable statistical support from Andrew Pinney. Mariamme Nadjaf has worked very closely with me and successfully managed the entire process. Leila Farhang, Zubair Reza, Kay Kirby Dorji, Clark Soriano, Nesrin Hannoun and Charlotte Scawen provided valuable research and management support, and Stephen Koss assisted with the preparation of charts and graphs. Useful comments were provided by Momin Ahmed, Fernando da Cruz, Sarah Hennell, David Mauro, Esmatullah Ramzi, and Daoud Yaqub. Martha Fay edited the report. The difficult work of translation not just of words, but also of concepts, was carried out by Mohammad Eshaq, Ahmad Farid Tookhy, Daud Mordid, Shahmahmood Miakhel, Esmatullah Ramzi and Rehman Rahimi. Technical support was provided by Saleem Alokozai and Qaher Shafai. Tayeb Waizi created the outstanding website that facilitated our consultations.

Barnett Rubin's in-depth knowledge of Afghanistan proved to be extremely valuable in both providing important contributions and reviewing and commenting on the draft. A peer review group including Ameerah Haq, Sir Richard Jolly, Andrew Pinney and Richard Ponzio provided extensive and detailed comments on the draft report. Useful comments and contributions were also received from Peter Middlebrook and Dorothy Rosenberg. Kawun Kakar of the Office of the President assured us of the support of H.E. President Hamid Karzai. The final report also benefited greatly from the comments received from line ministries, donor agencies, civil society, NGO's and the United Nations Country Team.

The report was finalized by the Oversight Committee, ratified by the Cabinet, and presented at the World Summit at the United Nations in New York on 15 September 2005.

I would like to thank all those who contributed to the endeavour of preparing the first Afghanistan Millennium Development Goals Report with the full engagement of Government and our wide range of partners.



Adib Farhadi, Director
Afghanistan Reconstruction and Development Services and
Afghanistan National Development Strategy

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List of Acronyms

ACF	Action Contre La Faim	MDGR	Millennium Development Goals Report
ADB	Asian Development Bank	MICS	Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey
AIAF	Afghan Interim Authority Fund	MMR	Maternal Mortality Ratio
ALIS	Afghanistan Landmine Impact Survey	MOD	Ministry of Defense
AMDGs	Afghanistan Millennium Development Goals	MoF	Ministry of Finance
AMF	Afghan Military Forces	MoPH	Ministry of Public Health
ANA	Afghan National Army	MRRD	Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
ANBP	Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme	MSH	Management Sciences for Health
ANC	Antenatal Care	MT	Metric Tonnes
ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy	NEEP	National Emergency Employment Programme
ANP	Afghan National Police	NGO	Non-Government Organisation
ARDS	Afghanistan Reconstruction and Development Services	NMS	National Micronutrient Survey
AREU	Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit	NRVA	National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment
ARI	Annual Risk of Infection	NSC	National Security Council
ARTF	Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund	NSP	National Solidarity Programme
AWCC	Afghan Wireless Communication Company	ODA	Official Development Assistance
BPHS	Basic Package of Health Services	OECD/DAC	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/ Development Assistance Committee
CDC	Centres for Disease Control	OHRLLS	United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States
CFC	Chlorofluorocarbons	PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
CFC-A	Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan	PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
CIET	Community Information and Epidemiological Technologies	PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
CSO	Central Statistics Office	RALS	Rapid Assessment of Learning Spaces
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration	SC-US	Save the Children – United States (NGO)
DFID	UK Department for International Development	SCA	Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (NGO)
DIAG	Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups	SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
DOTS	Directly Observed Treatment – Short Course	STD	Sexually Transmitted Diseases
EMIS	Education Management Information System	STI	Sexually Transmitted Infection
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War	TB	Tuberculosis
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations	TBA	Trained Birth Attendant
GDP	Gross Domestic Product	TWG	Technical Working Group
GNI	Gross National Income	U5MR	Under-5 Mortality Rate
HDI	Human Development Index	UN	United Nations
HDR	Human Development Report	UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
HIES	Household Income and Expenditure Survey	UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/ Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
I-ANDS	Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy	UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
ICT	Information and Communication Technology	UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
IDP	Internally Displaced Person	UNESCAP	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
IED	Improvised Explosive Device	UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund	UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
IMR	Infant Mortality Rate	UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
IPRSP	Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers	UNMACA	United Nations Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan
IRIN	United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks	UNODC	United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force	USAID	United States Agency for International Development
ISCED	International Standard Classification of Education	UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
IV	Intra-Venous	WB	World Bank
LDCs	Least Developed Countries	WDI	World Development Indicators
LLDCs	Landlocked Least Developed Countries	WFP	World Food Programme
LOTFA	Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan	WHO	World Health Organisation
LSPIP	Livelihood and Social Protection Public Investment Programme		
MAAH	Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Food		
MDG	Millennium Development Goal		

Executive Summary



With this report, Afghanistan takes another step toward fulfilling some of the goals enumerated in the preamble to its 2004 constitution: “ensuring a prosperous life and sound environment for all those residing in this land” and “regaining Afghanistan’s rightful place in the international community.” (Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 1382/2004, preamble). In December 2001, when the Interim Administration of Afghanistan assumed authority after twenty-three years of war, Afghanistan was by all measures a ruined society. Since then, Afghanistan has made impressive gains in rebuilding institutions and repairing the social fabric. It has held two *Loya Jirgas*, adopted a new constitution establishing an Islamic democratic state, held a presidential election, and will soon hold parliamentary and provincial council elections. It has demobilised and begun the reintegration of 60,000 former combatants and started building a professional army and police force that will respect the rule of law and Islamic and Afghan values. It has enrolled more than four million children in school, welcomed four million returning refugees, and assured that, despite the effects of drought and displacement, there has been no starvation. The commitment of this government to move towards an open, pluralistic and democratic society is reflected by the extensive consultation conducted by government with Afghanistan’s development community in the production of this report.

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) adopted by all members of the United Nations set measurable targets for enabling more human beings to enjoy the minimum requirements of a dignified life by 2015. As a result of what the Afghan constitution calls “the injustices and shortcomings of the past, and the numerous troubles imposed on our country,” Afghanistan could not participate in the formulation of these goals. In September 2000, when the Millennium Summit was held at the UN General Assembly in New York, Afghanistan was still in a state of war and turmoil.

Only since March 2004, when President Karzai endorsed the MDGs in a letter to the United Nations Secretary-General, has Afghanistan’s government been able to begin planning its contribution to the global task. The gains made in re-establishing the state of Afghanistan provide a strong foundation for realisation of these goals. Afghanistan, however, having lost over two decades to war, has had to modify the global timetable and benchmarks to fit local realities. The rest of the international community defined the MDGs, to be attained by 2015, against a baseline of 1990. The Millennium Declaration establishing the MDGs pledged, for instance, that by 2015 the share of the world’s population living on less than US \$1 per day would be reduced to half what it was in 1990. Because of its lost decades and the lack of available information, Afghanistan has defined its MDG contribution as targets for 2020 from baselines of 2002 to 2005. It is an ambitious goal to try to achieve in 15-18 years what less devastated countries are attempting in 25, but after deliberation the government decided to set high goals for itself rather than accept the permanence of Afghanistan’s destitution.

Afghanistan has lost over two decades in war when most countries, particularly in Asia, made substantial economic and social progress and improved the lives of their people. Though one of the world’s poorest countries even before the onset of war, Afghanistan in the 1970s was slowly increasing its governance capacity with support from the international community. In the years of war that followed, hundreds of thousands of people, most of them innocent civilians, were killed, a third of the population was uprooted and forced into exile, villages were devastated, the country’s educated class and educational system were destroyed, and the modest advances made by Afghanistan’s women were cruelly reversed. The country’s food production fell by one half. Government ceased to be an instrument for providing even modest services to people; instead it became an instrument of control through fear and violence. Narcotics traffickers looking for new sources of supply induced many Afghan cultivators to turn to opium poppy, creating a parallel economy that funds trafficking, warlordism, and corruption.

The events of September 11, 2001, demonstrated that the pervasive insecurity of the people of Afghanistan constituted a threat to the whole world. These events led to a change of government

through military intervention and the conclusion in December 2001 of the UN-mediated Bonn Agreement, the aim of which was to reconstruct the institutions of self-government in Afghanistan. In spite of impressive gains since the establishment of the Interim Administration in December 2001, the new constitutional framework remains fragile. The legacy of poverty, violence, and war keeps the majority of Afghans insecure.

Achieving the MDGs in Afghanistan, therefore, is not just a desirable developmental goal, but a necessity for the security of the country, the region and the world. International research suggests that the poverty of nations is closely linked to the threat of civil war: On average a negative economic growth shock of 5 percentage points increases the risk of civil war by about 50%. In Afghanistan we see the link more concretely when:

- ◆ Nearly 40% of the rural population cannot count on having sufficient food to satisfy their most basic hunger; 57% of the population is under 18 years of age but with little hope of employment; in much of the country over 80% of the people are illiterate; life expectancy is under 45 years; and arms supplied for decades by foreign patrons of armed groups are freely available; recruiting fighters is incredibly cheap; and some families send their sons to join armed groups in return for the guarantee that they will be fed.
- ◆ Much agricultural land is deserted or mined; irrigation systems are damaged or destroyed; prices of essential goods have skyrocketed over decades as leaders both distributed foreign aid and printed money to pay armed groups; roads to market have disintegrated into dust or mud; there is limited rural credit or agricultural aid; and it is no wonder that farmers turn to the opium poppy, providing raw material for the profits of traffickers, warlords, and international organized crime.

Afghanistan's Human Development Index, a measure of the most basic human welfare, is among the lowest in the world, comparable to only a few of the poorest landlocked or war-torn countries of sub-Saharan Africa. The past four years have seen significant progress in laying the basis for Afghanistan's recovery, but Afghanistan still has far to go to achieve these minimum standards. The MDGs provide concrete targets to be reached by Afghanistan's National Development Strategy (ANDS) currently under preparation. The ANDS (or the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper as it is known) will identify the policies and programmes that will enable the country to meet the MDGs while promoting growth, generating wealth and reducing poverty and vulnerability over the next five years.

Afghanistan will require extensive, predictable, and sustained international aid to meet these targets. Hence this report also describes what the international community must do to fulfill its share of the bargain inherent in the global agreement on MDGs.

The baseline indicators for the MDG goals in Afghanistan sketch a portrait of a nation and people deeply wounded by war, but struggling to restore basic security and dignity:

- ◆ ***Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger (Goal 1):*** Poverty measurement in Afghanistan is severely constrained by lack of data. Available data suggests that about 20% of rural Afghans are chronically unsure of obtaining enough food, and another 18% are vulnerable. The Afghan diet, consisting mostly of grains, has little variety, creating a serious problem of malnutrition. Nearly 40% of the children under 3 years old are underweight, and more than half the children in that age group are stunted. Both calorie intake and dietary diversity are greater for families that are closer to the market: households further from the market consume fewer calories and have a less diverse diet.

Afghanistan needs a secure environment and sustained growth over at least the next 10 years to reduce poverty significantly by 2020. This growth would have to actively favour the poor by building their productive assets. Much of this growth will have to come from (non-poppy) agriculture, which contributes more than 50% of the licit GDP and provides employment to two-thirds of the workforce. Investment in rural roads, power, and water will increase access to markets and provide impetus to the rural economy, reducing hunger and malnutrition. A massive rural public works programme to build a reliable rural road system and irrigation will help generate rural employment and wages, connect the rural population to the market and create necessary conditions for poverty reduction.

- ◆ **Achieve Universal Primary Education (Goal 2):** Afghanistan has the highest proportion of school-age (7-12) children in the world: about 1 in 5 Afghans is a school-age child. But despite the success of the back-to-school campaign, half of the school-age children are still out of school. In the southern provinces, more than 60% of the school-age children are not in school. Among Afghans aged 15 to 24 years, the most educated age portion of the population, 34% are literate - about half of the men and 18% of the women. Women and girls lag far behind men and boys in education, and the gap is not narrowing. Boys are twice as likely to complete primary school as girls. Because of gender segregation and the socio-cultural pressure that girls be taught by women teachers, it is very difficult to generate enough women teachers to expand girls' education fast enough to catch up with boys.

Afghanistan needs to increase school enrolment with a focus on increasing the attendance rate of girls. It is critical that access to education and the quality of education are addressed simultaneously. Both are key for rebuilding the education sector and gaining the confidence of parents that the system can deliver and that it is worthwhile to send their children to school.

- ◆ **Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women (Goal 3):** The educational disparity between males and females starts early in life. Primary school enrolments reflect the inequality that starts at birth, and the disparity increases in secondary and higher education. Afghanistan has the lowest female literacy rate in the world, between 9% and 18%. Violence against women is pervasive, a silent epidemic due to the low status of women, and compounded by long exposure to hostilities and conflict. It is a major obstacle to achieving gender equality and needs to be overcome through multiple efforts, including the rule of law, awareness creation, and gradually changing cultural practices and mindsets. Above all it requires political commitment and leadership at the highest levels to take actions that will concretely improve the rights of women.

By allocating 25% of the seats in the lower house of the National Assembly to women, Afghanistan has taken steps to bring about gender parity in the formal representation of women in decision-making. This needs to be followed by similar steps toward the effective participation of women in decision-making at all levels. But substantive participation by women will above all depend on the progress of education and economic empowerment.

- ◆ **Reduce Child Mortality (Goal 4):** Life expectancy at birth is under 45 years, 20 years less than any other Asian country. Over a fifth of all Afghan children die before the age of five. Of these, a third die soon after birth, and more than half within the first year. High mortality rates are due to lack of food, poor sanitation, and low literacy, especially of women. About 70% of the rural population and 40% of the urban population have no access to improved water. About 41% of the rural population and 13% of the urban population have no access to proper sanitation. The measles immunisation programme has been a success in Afghanistan, with 75% of children aged less than 12 months having been immunised. Owing to much higher immunisation coverage of children in urban as opposed to rural areas, infant and child mortality rates in the rural areas are around 25% higher.

With a supportive policy environment, the MDG target for reducing child mortality will potentially be met. Implementing the Afghan government's basic package of health services is critical for that goal. The health system needs to provide better care for mothers and babies before and after birth to reduce neonatal deaths.

- ◆ **Improve Maternal Health (Goal 5):** Afghanistan has the highest rate of maternal mortality of any country except Sierra Leone and Angola. Overall maternal mortality is estimated at 1600 to 2200 deaths per 100,000 live births. Parts of Badakhshan province have the highest maternal mortality rates ever recorded, with nearly 7% of mothers dying in childbirth. As a result of the low level of female education and gender segregation, fewer than 15% of births are attended by medically trained personnel (who must be female), and only 10% by a traditional midwife; 75% of births are attended only by family members. Nearly 16% of Afghan girls are married before the age of 15 and 52% are married before their eighteenth birthday. In some of the country's most populous provinces, where indebtedness is high (Kabul, Herat, Nangarhar, as well as Badghis) over half of girls are married off young for economic reasons, to pay off debts or earn brideprice for family subsistence.

Meeting the challenge of reducing maternal mortality will require education, communication and changes in cultural practices. Within the average Afghan family, there is little knowledge of reproductive health and the impact of sexual behaviour on health.

- ◆ **Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria, Tuberculosis, and other Diseases (Goal 6):** Currently Afghanistan has a low prevalence of HIV/AIDS, but it is at high risk. As the world's leading producer of opium and a rapidly growing producer of heroin as well, intravenous drug use is growing, with over 40% of users sharing needles. There is no blood screening, little condom use, and very little knowledge of the disease or how to prevent it, reinforced by widespread illiteracy and cultural inhibitions about discussion of the disease and how it spreads. HIV/AIDS is growing rapidly in South and Central Asia and is likely to spread with the drug trade and truck routes, especially if Afghanistan succeeds in its plan to establish both east-west and north-south transit corridors. Malaria is prevalent in 60% of the country and is spreading to higher altitudes as the climate warms. There are an estimated 2-3 million cases of malaria annually in a population of about 25 million. Afghanistan is one of the 22 countries with the highest rates of tuberculosis, with young women constituting about 70% of all adult cases of TB that are reported by public health facilities.

Access to health services, increased health awareness and specific strategies for each disease will be key to combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and other diseases. Simple strategies implemented widely—such as large-scale distribution of insecticide-treated bed-nets for malaria prevention—can help meet this challenge.

- ◆ **Ensure Environmental Sustainability (Goal 7):** Forest cover appears to have been cut in half since 1978 as a result of lack of energy alternatives to firewood and demand for timber in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Only 6% of the population has access to a regular supply of electricity. Due to drought and the destruction of water management systems, the water table has sunk in many areas. The growing population is mining the country's deep aquifer water reserves, and water quality is declining. Eighty percent of the rural population drinks contaminated water. With the return of millions of refugees, cities, overwhelmed by air pollution, sewage, and waste, have become swollen with transient populations living in slums, where an estimated 75% of the urban population lives.

Afghanistan must increase the proportion of land area under protected forests and restore the forest cover, while developing a system capable of implementing forest protection in the face of resistance from powerful timber mafias. The Afghan population needs access to cheap non-solid fuels. The experience of other poor countries shows that it is possible to change from the exclusive use of coal and wood toward a mix of energy including gas and solar energy over a period of 20 years. Rural electrification should be actively developed. Increased access to improved water sources and improved sanitation will not only contribute to sustaining the environment but also improve the overall health of the population, especially by reducing child morbidity and mortality.

- ◆ **Global Partnership for Development (Goal 8):** The government of Afghanistan raises a mere 5% of the GDP as internal revenue. In 2004, the Afghan government estimated that the amount of aid required for minimal stabilization would be US\$27.5 billion over a period of 7 years, equivalent to about US\$168 per capita per year for that period. Disbursements since 2002 are estimated at about US\$83 per capita per year, less than half the amount required, and aid is likely to decrease with time. Disbursements, furthermore, measure only the amount transferred by donors to implementing organizations, not the amount actually spent in Afghanistan. Since 2002, most assistance has gone to immediate humanitarian needs and security, with only 10% of the disbursements going to health and education, far less if one includes the cost of international military operations in Afghanistan. There is a growing gap between amounts pledged and amounts disbursed and a large gap in both money and time between disbursement and implementation. Nearly three quarters of the aid is disbursed and delivered outside of channels controlled by the government budget, involving multiple levels of contractors that inflate cost, create delays, and fail to build Afghan national capacity.

Among landlocked developing countries, Afghanistan has one of the longest distances to a seaport (over 2,000 kilometers) over exceedingly harsh terrain. The country has no railroads and one of the world's

lowest degrees of road penetration, about 0.032 km of roads per square km of area and only 16% of roads paved, with the definition of "paved road" appearing to be "a road that was paved at one time."

As an impoverished landlocked country seeking to emerge from violent conflict, Afghanistan needs international partnership to connect to the market, provide employment, particularly to youth (a major factor in preventing violence), and invest in basic institutions and services. Afghanistan and its neighbours need to transform their relationship from one based on fears of destabilisation to one based on a common interest in cooperation. Key to this change is the transformation of Afghanistan to a "land bridge" for the region through investment in regional transport infrastructure, simplification and harmonisation of border procedures, management of water resources, and encouragement of labour migration. Hence Afghanistan needs cooperation and increasing economic integration with its neighbors, in addition to global aid.

- ◆ **Enhancing Security (Goal 9):** Despite extreme poverty, ill health, and hunger, Afghans define the lack of security as their greatest problem. Hence the government of Afghanistan has added this new goal to the eight global MDGs. The main security threat identified by most Afghans is not terrorism or attacks by those fighting the government or its international supporters. The armed opposition is confined to a few border provinces. The main threat Afghans cite is an absence of the rule of law resulting in violent predation by local power holders, criminals, and corrupt officials. Four million Afghans live in communities affected by land mines or unexploded ordnance (UXO), and Afghanistan has the world's highest proportion of handicapped people after Cambodia. Half of the victims of landmines or UXOs are under 18 years old. Lack of security is a principal obstacle to the education and public participation of women, as well as to long-term investment for development.

Afghanistan's economy is far more dependent on the production, refining, and export of narcotics than any other economy in the world. Afghans receive only a tiny share of the ultimate value of narcotics in retail markets, and many opium farmers are burdened with massive debt, but the little that Afghans do receive forms a substantial part of their impoverished national economy. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime estimates that in 2004-2005 Afghanistan's opium economy earned US\$ 2.8 billion, three quarters of which went to traffickers, not farmers. This is a fraction of the value of Afghanistan's opium sold on the international market estimated to be worth between US \$30-60 billion. The income from narcotics exceeds the total official international assistance spent in the country and is more directly accessible to people than most foreign aid. In recent years the drug economy has grown more rapidly than the legal economy and is estimated to equal 50-60% of the legal economy and one-third to 40% of the total economy.

At least two million people rely directly on the drug economy for their livelihood, and many more benefit from its indirect effects, such as employment in construction and trade financed by drug profits. Increasing amounts of opium are processed into heroin and other high-value products within Afghanistan with the help of international organised crime, increasing the profits of traffickers, and further corrupting government and law enforcement. Opiates, Afghanistan's only major export, play a significant though as yet unquantified role in enabling the country to finance the non-drug trade deficit while maintaining price stability and the value of the currency. The government receives customs revenue levied on drug-financed imports. The government has an internationally supported plan for counter-narcotics, but eliminating a third to 40% of Afghanistan's economy without endangering security and stability will require massive resources and time.

The new Afghan National Army (ANA) is already considered successful in many areas. Its cost, however, paid substantially by foreign aid, equaled 17% of GDP in 2004-2005, compared to an international average of 3-5% of GDP for defense. Planned increases in the pay and equipment of police, while needed to support a more professional force and fight corruption, will further inflate the security budget. Donors, however, have contributed only 40% of the amount needed to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), which pays for police salaries and supplies. The cost of maintaining the security forces needed is not sustainable from the country's own resources and will not be for more than a decade, even if the taxable (non-drug) economy grows by 10% a year above the current rate. Although over time the amount allocated to the security forces from the national budget is expected

to decline, donor assistance will continue to be needed for some years to complete the reform and professionalisation process and establish civilian oversight.

Due to the complete destruction of its state and economy over the past decades, Afghanistan cannot achieve the MDGs without accelerating growth. But there is no contradiction between raising the welfare of the most vulnerable and pursuing economic growth. Growth is a necessary but not sufficient condition for reducing poverty. The Government has adopted a framework of pro-poor growth as the foundation for the ANDS. The pattern of growth must create employment for the poor and increase their assets sufficiently for them to produce or purchase enough food and other basic goods. Agriculture, which constitutes one-half of the licit economy and provides employment to two-thirds of the workforce, and related rural development must be central to any poverty reduction strategy and receive an adequate share of public spending and international aid. In addition, ensuring an enabling environment for investment, particularly for small and medium-sized businesses, will be essential to generating employment and raising the incomes of the poorest.

Unless the licit economy grows rapidly, and benefits the poor, the country will be unable to provide incomes and employment for the millions who now depend on opium. Without pro-poor growth, destroying the 30-40% of Afghanistan's economy currently contributed by opium will risk pushing the country back to violence and intensify poverty.

Without growth in the licit economy the government is also unlikely to be able to raise sufficient revenues to operate the army, police, schools, health services, transport network, energy supplies, and water management systems needed to attain the MDGs. An infusion of aid to build institutions without building the society's capacity to sustain and operate them risks precipitating a crisis in only a few years if external assistance declines before government can mobilise sufficient domestic revenue to fund its rapidly growing operating budget.

To attain the MDGs, Afghanistan must build the capacity of its state and its people. Raising literacy rates requires building primary schools, but it also requires training teachers, which in turn requires secondary schools and universities. Once schools are built and teachers trained, the government must maintain the schools and pay the teachers out of its own resources. The same need for building human skills and fiscal capacity holds equally for the health sector or for the transport infrastructure to connect Afghanistan to the world. The ANDS will address these linkages and present a framework for economic and social development that will enable the country to attain the MDGs.

The Afghan government has urgently asked donors to provide more aid through government channels. Studies show that untied aid - that is, aid in support of the government budget rather than "tied" to the implementation of specific programmes chosen by donors - is 25% more effective than tied aid. The aid system as currently operating burdens the struggling government with multiple reporting channels and inflates cost by frequent requirements that aid agencies use their own contractors. Above all, it deprives the government of the opportunity to learn by doing and to gain legitimacy by delivering services.

The MDGs constitute the terms of a compact between the poorest countries and the rest of the international community. Afghanistan needs full partnership and expanded cooperation with its neighbors, as well as with global donors. As this report shows, Afghanistan lies at the bottom of most indicators of human welfare and institutional capacity. Its people, however, have shown great capacity to survive and cope with hardships that might cause others to despair. In the past few years, under the harshest challenges, the Afghan people have re-established and started to reform their historic national institutions. Through this report, the Afghan government commits itself to build on this success, by developing the knowledge of its society and the policy framework to join the rest of humanity in aiming for these goals. Through its support for the Bonn Agreement, the pledges made in Tokyo and Berlin, and the provision of security by international forces, the international community has pledged itself to a partnership with the Afghan government and people in achieving these goals. This report highlights the need for greater effort from all to build on the successful foundations we have laid.



Can MDG Targets be met by Afghanistan?

Goals	Targets	Will the target be met?	State of policy environment?
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger	Target 1: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than US \$1 a day	Lack of data	Fair
	Target 2: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger	Lack of data	Fair
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education	Target 3: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling	Unlikely	Fair
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women	Target 4: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015	Unlikely	Weak but improving
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality	Target 5: Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-5 mortality rate	Lack of data	Fair
Goal 5: Improve maternal health	Target 6: Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio	Lack of data	Fair
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases	Target 7: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS	Lack of data	Fair
	Target 8: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases	Potentially	Fair
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability	Target 9: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources	Lack of data	Weak but improving
	Target 10: Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and sanitation	Potentially	Fair
	Target 11: By 2020 to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of 100 million slum dwellers	Lack of data	Fair
Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development	Target 12: Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system	Not applicable	Not applicable
	Target 13: Address the special needs of the Least Developed Countries	Not applicable	Not applicable
	Target 14: Address the special needs of landlocked developing countries and Small Island Developing States	Not applicable	Not applicable
	Target 15: Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term	Not applicable	Not applicable
	Target 16: Develop and implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth	Lack of data	Weak but improving
	Target 17: In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries	Lack of data	Weak but improving
	Target 18: In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communication	Potentially	Fair
<i>Assessment scale</i>		<i>Probably Potentially Unlikely Lack of data</i>	<i>Strong Fair Weak but improving Weak</i>

Note: assessment against the global MDG targets is faced with the difficulty of a lack of data for 1990 against which to measure achievements. Afghanistan, therefore, decided to "afghanise" the targets and the end date for their achievement to make them more meaningful for the country and be a vision for 2020.



Can the "Afghanised" MDG Targets be met?

Goals	Targets	Will the target be met?	State of policy environment?
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger	Target 1: The proportion of people whose income is less than US \$1 a day decreases by 3% per annum until the year 2020	Potentially	Fair
	Target 2: The proportion of people who suffer from hunger decreases by 5% per annum until the year 2020	Potentially	Fair
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education	Target 3: Ensure that, by 2020, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling	Potentially	Fair
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women	Target 4: Eliminate gender disparity in all levels of education no later than 2020	Potentially	Weak but improving
	Target 5: Reduce gender disparity in economic areas by 2020	Lack of data	Weak but improving
	Target 6: Increase female participation in elected and appointed bodies at all levels of governance to 30% by 2020	Potentially	Fair
	Target 7: Reduce gender disparity in access to justice by 50% by 2015 and completely (100%) by 2020	Lack of data	Weak but improving
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality	Target 8: Reduce by 50%, between 2003 and 2015, the under-5 mortality rate, and further reduce it to 1/3 of the 2003 level by 2020	Potentially	Fair
Goal 5: Improve maternal health	Target 9: Reduce by 50% between 2002 and 2015 the maternal mortality ratio, and further reduce the MMR to 25% of the 2002 level by 2020	Potentially	Fair
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases	Target 10: Have halted by 2020 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS	Lack of data	Fair
	Target 11: Have halted by 2020 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases	Potentially	Fair
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability	Target 12: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources	Lack of data	Weak but improving
	Target 13: Halve, by 2020, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and sanitation	Potentially	Fair
	Target 14: By 2020 to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of all slum dwellers	Lack of data	Fair
Goal 8: Develop global partnership for development	Target 15: Deal comprehensively and influence the provision of foreign aid through appropriate measures to enable Afghanistan develop sustainably in the long term	Potentially	Fair
	Target 16: Develop an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system includes a commitment to good governance, development and poverty reduction	Potentially	Fair
	Target 17: Develop and implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth	Lack of data	Weak but improving
	Target 18: In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries	Lack of data	Weak but improving
	Target 19: In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communication	Potentially	Fair
Goal 9: Enhance security	Target 20: Reform and professionalise the Afghan National Army by 2010	Probably	Fair
	Target 21: Reduce the misuse of weapons, and reduce the proportion of illegally held weapons by 2010	Potentially	Fair
	Target 22: Reform, restructure and professionalise the Afghan National Police by 2010	Potentially	Fair
	Target 23: All emplaced antipersonnel mines destroyed by 2013. All other explosive contaminants destroyed by 2015	Probably	Fair
	Target 24: All stockpiled antipersonnel mines destroyed by 2007. All other abandoned or unwanted explosive stocks destroyed by 2020	Potentially	Fair
	Target 25: To reduce the contribution of opium to the total (licit and illicit) GDP to less than 5% by 2015, and to less than 1% by 2020	Potentially	Fair
<i>Assessment scale</i>		<i>Probably Potentially Unlikely Lack of data</i>	<i>Strong Fair Weak but improving Weak</i>

Chapter 1:
THE MILLENNIUM
DEVELOPMENT
GOALS







THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS

The Millennium Declaration signed in September 2000 was an unprecedented commitment among world leaders to work together to ensure a more peaceful, prosperous and just world. Aiming to advance a global vision for improving the human condition in the areas of development and poverty, human rights and democracy, peace and security and protection of the environment, these commitments were translated into the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

Offering a guide for planning and implementing a broad range of development efforts, the MDGs represent the state's obligations towards every individual, whatever their circumstances, and are therefore also human rights obligations. They help to reinforce strategies to achieve other internationally agreed-upon objectives reached at world summits and global conferences during the 1990s. Building on the outcomes of these conferences, the MDGs provide useful benchmarks against which progress in meeting human rights, employment and social protection can be measured. In particular they

- ◆ set a powerful agenda for developing countries and the international community,
- ◆ provide a global benchmark for eradicating poverty, and
- ◆ set standards for monitoring progress made towards achieving this benchmark.

PURPOSE OF THE MDG REPORT

The MDG Report (MDGR) helps engage political leaders and top decision-makers, as well as to mobilise civil society, communities, the general public, parliamentarians and the media in a debate about human development.

The main purpose of the MDGR is two-fold: public information and social mobilisation. It is a tool for raising awareness, for advocacy, alliance building, and renewal of political commitments at the country level, as well as to build national capacity for monitoring and reporting on progress. The Report primarily addresses a national audience, and locates the global goals and targets within the national context, in an effort to make a real difference in terms of domestic policy reforms and hence action. In the context of Afghanistan's long history of conflict, and the huge gap between the human and financial resources needed and those available, both the state and the society will face immense challenges meeting the MDGs. It will be some time before Afghanistan will generate sufficient domestic resources to meet these challenges alone. The help of the international assistance community will, therefore, be crucial for Afghanistan to be able to meet the MDGs.

The MDG Report is also useful for building national capacity for monitoring and reporting on goals and targets and for generating a 'can do' atmosphere so that policy makers and other stakeholders are encouraged to act. Triggering action for accelerating MDG progress is the ultimate objective of MDGR. Given the relatively low awareness of the MDGs in Afghanistan, an MDG-awareness campaign (Box 1.1) is planned to build political will for achievement of the Goals, enable people to hold the Government accountable to the Millennium pledge, and facilitate people's contribution to achieving the MDGs. The MDGs offer an opportunity to build alliances that cut across sectors and issues, and create an opportunity for people at national and local levels to connect with a larger global movement.



Box 1.1: Raising Awareness of the MDGs in Afghanistan

In Afghanistan, one pre-requisite for a successful advocacy and awareness campaign is the design of a logo, which will ensure visual recognition in a country where only 34% of the population in the 15-24 year age group is literate. Simple messages need to be developed to communicate the content of the Afghanistan MDGs. These messages need to be easily understood by all people, regardless of their level of education and awareness. One key message is that the government and ordinary citizens both have obligations if the MDGs are to be met in Afghanistan. Civil society will have to play a critical role by doing its part in the collective effort.

Because of the generally low awareness of development strategies among local authorities in Afghanistan, the sensitisation process at sub-national level aims to target them at an early stage. Orientation workshops will be conducted at provincial level, to bring together all stakeholders in development (provincial and – maybe – district authorities, UN Agencies, NGOs, bilateral agencies, civil society, media, etc.) and in order to place the advocacy and awareness campaign within the provincial context. These workshops will attempt to come up with concrete action plans and resource requirements. Orientation workshops will be at the very core of the process of taking the MDGs to the people.

The advocacy and awareness campaign will be carried out simultaneously at the national and sub-national levels. The campaign will be launched through the broadcast of a short film on MDGs in Dari and Pashto, co-produced by the Government and the United Nations System on Radio-TV Afghanistan.

PROCESS OF THE MDG REPORT PREPARATION

Afghanistan was not among the 187 United Nations Member States represented at the Millennium Summit in September 2000, where the Millennium Declaration was adopted. The Government of Afghanistan endorsed the Declaration as well as the MDGs only in March 2004, by letter from President Karzai to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

The first step in the implementation of the MDGs in Afghanistan is the preparation of an MDG Report that takes stock of the current state on each Goal, reviews the available data, and analyses the issues that need to be addressed to meet the Goals. The President appointed his Senior Economic Advisor as the national focal point for MDGs, and the Economic Group as MDG Oversight Committee. Members of the Oversight Committee are the First Vice-President, the Senior Economic Advisor to the President, the National Security Advisor, and the Ministers of Commerce, Economy, Finance, Foreign Affairs, and Rural Rehabilitation and Development.


As part of the report preparation process, a series of consultations were organised by ARDS in June 2005 to build consensus on the MDGs, and to tailor and customise the global targets to the national circumstances and priorities. These consultations were thematically structured around each Goal and led by a Technical Working Group set up for each Goal. Representatives from related Ministries and government agencies, donors, NGOs, United Nations Agencies, the Chamber of Commerce and the Afghanistan Investment Support Agency participated in the consultations.

Recognising the capacity constraints, and acknowledging that for Afghanistan the 1990s was a “lost decade” for development, the Technical Working Groups recommended that the government extend the time period for meeting the MDG targets from 2015 to 2020 so as to have a more realistic chance. The government has thus adopted a “Vision 2020” for meeting most of the MDGs.

Furthermore, the process of preparing the MDGR helped define globally agreed upon objectives into country-specific targets to focus the debate on national development priorities. The global targets have been contextualised to Afghanistan's specific situation, and revised targets were set for many Goals to balance ambition with realism. These revised targets will help targets developed for intermediate years correspond more closely with the national planning framework.

Through the consultative process, Afghanistan has taken ownership of the MDGs, and made them part of the process that will extend to the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), for which they will serve as the overarching framework. In particular, Afghanistan's MDG report preparation process has served to

- ◆ Build national ownership and commitment towards the MDGs
- ◆ Integrate the MDG framework into the country's larger development agenda
- ◆ Localise and contextualise the Global MDG targets and indicators, and
- ◆ Initiate a broad-based consultative process that will be carried on during the preparation of the ANDS.



THE MDGs AND THE AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY – HOW DO THEY LINK UP?

The MDG Report outlines the nature, scale and scope of poverty in Afghanistan, sets benchmarks and identifies the key issues which need to be addressed to meet the locally adapted MDG targets that will be met over the next 10-15 years. As such, it provides the overarching framework for developing Afghanistan's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), which will identify the policies and programmes to meet the MDGs, while promoting growth, generating wealth and reducing poverty and vulnerability over the next five years.

As this report is published, the Government of Afghanistan is working on the Interim PRSP, or Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (I-ANDS), which will be presented at the London Conference on Afghanistan on 31 January - 1 February 2006. The full ANDS will be finalised by November 2006. The ANDS aims to consolidate peace and stability through just and democratic processes and institutions, and reduce poverty and achieve prosperity through broad-based and equitable economic growth. Essentially, the ANDS will lay the foundation for the achievement of Afghanistan's "Vision 2020," detailing the necessary policies and programmes over the next five years – a critical period in its post-conflict recovery.

The process of developing the ANDS will provide an opportunity for deeper consultation with Ministries, donors, civil society and the private sector around competing priorities. It will take advantage of more comprehensive poverty assessments such as the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) 2005 and the proposed Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) to develop more targeted policies and programmes.¹


The ANDS is organised around three "pillars":

- ◆ Security
- ◆ Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights
- ◆ Economic and Social Development

Each of the MDGs is reflected in one or more of the pillars and the ANDS will provide an opportunity to examine the linkages and trade-offs between the goals and the required strategies to meet them. In accordance with the vision of the ANDS, there will be strong emphasis on developing professional and effective institutions to implement the strategy.

The preparation of MDG Report has been used to support the process of setting national targets for the ANDS and to monitor progress. The MDGR thus provides important input to the formulation of the ANDS. Consistency between these two processes in the definition of long-term MDG targets and shorter-term ANDS targets is essential.

Chart 1.1: Link between MDGs and ANDS



Chapter 2:
AFGHANISATION OF
THE MDGs







AFGHANISATION OF THE MDGs

Afghanistan's recent conflict-ridden history, which had global ramifications, makes it a special case in international development. It also effectively lost out on development during the 23 years of conflict. Afghanistan was not present at the time of signing of the Millennium Declaration in September 2000. It signed the Millennium Declaration only in March 2004, thereby making it a late-entrant to global development efforts.

The MDGs agreed upon in 2000 set the benchmarks for monitoring progress from 1990. Starting in 2005, Afghanistan would have had only 10 years to achieve what other countries have 25 years to achieve. Thus it was important for Afghanistan to adapt the global timelines and targets for them to be meaningful in the Afghan context. One of the decisions taken by the government along with the Technical Working Groups was to at least give Afghanistan a time span of 15 years from the time of signing the global commitment for achieving the targets. The second decision was to revise the targets and indicators to make them more relevant to the Afghan context. This was an independent exercise conducted in the same spirit as the MDGs in that these are the development targets which Afghanistan aspires to attain. Finally, recognising the reality of Afghanistan, it was decided to add a 9th Goal on Enhancing Security.

The three sets of actions (i) extending the time period for attaining the targets to 2020; (ii) revising the global targets to make them more relevant to Afghanistan; and (iii) adding a 9th Goal on Enhancing Security have "Afghanised" the MDGs and allowed this to form Afghanistan's "Vision 2020". This exercise was independent of the subsequent exercise of assessing the prospect of Afghanistan meeting its MDG targets.


Afghanistan's Vision 2020

Afghanistan's "Vision 2020" collectively reflects Afghanistan's own aspirations for its people of reducing poverty and hunger, providing universal primary education, reducing child mortality, improving maternal health, combating diseases, promoting gender equality, ensuring environmental sustainability and enhancing personal security.

Development without security is unachievable, and security without development is meaningless

Security is a prime concern in Afghanistan and will remain so for at least the next 5 years. A public opinion survey in 2004 found that the majority of Afghans highlight security as the biggest problem facing Afghanistan (Chart 2.1).


Chart 2.1: Lack of security is the biggest problem facing Afghanistan today



Source: Asia Foundation (2004)

The Millennium Development Goals are about people and about improving their access to health, education and opportunities that improve their well-being. Security is important for the poor – as important as their livelihoods and their education.² Insecurity, manifested in the form of landmines, outbreaks of fighting or violent crime deters people from accessing basic services such as health clinics, and from sending their children to school.

Insecurity, arising from violent conflict, and poverty are closely interrelated. Empirical evidence shows that poorer countries are more likely to experience violent conflict, and conflict affected countries tend to experience higher levels of poverty.³ Violent conflict results in the destruction of economic and human capital. It places a heavy burden on the health services and on communities to treat and care for victims. A 1997 study in South Africa estimated that the cost of treating 1,000 gunshot victims was US \$6.5 million.⁴ For the landless poor, whose only real asset is their labour, the loss of a productive member of the household through death or injury can be devastating. Caring for someone



disabled or severely injured can further reduce the availability of household labour.

In addition, conflict increases military expenditures, which diverts resources from public and social spending. This is true both at the national level, in terms of government decisions about funds allocation, and at the local level, where residents might choose to invest in some form of private security, thus reducing resources available for other spending.

Continued insecurity reduces the trust which people place in the government and institutions of the State that are responsible for governance, justice and public safety. It may also contribute to poor-quality education, inadequate social service delivery, and high levels of brain-drain, thus undermining post-conflict recovery. This situation is worsened by weak governing institutions, which are often unable to implement policy and uphold the rule of law. The intersection of these factors increases both the depth of poverty and the risk of conflict being reignited. The security costs for domestic businesses also remain prohibitively high and prevent the creation of employment opportunities.

Many aspects of human security relate to food and nutrition security, health security, economic security, and environmental security. These are addressed by the other MDGs:

Food/nutrition security	MDG #1
Economic security	MDG #1
Women's security	MDG #3
Health security	MDG #4, 5, 6
Environmental security	MDG #7

The issue of personal security is of paramount importance in Afghanistan, which is emerging from decades of conflict that

militarised its polity, eroded the security framework of police, littered the landscape with landmines, UXOs and ERW, and now faces a daunting task of demobilisation and rehabilitation of ex-combatants, and development of a reliable judicial system.

Recognising the critical role of peace and security in achieving the other Goals in the Afghan environment, the government has added a 9th MDG on Enhancing Security to broadcast its commitment to providing personal security to its people, and its belief that development without security is unachievable, and security without development is meaningless. The limitations of this new Goal must be recognised, however, since the indicators under the new Goal must be objective and measurable, while security is also about perceptions and includes elements that can be hard to measure objectively.

"Afghanisation" of MDG targets and indicators does not mean 'lowering the bar'

The "Afghanisation" of the MDG targets and indicators has required revision of existing targets and indicators and/or inclusion of new targets and indicators as described in the accompanying Tables. But "Afghanisation" of the MDGs does not signify a 'lowering of the bar' to meet the targets. The "Afghanised" targets are as aspirational as the global targets and aim to push the government towards developing suitable policies for achieving them. Even after extending the time period to bring it on par with other countries for achieving the targets until 2020, Afghanistan gives itself only 15 years to achieve what are clearly extremely challenging targets given the low base. This further reflects Afghanistan's commitment to put its past behind it and move forward on the development path with confidence and optimism.



Chapter 2

Table 2.1: Revision of global MDG targets

Goal	Old target	Revised target	Rationale
#1. Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger	Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than US \$1 a day	The proportion of people whose income is less than US\$1 a day decreases by 3% per annum until the year 2020	Lack of availability of baseline data for 1990; Because of late start for achievement and tracking of the target
	Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger	The proportion of people who suffer from hunger decreases by 5% per annum until the year 2020	Lack of availability of baseline data for 1990; Because of late start for achievement and tracking of the target
#3. Promote gender equality and women's empowerment	Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015	Eliminate gender disparity in all levels of education no later than 2020	Because of late start for achievement and tracking of the target
#4. Reduce child mortality	Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-5 mortality rate	Reduce by 50%, between 2003 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate, and further reduce the USMR to 1/3 of the 2003 level by 2020	Lack of availability of baseline data for 1990; Because of late start for achievement and tracking of the target
#5. Improve maternal health	Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio	Reduce by 50%, between 2002 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio, and further reduce the MMR to 25% of the 2002 level by 2020	Lack of availability of baseline data for 1990; Because of late start for achievement and tracking of the target

Table 2.2: Addition of new targets

Goal	New target	Rationale
#3. Promote gender equality and women's empowerment	Reduce gender disparity in economic areas by 2020	Important to focus government policy on reducing gender disparities in economic areas
	Increase female participation in elected and appointed bodies at all levels of governance to 30% by 2020	Necessary to enhance women's political participation at all levels
	Reduce gender disparity in access to justice by 50% by 2015 and completely (100%) by 2020	Ensuring access to justice a key issue in women's empowerment
#9. Enhance security	Reform and professionalise the Afghan National Army by 2010	Necessary for enhancing security
	Reform, restructure and professionalise the Afghan National Police by 2010	Necessary for enhancing security
	Disarm, disband and reintegrate all non-statutory armed groups by end 2010	Necessary for enhancing security
	All emplaced antipersonnel mines destroyed by 2013. All other explosive contaminants destroyed by 2015	Necessary for enhancing security
	All stockpiled antipersonnel mines destroyed by 2007. All other abandoned or unwanted explosive stocks destroyed by 2020	Necessary for enhancing security
	Reduce the contribution of opium to the total economy to less than 5% by 2015, and to less than 1% by 2020	Necessary for enhancing security

Table 2.3: Revision of indicators

Goal	Old indicator	New indicator	Rationale
#3. Promote gender equality and women's empowerment	Share of women in wage employment in non-agricultural sector	Ratio of female to male government employees	Government is the largest employer and the revised indicator reflects the government's commitment to removing gender disparities in civil sector employment
	Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament	Proportion of seats held by women in national, provincial and district representative bodies	Better captures women's political participation at sub-national levels




Table 2.4: Addition of new indicators

Goal	New indicator	Rationale
#1. Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger.	Proportion of population below national poverty line.	To track progress of the new indicator
#3. Promote gender equality and women's empowerment	Adoption, review and amendment of legislation that protects the rights of women, particularly in employment, family rights, property and inheritance and in accordance with the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan	To track progress of the new indicator
	Adoption of legislation that criminalises all forms of gender and sexual-based violence	To track progress of the new indicator
#5. Improve maternal health	Reduce total fertility rate (births per woman) by 30% by 2020	Fertility rate strongly correlated to maternal mortality
	Proportion of women receiving professional ante-natal care	Quality of ante-natal care strongly correlated to maternal mortality
#6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases	HIV prevalence among blood donors	More relevant to the Afghan context
	% of population aged 15-49 with comprehensive correct knowledge of HIV/AIDS	More relevant to the Afghan context
	Proportion of blood samples screened for HIV/AIDS and STDs	More relevant to the Afghan context
	Proportion of women's unmet needs for family planning met	More relevant to the Afghan context
	Proportion of IV drug users in treatment by 2015	More relevant to the Afghan context



Chapter 3:
AFGHANISTAN:
OVERCOMING THE
LEGACY OF
CONFLICT







AFGHANISTAN: OVERCOMING THE LEGACY OF CONFLICT

Afghanistan has lost over two decades during which many countries, particularly in Asia, made substantial economic and social progress. Before the start of conflict in 1978, Afghanistan was one of the world's poorest countries, but one where, according to many observers, the government was slowly increasing its capabilities with support from the international community. Education had expanded rapidly since the mid-1950s. The outbreak of war in 1978-79 halted the country's first attempt to carry out a population census, which remained incomplete, and the period 1978-2001 was 'lost' to development: economic growth stagnated, people were displaced, and institutional structures eroded. This occurred during the period when most other countries made considerable progress in tackling poverty and in improving the lives of their people.

Successive wars sparked by both domestic conflicts and foreign intervention and interference killed hundreds of thousands, perhaps over a million Afghans, mostly civilians; forced about a third of the population into exile as refugees; devastated the villages where most of the population lived; and destroyed the country's educated class. Agricultural land and pastures were strewn with mines. Fragile systems for managing the country's scarce supplies of water were devastated. The few roads that this landlocked country had managed to build were ground up by military vehicles, while their bridges and culverts were destroyed in battles. Schools and clinics were burned down or converted into military bases, and more than one generation lost the chance for education. Male-headed families that had supported the gradual education and employment of women now confined them once again out of fear for their safety, and, in reaction to the loss of honor felt by the whole society, extremist movements emerged that reversed the modest advances Afghanistan's women had made.

As if these man-made disasters were not enough, during 1999-2002 Afghanistan also experienced one of the worst extended droughts in its history. During the period of conflict, when Afghanistan should have been developing, food production fell by one half instead. In a general atmosphere of violence and lawlessness,

narcotics traffickers looking for new sources of supply induced many Afghan cultivators to turn to the one high-value crop available to them—opium poppy—to borrow or earn the cash to rent land, build wells, and buy food.

Throughout this period government ceased to be an instrument for providing even modest services to people. Though loyal civil servants tried to perform their duties, government either became an instrument of control through fear and violence, or it simply disintegrated. The state lost the capacity to collect even basic information about the society it supposedly governed, so that much of this report is based on crude estimates or is awaiting better data for the formulation of more concrete benchmarks. Decades of war led to chronic political instability, fragmentation of society, militarisation of public life and the coexistence of competing power structures across the country. The repeated failure of successive governments led to the emergence of informal governance structures and to a self-reinforcing equilibrium of illicit economic activity, mainly, though not exclusively, the opium sector, thereby hindering revenue mobilisation, state-building, security, and ultimately competitiveness and growth.

In 2001, Afghanistan, with an average per capita GDP estimated at less than US \$200, was one of the poorest countries in the world; a recent estimate of the Human Development Index (HDI) for Afghanistan placed it second only to Sierra Leone -- measured from the bottom. The government inherited a moribund economy, with food production down to well under half its normal level, livestock herds decimated, orchards lost from lack of water, very little industry functioning, the country's infrastructure dilapidated, and its social services grossly inadequate (exacerbated by the retrogressive social policies of the Taliban). Inflation had eroded the value of Afghanistan's currency to almost nothing, and multiple currencies were circulating including large amounts of domestic and foreign currency in the hands of warlords.

At the end of 2001 some 25% of the Afghan population was forcibly displaced as refugees and categorised as internally displaced persons (IDPs). Since then, over four



Chapter 3

million refugees were able to return. The immediate concern of the Afghan government and international community was to address the basic needs of the people, ensure safe return and reintegration of the refugees, and begin reforming the political system and state institutions. Considerable progress has been achieved on many fronts during the last three years.

Grain production doubled and the GDP was estimated to have increased by some 50% by 2004, albeit from a very low base. While GDP growth is now nearer to 9% per annum, inflation has been contained by responsible fiscal and monetary policies. A new currency has been introduced—much faster than experts thought possible—and has remained stable. Girls and boys are in school in unprecedented numbers. Despite lacking meaningful enforcement power, the government has succeeded in mobilising a significant amount of domestic revenue, and reforms in customs and domestic taxation are underway.

Afghanistan is putting in place the most liberal trade and tariff regime in the region. There has been rapid development of telecommunications based on private investment in mobile phone technology. A major road rehabilitation programme is underway. On the security front disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration have now been largely completed, and new national army and police forces are well on their way to being established.

Under the Bonn Agreement, and with the support of the international community, the Government has already made significant gains in overcoming the legacy of war reflected in the organisation of the two *Loya Jirgas*, successful passage of the new Afghan constitution, the presidential election in September 2004, and the parliamentary elections now planned for September 2005.

These achievements reflect the government's commitment to provide an acceptable standard of living for all its people, and an assurance to the international community that it has nothing to fear from Afghanistan. In essence, the Government has attempted to move 'beyond conflict' by focusing on:

- ◆ Commitment to the peace process and the re-consolidation of the Afghan nation-state;
- ◆ Commitment and support for the state-building

process founded on a fair and efficient governance system;

- ◆ Constitutional support for social cohesion based on principles of equitable access for all;
- ◆ Participation of all stakeholders in decision-making processes, now planned through the national assembly and provincial council elections with consultation on the National Development Strategy; and,
- ◆ An economic growth model based on pro-poor growth and macroeconomic sustainability.


Numerous challenges remain. Even after three years of considerable investment, social and economic indicators continue to indicate that Afghanistan is a nation populated by a largely illiterate population, lacking in basic needs of education and health, food and shelter; the situation is especially alarming in rural areas. In the first decade of the 21st century, Afghanistan has an average life expectancy of less than 45 years, 20 out of every 100 children die before they are five, and only a third of the adults can read and write.

Security continues to remain a cause for worry. Without the presence of international military forces, the likelihood of a resumption of violence and the country's re-emergence as a haven for international terrorists remains high. But spending close to US \$12.5 billion per year to combat insecurity is an unsustainable burden for the international community.⁵ If a fraction of this total were invested in the reconstruction of national security institutions over the coming years, this commitment could be phased out.

Even though the past three years have witnessed a stunning transformation, the pace of reconstruction remains invisible to most Afghans and threatens to undermine the early political gains. In response to these challenges, the final act in overcoming the legacy of war is Afghanistan's commitment to achieving the Millennium Development Goals and the design of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy focused on overturning the key obstacles to growth and poverty and putting Afghanistan firmly and irreversibly on the development track.



Chapter 4:
ERADICATE EXTREME
POVERTY AND
HUNGER (Goal 1)







ERADICATE EXTREME POVERTY AND HUNGER (Goal 1)

- ◆ *Despite years of violent conflict and severe drought, the Afghan people have demonstrated remarkable resilience. Still, two in five Afghans face food shortages at different times during the year.*
- ◆ *The diet of a typical Afghan is heavily dependent upon cereals, primarily wheat. This leads to micronutrient deficiencies, with the result that two in five children under the age of five are malnourished.*
- ◆ *Afghans consume fewer calories, and the diversity of their diet declines, the farther they are from the market. In nine provinces in the northwest and the central highlands, high level of food insecurity is matched with low dietary diversity. In general, however, Afghanistan is similar to other South Asian countries with low food insecurity but high malnutrition.*
- ◆ *Agriculture and employment generation will have to form the core of economic growth to benefit the poor and reduce poverty and hunger in Afghanistan.*
- ◆ *Improved rural infrastructure is necessary for improving access to markets and services and to reduce hunger and malnutrition.*



CAN AFGHANISTAN MEET THE TARGETS FOR ERADICATING EXTREME POVERTY AND HUNGER?

	Will the target be met?	State of policy environment?
Target 1. The proportion of people whose income is less than US \$1 a day decreases by 3% per annum until the year 2020	Potentially	Fair
Target 2. The proportion of people who suffer from hunger decreases by 5% per annum until the year 2020	Potentially	Fair
Assessment scale	Probably Potentially Unlikely Lack of data	Strong Fair Weak but improving Weak

SUMMARY

- ◆ Poverty measurement in Afghanistan is severely constrained by lack of data. It is difficult to reliably estimate and track the Global MDG indicators for income or asset poverty, but available data suggest that about 20% of rural households are chronically food insecure and another 18% face seasonal food shortages. So, 20-40% of Afghans need varying levels of food assistance at different times of the year.
- ◆ Despite extensive damage to production and marketing systems as a result of war, and dramatic fluctuations in the annual rainfall, Afghans have been resourceful at maintaining a minimum level of calorie intake by relying on social networks, remittances, migration, and cultivation of drought-resistant cash crops (opium poppy) as a livelihood option.
- ◆ Food insecurity was estimated to be highest in Herat and Ghor in the west, Khost in the east, Jawzjan, Faryab, Samangan and Balkh in the north, and Bamyan in the central highlands. In contrast, the northeast had relatively lower levels of poverty. Poverty rates in areas without irrigation are likely to be higher, with 65% households being food insecure.
- ◆ Malnutrition is a serious problem for Afghanistan. Nearly 40% of the children under 3 are moderately or severely underweight, and more than 50% of children in that age group are moderately or severely stunted. There is little diversity in the Afghan diet. Poor dietary diversity leads to micronutrient deficiencies and to poor nutrition outcomes.
- ◆ Seventy-five percent of the typical rural Afghan diet consists of cereals, primarily wheat. In the provinces of Ghor, Herat, Laghman, Khost and Uruzgan 80-90% of households have very poor dietary diversity. Some of these provinces are doubly disadvantaged since a large number of households also suffer from food insufficiency.

Meeting the targets

- ◆ Afghanistan needs a secure environment and sustained growth over at least the next 10 years for a significant reduction in poverty and to achieve the MDG by 2020. Such growth would have to be accompanied by government policies assuring that the poorest and most vulnerable benefit from it. Much of this growth will have to come from (non-poppy) agriculture, which contributes more than 50% of the licit GDP and provides employment to two-thirds of the workforce.
- ◆ Investment in rural infrastructure will increase access to markets and provide impetus to the rural economy, thereby reducing hunger and malnutrition. A massive rural public works programme to build an all-weather rural road system and restore reliable irrigation will help generate rural employment and wages, connect the rural population to the market and create necessary conditions for poverty reduction.
- ◆ Government policies will have to target asset and employment creation for the most vulnerable in the rural areas. This will require micro-credit, education, and other policies.



GLOBAL MDG TARGETS AND INDICATORS

==> *Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than US \$1 a day*

- ◆ Proportion of population below US \$1 per day
- ◆ Poverty gap ratio (incidence x depth of poverty)
- ◆ Share of poorest quintile in national consumption

==> *Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger*

- ◆ Prevalence of underweight children under 5 years of age
- ◆ Proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy

AFGHANISTAN'S REVISED MDG TARGETS AND INDICATORS

==> *The proportion of people whose income is less than US \$1 a day decreases by 3% per annum until the year 2020*

- ◆ Proportion of population below US \$1 per day
- ◆ Proportion of population below national poverty line
- ◆ Poverty gap ratio (incidence x depth of poverty)
- ◆ Share of poorest quintile in national consumption

==> *The proportion of people who suffer from hunger decreases by 5% per annum until the year 2020*

- ◆ Prevalence of underweight children under 5 years of age
- ◆ Proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy

POVERTY, HUNGER AND MALNUTRITION IN AFGHANISTAN

For almost a quarter of a century, from 1978 to 2001, the people of Afghanistan endured an extraordinary sequence of events, which had a devastating impact on their economy, society and country. These events led to a near total collapse of its physical and economic infrastructure and institutions, to human rights abuses, a decline in social sector investment, and to pervasive destitution in a country that had always been poor but had always retained a degree of human dignity.

Poverty is a bundle of deprivations⁶ and in Afghanistan it is characterised by a lack of opportunities and capabilities, limited access to services, insecurity, powerlessness, a lack of voice and representation, and extreme vulnerability to shocks. On the HDI, Afghanistan is ranked close to the bottom, alongside such African countries as Burkina Faso, Burundi, Mali, Niger and Sierra Leone.

Poverty is about people and numbers often mask the human suffering and deprivation that are its manifestations. But numbers are needed to inform public spending decisions, understand the impact of policies on economic growth and poverty reduction, and track progress on achievement of mutually agreed targets.

Poverty measurement in Afghanistan is severely constrained by lack of data


In the absence of a population census, household income and expenditure surveys, a national poverty line, and

suitable baseline data, it is difficult to reliably estimate and track the global MDG indicators for income poverty. Periodic estimates of food security⁷ have been used as a proxy for poverty headcount ratio since food insecure households are likely to be poor as well. But there are no estimates of urban food insecurity, and without these it is not possible to get national-level estimates. The NRVA 2005, which is currently underway will considerably improve the database. As additional data on income and asset poverty and the urban population becomes available, the government will adjust baselines and benchmarks. Until then, poverty in Afghanistan will refer to the extent of food poverty. Once household consumption data is available, a national poverty line will be calculated and used for within-country planning, as it can accommodate national criteria for poverty line calculation, and does not use the purchasing power parity data, which is weak for Afghanistan.

About two in five people in rural Afghanistan suffer from chronic or transient food shortages

Around 20% of rural households⁸ or about 3.2 million Afghans do not consume sufficient calories to meet their dietary energy requirements. These food insecure households are unlikely to meet their basic food requirements at any time during the year, are chronically food-insecure and likely to be very poor. Another 18%, or about 3 million households, can be considered as seasonally food insecure and vulnerable. So, a total of 38% of rural households (or about 6 million rural Afghans) face chronic or transient food shortages and require varying levels of food assistance.

On average, Afghanistan faces an aggregate food deficit of





500-600 thousand metric tonnes (MT) of cereals per year, an amount that is made up by commercial imports of 300-400 thousand MT of wheat flour from neighbouring countries and about 100,000 MT delivered as food aid. Aggregate imports of food, of course, do not indicate whether the most vulnerable groups have sufficient assets to purchase it. While food aid reaches many remote rural villages, insecurity and lack of infrastructure prevents some from being reached.

Despite food shortages, the people of Afghanistan are not on the brink of starvation, nor have they been in recent years

Even though suffering has been widespread and multi-dimensional, the degree of hunger and food shortage among the Afghan people is not bad as one might expect. During 2001-04, the proportion of total households unable to meet their dietary energy requirements has remained within the narrow band of 20-27%.⁹ This suggests that the resilience of a majority of Afghans, coupled with timely and targeted food aid interventions in the most food insecure areas and during the most difficult periods, ensured and maintained a minimum level of calorie intake despite conflict and year to year fluctuations in rainfall. However, millions are still chronically or seasonally food insecure.

The agricultural production systems of Afghanistan are dependent on fragile systems of water management and care for the soil, whose productivity is generally low. The country's large livestock population also depends on access to pastures and patterns of seasonal migration disrupted by war and drought. Confronted with the disastrous destruction of this production system, however, the rural population has proved resilient, deploying complex survival strategies. These have included the emigration of over a third of the population to countries where they could receive international aid; emigrating to urban areas or to countries in the region where family members could remit part of their income through informal banking systems; joining political and military groups that gained foreign

support; relying on the strong social networks known as "qawms" within rural communities (Box 4.1); and cultivating opium poppy in conjunction with subsistence crops. Although malnutrition and hunger were reported, these did not lead to catastrophic nutritional outcomes. Nonetheless, some of the coping strategies that evolved during the decades of armed conflict and lawlessness, such as narcotics production, must be transformed gradually to provide the basis for a healthy economy.


In contrast to the North East, a historically impoverished and isolated area that has become a major opium producing region, food insecurity is higher in the West (Herat and Ghor), Khost in the East, Jawzjan, Faryab, Samangan and Balkh in the North, and Bamyan in the central highlands. None of these areas have produced much opium, and farmers' alternatives were therefore constrained, compared with the major producing areas in the northeast (Badakhshan), east (Nangarhar), and Southwest (Kandahar-Helmand), where incomes from the opium economy financed food purchases. In the unirrigated areas nearly two-thirds of all households face seasonal food shortages. Some of this may be because of the limited contribution of agriculture to household income, which varies with location from 41% in Farah to 89% in Kunduz and Baghlan (Map 4.1).

Box 4.1: Afghan social networks

Afghans survive because people do not operate only as individuals; they also operate as members of networks. You look after those in your network; a salary does not feed your immediate family, it supports an entire group of people to whom you have obligations. Those in work share with those without, remittances from those lucky enough to have gone overseas keep entire villages from starvation.

Source: Johnson and Leslie (2004)

Map 4.1: Agricultural contribution to total rural income



Areas that are mainly or completely unirrigated, or dependent on grazing land rank the lowest with respect to availability of water and land, access to education and health services, options for non-agricultural income generation, reliability of access to markets, fertility of land, and revenues/yields from cash crops, including opium poppy.

Lack of diversity in the Afghan diet and an over-reliance on wheat leads to micronutrient deficiency disorders


Even though calorie intakes are not catastrophically low (people by and large get the required calories: only about 1 in 5 do not, and this proportion has not changed much even through the drought years), nutritional outcomes¹⁰ are very poor.

Nearly 40% of children under the age of three are moderately or severely underweight, with 12% severely underweight. The 2004 National Micronutrient Survey (NMS) collected data on underweight children for the 6-35 month cohort but not on the global MDG indicator for under five year olds. This may slightly over-estimate the proportion of underweight children, as it is in the post-weaning period when new-borns are most vulnerable. There is little or no difference between male and female children for this indicator.

The general nutrition status of the Afghan population is poor largely as a result of the lack of diversity in the diet and over-reliance on the staple food wheat (Chart 4.1). Essential nutrients and minerals from other food sources form a very small proportion of the average diet of the rural Afghan.

Heavy reliance on wheat, especially among the poorer groups, is one of the underlying causes of micronutrient deficiencies, which leads to poor nutritional outcomes. More than 80% of the sampled households in Khost, Laghman and Uruzgan, and more than 90% in Ghor and Herat provinces exhibited poor dietary diversity in all food groups. On average, nearly 60% of the households nationally had poor dietary diversity in all food groups.

Chart 4.1: Cereals are the largest source of dietary energy for the typical rural Afghan



Source: Compiled from NRVA 2003


There is an extremely high prevalence of chronic malnutrition, as indicated by the incidence of stunting (45-52%), and widespread occurrence of micronutrient deficiency diseases among children less than 5 years of age. Mothers, infants less than six months old, as well as young children of 6-24 months are at particular risk.¹¹ Iodine deficiency disorders are widespread, particularly in mountainous provinces in the north, the northwest and the central highlands. Clinical cases of goiter have been reported in the 20-70% range in different populations.¹²

Even though access to iodised salt has increased across the country from less than 1% in 2001-2002,¹³ the limited localised data for other micronutrient deficiencies show a prevalence of 50-70% anemia (shortage of iron) among young children and mothers and up to 20% night blindness among women, resulting from a shortage of vitamin A.¹⁴ In addition, over the past few years, outbreaks of scurvy due to shortage of vitamin C have occurred repeatedly in the winter months, with severe clinical signs observed in up to 10% of the population in some remote districts, such as Faryab.¹⁵

Dietary diversity and caloric intake decline with increasing distance from markets


Dietary diversity does not seem to vary significantly between income groups in the same area, indicating that geographical distance to markets is an important determinant of the level of food diversity in the rural Afghan diet (Charts 4.2 and 4.3). Surprisingly, the diversity has been found to be low even after a good harvest (as in 2003), when one would expect greater purchasing power and higher availability of diverse foods. This may suggest a general lack of awareness of the benefits of a balanced diet. The apparent anomaly (in Chart 4.3) of households nearest to the market eating a less diverse diet may be because the sample covered a set of very poor households living near a market centre but without enough purchasing power to buy a more expensive variety of foods and basic grains.

In nine provinces high levels of food insecurity are matched with low dietary diversity (Quadrant IV, Chart 4.4). Most of them are in the northwest and the central highlands, where access to markets, international aid, and the opium economy is limited. These doubly disadvantaged households require immediate attention.




Chapter 4

Chart 4.2: The further Afghans are from the market, the fewer calories they consume...




Source: Compiled from NRVA 2003

Chart 4.3: ... and the less diversity there is in their diet



Source: Compiled from NRVA 2003

Chart 4.4: Nine provinces exhibit both low dietary diversity and high food insecurity



Source: Compiled from NRVA 2003

- Quadrant I - High food security, low dietary diversity
- Quadrant II - High food security, high dietary diversity
- Quadrant III - Low food security, high dietary diversity
- Quadrant IV - Low food security, low dietary diversity



INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON ON POVERTY AND HUNGER

Afghanistan has low food insecurity but high malnutrition, similar to many South Asian countries

Though cross-country comparisons require careful interpretation, and especially since Afghanistan's data on food security is only from a rural sample, Table 4.1 compares Afghanistan with four categories of countries: neighbours in the region; other countries in South Asia, other landlocked countries in Asia; and other post-conflict countries.

Even though Afghanistan has better food security than some post-conflict countries, such as Sudan and Cambodia,

the malnutrition figures are just as bad. So Afghanistan, with relatively low levels of food energy insufficiency, exhibits very poor nutrition outcomes. This suggests that Afghanistan suffers from a high level of malnutrition in spite of a relatively moderate level of food insufficiency, and needs a strong policy focus to combat the problem of malnutrition.


The data show that improvements in food security do not necessarily lead to a decrease in malnutrition. Uzbekistan, Mongolia, Sri Lanka, and, though just barely, Pakistan, all have less malnutrition than Afghanistan, though they have similar levels of food insecurity. Nepal, with less food insecurity, nonetheless has a higher rate of malnutrition.

Table 4.1: Poverty, malnutrition and food security: international comparisons

	Poverty				Malnutrition		Food Security	
	Head count ratio				Prevalence of underweight children (under 5-years) (%)		Proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption (%)	
	US \$ 1 PPP		National poverty ratio		Base year (1989-94)	Latest year (2000-03)	Base year (1990)	Latest year (2003)
	Base year (1990)	Latest year (2003)	Base year (1987-97)	Latest year (1995-2004)	Base year (1989-94)	Latest year (2000-03)	Base year (1990)	Latest year (2003)
Afghanistan	53 ¹	n.a.	49.3 ²	41	n.a.	20.4 ³
Neighbours:								
Iran	2	4	4
Pakistan	48	13	28.6	32.6	40	35	24	20
Tajikistan	21	61
Turkmenistan	...	12	12	13	9
Uzbekistan	...	17	...	27.5	...	8	8	26
South Asia:								
Bangladesh	36	36	51.0	49.8	68	52	35	30
Bhutan
India	42	35	36.0	28.6	53	...	25	21
Maldives
Nepal	...	39	42.0	48	20	17
Pakistan	48	13	28.6	32.6	40	35	24	20
Sri Lanka	4	8	20.0	25.0	38	29	28	22
Landlocked countries in Asia:								
Bhutan
Kyrgyzstan	...	2	52.0	47.6	...	6	21	6
Laos	8	...	45.0	38.6	40	40	29	22
Mongolia	...	27	36.3	35.6	12	13	34	28
Nepal	...	39	42.0	48	20	17
Post-conflict countries:								
Bosnia and Herzegovina	19.5	4	9	8
Cambodia	34	...	36.1	35.9	...	45	43	33
Haiti	65.0	...	27	17	65	47
Mozambique	69.4	66	47
Sierra Leone	82.8	70.2	29	27	46	50
Sudan	34	41	32	27
Timor-Leste


Source: All data from World Bank (2005a) unless otherwise stated

- 1 Average estimated by ADB for the period 1980-90 (<http://www.adb.org/Statistics/Poverty/AFG.asp>)
- 2 For 1997 from World Development Indicators Database, 2005, World Bank
- 3 Of the rural population only, from NRVA 2003



Chapter 4


Chart 4.5: Similar to many South Asian countries, Afghanistan has low food insecurity but high malnutrition



Note: Latest year data is used where it is available for both dietary energy consumption and malnutrition. For India, the base year data is used.

Source: World Bank (2005a)

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Chapter 4

- Quadrant I - High food security, low malnutrition
- Quadrant II - High food security, high malnutrition
- Quadrant III - Low food security, high malnutrition
- Quadrant IV - Low food security, low malnutrition

POVERTY AND HUNGER: REVISED MDG TARGETS FOR AFGHANISTAN

The results of NRVA 2005 and of the planned HIES will help set baseline values for three indicators to monitor poverty. Some

targets could be set, nonetheless, and it was decided to use the annual rate of decline of poverty and hunger as a target.

AFGHANISTAN'S REVISED MDG TARGETS, INDICATORS AND BASELINES

Target	Indicator	Baseline year	Data source	Baseline value	Targets	
					2015	2020
Target 1. The proportion of people whose income is less than US \$1 a day decreases by 3% per annum until the year 2020	1. Proportion of population below us \$1 per day (1993 PPP values)	2005	NRVA	To be determined		
	2. Poverty gap ratio	2005	NRVA	To be determined		
	3. Share of poorest quintile in national consumption	2005	NRVA	To be determined		
Target 2. The proportion of people who suffer from hunger decreases by 5% per annum until the year 2020	4. Prevalence of underweight children under 5 years of age	2002	UNICEF /CDC	41%	15%	
	5. Proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption	2003	NRVA	20%	11%	9%

MEETING THE TARGETS

Sustained pro-poor economic growth will be crucial for poverty reduction in Afghanistan

Poverty is multidimensional; therefore, poverty reduction efforts have to be multi-targeted. The policies have to straddle different disciplines and must include economic, social, political and institutional instruments. The institutional environment in which the poor derive their livelihoods, and the socio-political factors that restrict their access to resources, can influence the relationship between economic growth and the level and extent of poverty.

Notwithstanding such diversity, economic growth will be necessary if not sufficient for poverty reduction. Sustaining the present high level of growth is a key challenge confronting Afghanistan. Post-conflict countries usually enjoy relatively high levels of growth for a few years after the end of the conflict. Between the fourth and seventh years the country becomes better able to utilise assistance for growth. The delay in the start of sustained recovery reflects the initial low capacity of the country to absorb and use aid and the time required to stabilise the political situation and build or strengthen institutions needed for economic activity.¹⁷ In Afghanistan this period will occur approximately in 2005-08, during which growth might be two percentage points above average, all other things being equal.¹⁸

Even though the level of economic growth is important, it is the pattern of growth that is crucial. Afghanistan's annual per capita income is still below US \$200, and nearly two out of every five rural households suffer from hunger at some period during the year. To achieve this MDG, Afghanistan must ensure both that growth occurs and that it is pro-poor, i.e. that the fruits of economic growth benefit the poor more than the non-poor. What is needed is growth that increases the assets of the poor sufficiently for them to produce or purchase enough food and other basic goods to assure them food security and better nutrition. There is an immediate need to develop policies that will strengthen the capacity of the poor and the vulnerable to diversify their sources of income, making it possible for them to draw on a combination of farm and non-farm activities to move out of poverty and accumulate sustaining wealth.

The fact that participating in the narcotics economy has been a major coping strategy of the poor must be taken into account. No major opium producing province is found in quadrant IV (high food insecurity and low dietary diversity) of Chart 4.4. The government of Afghanistan is committed to reducing and eliminating the opium economy, which constitutes a major obstacle to security, the rule of law, the growth of legitimate economic opportunities, and the economic cooperation of Afghanistan with its neighbors. But in order to simultaneously meet the goal of reducing

and ultimately eliminating poverty and hunger, Afghanistan must move carefully and gradually to assure that counter-narcotics efforts do not undermine the livelihoods of vulnerable groups. This requires a counter-narcotics strategy that targets trafficking and refining first (actual production accounts for less than half the value of the overall opium economy), while developing comprehensive alternative rural livelihoods to enable rural families to shift their survival strategies out of the illicit economy over a period of years.


Agriculture, rural development and employment generation must form the core of that growth

More than 50% of licit GDP is directly linked to non-poppy agriculture, which provides employment to nearly two-thirds of the workforce. Internationally, there are virtually no examples of mass poverty reduction over the last 300 years that did not start with sharp rises in employment and self-employment income due to higher agricultural productivity, especially in small family farms. The poor derive almost all their income from employment (hired or self-employed), 45-60% of it in agriculture, and devote well over half their consumption to food.¹⁹ So agriculture and related rural development will be central to any poverty reduction strategy.

To initiate major reductions in poverty, Afghanistan needs higher employment, higher unskilled wage-rates, and/or more command over low-cost food. Productivity growth in small farms alone usually has the potential to raise all three. In most countries this subsequently leads to further poverty reduction via cash-cropping, rural non-farm work, and shifts to urban employment and income growth.

Improvements in cereal productivity alone are unlikely to increase rural income. Afghanistan does not have a comparative advantage in growing wheat, but could have comparative advantages for high-value crops such as raisins, walnuts, almonds, pistachios and other horticultural crops. The real added value to the rural economy will come from investing in comprehensive rural infrastructure that will make the production and marketing of high-value crops possible. This infrastructure will have to include credit, debt relief, water management systems, road building, energy and power, agricultural extension, and measures to assure access to all of these to the most vulnerable and to protect their security from predatory power holders.

The welfare of the poor depends on many aspects of public action other than direct investment in agriculture and economic infrastructure. It also depends on building the human and social capital of the rural population, including schools, clinics and civil order. Private enterprise is just as necessary as public support. Nevertheless, poverty reduction does depend, in part, on an adequate share of support for comprehensive pro-poor rural development



within the portions of public spending and international aid that can be allocated among economic sectors. To assist Afghanistan, international donors will have to ignore the global trend of declining aid to agriculture (Box 4.2) and provide technical and financial support to strengthen agriculture and rural productive systems.


A massive rural public works programme to rapidly expand the all weather rural road system, power supplies, and reliable irrigation will also help generate rural employment and wages and contribute to interim poverty reduction until such time as the licit rural economy starts to grow.

Box 4.2: The global trend of declining aid to agriculture needs to be reversed in Afghanistan

For agriculture, including forestry and fisheries, the proportion of sectorally allocable aid disbursed fell from 20.2% in 1987-89 to 12.5% in 1996-98. The proportion of OECD bilateral aid disbursed to agriculture fell from 12.4% in 1982-83 to 3.7% in 2002-03. Total aid disbursed to agriculture in 1990 prices fell from US \$9.2 billion in 1980-84 (17% of all aid) to \$3.9 bn (6%) in 2000. And total aid committed to agriculture under FAO's "broad" definition fell from 16.3 to 9.1% of aid in 1988-99, and, under the "narrow" definition, from 9.1 to 4.5%.

- Lipton (2005)

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Chapter 4

Provision of alternative livelihoods is essential to reduce poppy cultivation

A key challenge for the government is to reduce poppy cultivation. At present around one-third to 40% of total (drug inclusive) national income is generated by the production, processing, and trafficking of opium. The narcotics economy is linked with the non-drug economy in many ways. Rural credit and access to land and water has become strongly linked to poppy production, as the prices of factors of production are linked to opium prices. Opium poppy cultivation has become a major strategy for coping with the growing burden of rural debt and landlessness, as well as with food shortfalls. The cash earned through opium sales finances a significant part of the country's food imports. While much of the foreign exchange earned through export of narcotics is invested outside Afghanistan, some of it finances imports of luxury goods and both urban and rural construction, a significant source of employment and of customs duties for the government. Because of the footloose nature of the drug industry, attempts to lower

production through coercion before investment in alternative livelihoods could increase food insecurity and cause poppy cultivation to migrate in response to temporary price increases rather than to decrease.

The best alternative to poppy cultivation is to raise licit rural incomes, both farm and non-farm, especially of the poor. One option is to promote perennial horticultural crops such as raisins, walnuts, almonds, pistachios, and botanicals for essential oils, which fall short of poppy cultivation in direct job creation, but come close to competing on a per hectare basis in income generation.²⁰


An improved rural road network is necessary for improving access to markets and services and also to reduce hunger and malnutrition

Many of the chronically food insecure households are female-headed, have disabled household members and large numbers of children, and live in remote rural areas with little or no access to irrigation, markets or other services.²¹ The revised MDG target for reducing the proportion of population below a minimum level of dietary energy is unlikely to be met unless the constraining factors are addressed. Improving rural infrastructure through rural roads would result in an improvement in calorie intake, but more importantly, it would increase the diversity of the diet for many rural Afghans. Areas that have the poorest dietary diversity could be highlighted for rural road construction on a priority basis.

The government has initiated a number of activities under the Livelihood and Social Protection Public Investment Programme (LSPIP) for employment generation through public works, expansion of credit to women, and support for existing coping mechanisms in the community for assisting the vulnerable and the disabled. The overall goal of the LSPIP is to enhance human security and promote poverty reduction by empowering and supporting the poorest and most vulnerable people in Afghanistan.

So while economic growth is essential, it is not sufficient. Achieving significant reductions in poverty requires a strong focus on agriculture and rural employment generation, and promotion of alternative livelihoods and rural infrastructure development. Such a growth pattern would allow social protection for the chronically poor households.

Chapter 5:
ACHIEVE UNIVERSAL
PRIMARY EDUCATION
(GOAL 2)








ACHIEVE UNIVERSAL PRIMARY EDUCATION (GOAL 2)

- ◆ *Afghanistan has the highest proportion of school-age children in the world: about 1 in every 5 Afghans is a school-age child.*
- ◆ *Boys are much more likely to complete primary education than girls in Afghanistan: for every girl who completes her education, there are almost 2 boys*
- ◆ *Despite the great success of the back-to-school campaign, half of the school-age children are still out of school.*
- ◆ *Fewer than 1 in 5 Afghan women are literate, as opposed to 1 in 2 men. Adolescent Afghans are more likely to be literate than Afghans of older age groups.*
- ◆ *Girls do not catch up: the gap in primary enrolment of girls as compared to boys remains constant. While boys over 12 years of age, who missed out on primary school at the appropriate age because of war and turmoil, catch up on their education now, most of the over 12 year-old girls are lost to education.*
- ◆ *Increasing access to education and the quality of education simultaneously is key.*



CAN AFGHANISTAN MEET THE TARGET FOR ACHIEVING UNIVERSAL PRIMARY EDUCATION?

	Will the target be met?	State of policy environment?
Target 3. Ensure that, by 2020, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling	Potentially	Fair
Assessment scale	Probably Potentially Unlikely Lack of data	Strong Fair Weak but improving Weak

SUMMARY

- ◆ About 1 in 5 Afghans is a school-age child. This is the highest proportion in the world.
- ◆ Despite the success of the return to school campaign between 2002 and 2005, the growth in the school population for boys has been slightly faster than that for girls. Girls have, with their enrolment increasing at the present pace, little prospect of catching up.
- ◆ There is currently no data available in Afghanistan for net enrolment. The school attendance rate is used as proxy indicator. For 2003 the net attendance was 54%, or 2.3 million students. The increase in net enrolment between 1997 and 2003 is 50% higher in the urban areas than in the rural areas.
- ◆ In spite of the rapid increases in gross enrolment and net attendance rates, in 2003 still almost 2 million children, twice as many girls as boys, were out of school.
- ◆ Most of the out-of-school children lived in the south and central parts of the country. But there is a steady change as the number of provinces with few children attending school declines.
- ◆ Though major progress was achieved in the past years and in spite of a beneficial policy environment, it will be challenging for Afghanistan to meet its Millennium Development Goal to achieve universal primary education for both girls and boys by 2020. This assessment takes into consideration the combination of one of the world's lowest participation rates (especially for girls) and the highest proportion of school age population. The task is daunting, but potentially achievable.
- ◆ The overall primary completion rate is estimated as 45%. For boys it is 56% and for girls 30%. This means that of all the boys and girls who enrolled in Grade 1, slightly more than half the boys and only about one-third girls complete 5 years of education in the allotted time.
- ◆ The literacy rate of 15 to 24-year old Afghans is 34%, with 50% for men and only 18% for women. The younger an Afghan is, the more likely he/she is able to read and to write. There are regional variations, with particularly low literacy rates of the population in a belt of provinces reaching from the north of the country toward the south.

Meeting the targets

- ◆ With its immense school age population and its still very low school attendance rate of girls, one of Afghanistan's most critical challenges is to enrol all children in school. Girls' enrolment must be particularly focused on.
- ◆ It is critical that access to education and the quality of education are addressed simultaneously. Both are key for rebuilding the education sector and gaining the confidence of parents that the system can deliver, and that it is worth it to send their children to school.
- ◆ The Afghan government will not be able to bear the necessary investment alone. Support from the international community, both financial and technical, is needed for some time to come. However, although the need for rehabilitation and construction of educational institutions is vast, it is critical that investment does not exceed the state's capacity for meeting recurrent costs. Afghanistan, with the help of the international community, must develop efficient and sustainable financing strategies for the education sector, encouraging contributions from the communities, NGOs, the private sector, students, and employers.



GLOBAL MDG TARGET AND INDICATORS

==> *Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling*

- ◆ Net enrolment ratio in primary education
- ◆ Proportion of pupils starting Grade 1 who reach grade 5
- ◆ Literacy rate of 15- to 24-year olds

AFGHANISTAN'S REVISED MDG TARGET AND INDICATORS

==> *Ensure that, by 2020, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling*

- ◆ Net enrolment ratio in primary education
- ◆ Proportion of pupils starting Grade 1 who reach grade 5
- ◆ Literacy rate of 15- to 24-year olds

Providing quality education is critical for sustained poverty alleviation and economic growth in Afghanistan. Achieving 100% primary education in Afghanistan by 2020 may be an ambitious task, however, given the steep decline in enrolment for much of the twenty years prior to 2002 because of war, and the restrictive policies of the Taliban.

NET ENROLMENT RATIO IN PRIMARY EDUCATION

The available gross enrolment data does not include the age of students; therefore net enrolment estimates cannot be made. The gross enrolment data are all based on Rapid Assessment of Learning Spaces (RALS), a UNICEF tool that has been used in 2002, 2003 and 2004 to provide information for planning the UNICEF back-to-school campaign. There are no plans to repeat this until 2006.

Afghanistan has the highest proportion of school-age children in the world


Since 2002, there has been a significant return to school. Afghanistan has the largest school age population proportion in the world, with the 7-12 year olds making up 19.6% of the population.²² This includes older children, particularly boys, who were not able to complete primary school at the appropriate age because of war and insecurity. Hence currently the gross enrolment rate for primary schoolboys is greater than 100%. This is a welcome increase from 1999 when the gross enrolment rate for boys was 53% and for girls an abysmally low 5%.

Measuring the net school attendance rate is a good proxy indicator for net enrolment. It counts children who are attending school in the survey period. It is a rate, not a ratio, because the total age group is found in the same survey and the number cannot exceed 100. According to the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) conducted by the Central Statistics Office (CSO) and UNICEF in 2003, the overall school attendance rate in Afghanistan doubled from 27% to 54% between 1997 and 2002. Girls' attendance rate tripled from 13% to 40% in the same period. For 2003 the net attendance was 54%, or 2.3 million students. The improvements were in the first place achieved in the urban areas. The increase in net enrolment is 50% higher in the urban areas. Until data on the net enrolment rate is available, the net attendance rate will be used as a baseline for monitoring this indicator in Afghanistan.


Despite the great success of the back-to-school campaign, half of the school-age children are still out of school

In spite of the rapid increases in enrolment rates, in 2003 almost 2 million children, 1.25 million girls and 700,000 boys, were not yet in school.²³ This means that almost twice as many girls than boys are still out of school. There are also clear regional variations in school enrolment (Map 5.1), with significantly worse statistics for rural areas. Most of the out-of-school children are found in the southern and central parts of the country. But there is a steady change as the number of provinces with few or no children attending school declines.

Map 5.1: Change in % of children (7-13 yrs) NOT enrolled in school (2002-03)



Source: MICS 2003



Chapter 5

The MICS 2003 survey found that Afghan parents' major reasons for not enrolling their children in school (multiple statements were possible) included geographic distance of the school (37.2%); inadequacy of facility (25.8%); the fact that there are no separate schools for girls and boys (22%); the fact that children are needed for domestic chores (17.2%); a belief that schooling is not necessary (15%); the fact that children are needed to contribute to the household income (7.1%); and the teachers' gender (6.4%).

The current status indicates that great strides have been made since the fall of the Taliban, however much more needs to be done. In this regard, achieving 100% primary education depends on the level and nature of investment in the sector. Changing parents' attitudes is an important factor, and needs to be taken into account.

Girls do not catch up: the gap in primary enrolment of girls as compared to boys remains constant

Despite the success of the return to school, the growth in the school population for boys has been slightly faster than that for girls, and therefore there is little prospect of catching up in terms of primary school education for girls. Data show that the girl/boy ratio remains constant across years and urban versus rural locations.

In 2003, 80% of the girls had the correct school age as compared with only 63% for the boys. As expected, the older children at school are almost all boys. For most girls school is over after age 12, with frequent under-age marriages taking place.²⁴

PROPORTION OF PUPILS STARTING GRADE 1 WHO REACH GRADE 5

More boys are likely to complete primary education than girls in Afghanistan: for every 1 girl that completes her education, there are almost 2 boys

There are severe data limitations to estimating the proportion of pupils starting Grade 1 who reach Grade 5. This is because there is no cohort data and there has been a large inflow of returnee children into the primary school system since 2002. An indirect way is used to get an estimated value. The overall primary completion rate is estimated as 45%. For boys it is 56% and for girls 30%. This means that of all the boys and girls who enrolled in Grade 1, slightly more than half the boys and only about one-third girls complete 5 years of education in the allotted time.


LITERACY RATE OF 15- TO 24-YEAR-OLDS

In 2003, almost one-third (33.6%) of young Afghans between 15 and 24 years of age are literate. This includes an 18% literacy rate for young women and a 50% rate for young men.

Young Afghans are more likely to be literate than the older generations

Afghan literacy levels are closely related to age (Chart 5.1). There is improvement in the literacy rates of adolescent Afghans as compared to older groups. This improvement, however, is much more pronounced for men than for women. The impact of improved school attendance that was witnessed since 2002 does not yet have an impact on literacy rates.


Chart 5.1: Younger Afghans are more likely to be literate than older ones



Source: MICS 2003

There are significant regional differences in literacy in Afghanistan (Map 5.2). Most of the eleven provinces exhibiting over 80% illiteracy are part of a belt, which reaches from Jawzjan and Faryab in the north via Ghor and Badghis in central Afghanistan to Uruzgan, Zabul and Helmand in the south. The provinces in the south with high illiteracy rates also had poor female participation rates in the presidential elections.

Map 5.2: Regional variation in illiteracy rates



Source: MICS 2003



INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON

Afghanistan has data only for gross primary enrolment ratio while the indicator monitoring is net enrolment ratio. Hence, Afghanistan's data cannot be directly compared with other countries, as these are looking at net enrolment ratios. Still,

when looking at data from all comparison groups, even the post-conflict countries, it becomes obvious how long a way Afghanistan still has to go in education (Table 5.1). For the indicators on primary completion rate and literacy rate of 15 to 24-year olds, Afghanistan has by far the worst values of all featured countries.

Table 5.1: Primary education: international comparisons

	Net primary enrolment ratio		Primary completion rate (%)		Literacy rate of 15- to 24-year olds (%)	
	Base year (1990)	Latest year (2001)	Base year (1990)	Latest year (2000)	Base year (1990)	Latest year (2003)
Afghanistan	...	50.4*	...	45.0	...	34.0
Neighbours:						
Iran	92.3	86.5	-	93.7	86.3	-
Pakistan	34.7	59.1	-	-	47.4	-
Tajikistan	76.7	97.2	-	-	99.8	-
Turkmenistan	-	-	-	-	-	-
Uzbekistan	78.2	-	-	-	99.6	-
South Asia:						
Bangladesh	71.2	86.6	-	65.5	42.0	-
Bhutan	-	-	-	91.0	-	-
India	-	82.8	-	59.0	64.3	-
Maldives	86.7	96.2	-	-	98.1	-
Nepal	81.2	70.5	-	77.8	46.6	-
Pakistan	34.7	59.1	-	-	47.4	-
Sri Lanka	89.9	99.8	94.4	64.8	95.1	-
Landlocked countries in Asia:						
Bhutan	-	-	-	91.0	-	-
Kyrgyzstan	92.3	90.0	-	-	-	-
Laos	62.6	82.8	-	62.3	70.1	-
Mongolia	90.1	86.6	-	-	98.9	-
Nepal	81.2	70.5	-	77.8	46.6	-
Post-conflict countries:						
Bosnia and Herzegovina	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cambodia	66.6	86.2	-	70.4	73.5	-
Haiti	22.1	-	-	-	54.8	-
Mozambique	44.1	59.7	32.9	51.9	48.8	-
Sierra Leone	41.0	-	-	-	-	-
Sudan	43.3	-	51.9	-	65.0	-
Timor-Leste	-	-	-	-	-	-

* Gross enrolment rate so strictly not comparable with others

Source: UN Statistical Division

AFGHANISTAN'S REVISED MDG TARGET, INDICATORS AND BASELINES

Target	Indicator	Baseline year	Data source	Baseline value	Targets
Target 3. Ensure that, by 2020, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling	Net enrolment ratio in primary education	2003	UNICEF /CSO MICS	54%	100%
	Proportion of pupils starting Grade 1 who reach Grade 5	2003	UNICEF /CSO MICS	45%	100%
	Literacy rate of 15- to 24-year-olds	2003	UNICEF HQ MICS	34%	100%



A census survey of all primary schools in Afghanistan is currently under preparation with plans to set up a student monitoring system that would obviate the need to repeat RALS in 2006. If this survey and monitoring system are successfully implemented, statistics on primary school education will dramatically improve in Afghanistan.²⁵

MEETING THE TARGET

Education helps to form the very foundations of peace, nation building, the reduction of poverty, and economic growth. [...] The future of Afghanistan depends on what, and how, we invest today in its education sector. As a long-term investment in Afghanistan's social and economic development, success in education cannot be measured only by the numbers of children enrolled in school. Afghan children must also be equipped with well-developed skills in literacy, numeracy, problem-solving, critical thinking, team-building, and communications to face the needs of an expanding peacetime economy. Quality education, featuring these characteristics, is thus among the most critical investments in Afghanistan – an investment that must start today and continues in the years to come.

Source: World Bank (2005c)

Increasing access to and the quality of education is key

Considering the reasons of parents not to send their children to school, the most important thing is to increase access to schools, through, *inter alia*:

- ◆ Providing acceptable learning spaces. In the absence of permanent structures, providing temporary or alternative learning spaces close to home could significantly increase the enrolment of children in schools.²⁶
- ◆ Employing and training more primary school teachers (up to the Ministry of Education's target student/teacher ratio of 40/1), especially women teachers in rural areas, to enhance children's – and especially girls' – access.²⁷ Also, teachers must be given

the opportunity to learn new skills as part of a coherent long-term strategy.

- ◆ Seeking support from communities, where necessary cultivating their interest in and enthusiasm about education, and building their capacity to participate in and support school activities.²⁸ This would contribute much to changing parents' attitudes.


Besides access to education, enhancing the quality of education is key. Currently, available input indicators (teachers' backgrounds, curriculum, textbook quality and availability, status of physical learning space, time on task, etc.) indicate poor quality of education. The lessons learned from other post-conflict countries suggest that an early focus on the quality of education – not only access – is key for rebuilding the education sector and gaining the confidence of parents that the system can deliver.²⁹

Achieving universal primary education in Afghanistan by 2020 is an ambitious, if not over-ambitious task despite a supportive fair policy environment. The estimated annual per-student cost for both primary and secondary education, calculated recently by the World Bank, starts at US \$51 in 2003, increases to US \$65 in 2010 and goes up to US \$87 in 2015.

One of the underlying assumptions of the simulation is that existing schools will be rehabilitated by 2007.³⁰ It is obvious that the Afghan state will not be able to bear the necessary investments alone. Support from the international community, both financial and technical, will be needed for some time to come. However, although the need for rehabilitation and construction of educational institutions is vast, it is critical that investments do not exceed the state's capacity for meeting recurrent costs. Afghanistan, with the help of the international community, must develop efficient and sustainable financing strategies for the education sector, encouraging contributions from the communities, NGOs, the private sector, students, and employers.³¹



Chapter 6:
PROMOTE GENDER
EQUALITY AND
EMPOWER WOMEN
(Goal 3)








PROMOTE GENDER EQUALITY AND EMPOWER WOMEN (Goal 3)

- ◆ *Stories abound of the systematic discrimination against women and girls in Afghanistan, which starts early in life and has long been perpetuated through cultural systems, particularly during the years of Taliban rule. The disparity between males and females starts early in life, at primary school, and continues in secondary and higher education.*
- ◆ *Violence against women is pervasive in Afghanistan, a silent epidemic that has its roots in the low status of women, and is compounded by long exposure to hostilities and conflict. It is a major obstacle in achieving gender equality. It needs to be overcome through multiple efforts, including the rule of law, awareness creation, and changing cultural practices and mindsets. Above all it requires political commitment and leadership at the highest levels, to take actions which will actively improve the rights of women.*
- ◆ *Despite the recent upsurge in primary school enrolment of boys and girls, in order to bring about parity in their enrolment, for every 3 boys enrolled 5 girls will have to be enrolled. The significant catch-up required means that there will have to be focused and targeted efforts to reduce the disparities in education.*
- ◆ *By allocating two seats from each province in the Parliament to women, Afghanistan has taken steps to bring about gender parity in the representation of women in decision-making. This needs to be followed by similar steps at the sub-national level and the effective participation of women in decision-making at all levels.*
- ◆ *With a rate of between 9-18%, Afghanistan has among the lowest female literacy internationally.*



CAN AFGHANISTAN MEET THE TARGETS FOR PROMOTING GENDER EQUALITY AND WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT?

	Will the target be met?	State of policy environment?
Target 4: Eliminate gender disparity in primary education no later than 2020	Potentially	Weak but improving
Target 5: Reduce gender disparity in economic areas by 2020	Potentially	Weak but improving
Target 6: Increase female participation in elected and appointed bodies at all levels of governance to 30% by 2020	Potentially	Fair
Target 7: Reduce gender disparity in access to justice by 50% by 2015 and completely (100%) by 2020	Lack of data	Weak but improving
Assessment scale	Probably Potentially Unlikely Lack of data	Strong Fair Weak but improving Weak

SUMMARY

- ◆ Regional comparisons of primary school completion rates for girls and progress toward the MDG goal, showed Afghanistan to be the only country out of 16 ranked as “seriously off track”. To have any prospect of meeting the MDG target of eliminating gender disparity in education, Afghanistan will have to ensure that 5 girls are enrolled at the primary stage for every 3 boys, and 3 girls for every boy at the secondary stage.
- ◆ Amongst its neighbouring countries, landlocked Asian and post conflict countries, Afghanistan has the lowest percentage of female literacy.
- ◆ Women in Afghanistan are more likely than men to be engaged in various types of informal activities, such as unpaid family work, and small-scale economic activities that are difficult to measure, and that offer less enjoyment of employment rights and benefits.
- ◆ Violence against women has been pervasive in Afghanistan and is attributable to low status of women, combined with long exposure to hostilities and conflict.
- ◆ Afghanistan has almost the highest percentage of seats allocated for women in the national parliament. This will have little impact on enhancing women's political participation unless women can also contribute to local-level decision-making at the sub-national levels. At present, women are poorly represented at the sub-national level and in local governance bodies.

Meeting the targets

- ◆ There is a need for accelerated efforts for meeting the MDG target on eliminating gender discrimination at all levels of education.
- ◆ Afghanistan could address women's participation in wage labour through women's access to economic opportunities and education, and ensuring that women's rights are protected.
- ◆ Mainstreaming a gender perspective in all goals is key to guaranteeing that women's empowerment and equality is being promoted.
- ◆ Protection of the rights of women in employment, family rights, property and inheritance rights are keys to reducing disparity in access to justice.
- ◆ To improve women's access to justice, there is need, inter alia, for:
 - ◆ Criminal justice system and police reforms that recognise the rights of women
 - ◆ National awareness of violence against women and within judicial institutions
 - ◆ Capacity building among law enforcement bodies on the handling of reported violence against women
 - ◆ Awareness on the mechanisms to legally address violence against women



GLOBAL MDG TARGET AND INDICATORS

==> *Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015*

- ◆ Ratio of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education
- ◆ Ratio of literate females to males (15- to 24-year-olds)
- ◆ Share of women in wage employment in non-agricultural sector
- ◆ Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament

AFGHANISTAN'S REVISED MDG TARGETS AND INDICATORS

==> *Eliminate gender disparity in all levels of education no later than 2020*

- ◆ Ratio of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education
- ◆ Ratio of literate females to males (15- to 24-year-olds)

==> *Reduce gender disparity in economic areas by 2020*

- ◆ Ratio of female to male Government employees

==> *Increase female participation in elected bodies at all levels of governance to 30% by 2020*

- ◆ Proportion of seats held by women in national, provincial and district representative bodies

==> *Reduce gender disparity in access to justice by 50% by 2015 and completely (100%) by 2020*

- ◆ Adoption, review and amendment of legislation that protects the rights of women, particularly in employment, family rights, property and inheritance and in accordance with the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
- ◆ Adoption of legislation that criminalizes all forms of gender and sexual-based violence


Gender equality is at the heart of reaching the MDGs, and gender-disaggregated data are essential for monitoring MDG progress. Goal 3 explicitly refers to gender equality and the empowerment of women but indicators for all other goals must be disaggregated by sex so as to report key dimensions of gender inequalities. Gender discrimination does not occur indiscriminately; it is often mediated through a multitude of channels (e.g. education, socio-economic status, rural/urban location, ethnicity). The challenge is to highlight the most important dimension of gender equality across all goals and to illustrate these at a glance, using graphical presentations of data, maps and other tools to support the message in the text.

CURRENT STATUS OF GENDER EQUALITY IN AFGHANISTAN

In many ways, being an Afghan woman is one of the most difficult things in the world, and Afghanistan's low ranking on the HDI scale is symptomatic of the poor status of its women. The traditional dichotomy of the public and private spheres³² in Afghan life has always had a limiting effect on women's activities, but the period of Taliban control was perhaps the most draconian manifestation of a truly phenomenal repression of women, particularly in the urban areas.³³ Even though stories and evidence abound describing the systematic discrimination against women, none can really do justice to the reality of what the women experienced.

The context of gender relations in Afghanistan must be viewed through the prism of traditional, intensely patriarchal Afghan culture. The primary social unit in Afghanistan is the family, extending to kin group, and tribe. Most Afghan women do not want to be marginalized from their family unit, and the integrity of the family must be respected, particularly when targeting specific groups for assistance, especially women. Afghan culture is based on the code of honour, which is largely manifested in the behaviour of one's 'women'. The foundation of gender roles is the division of space into the public/community (men's) space and the private/domestic (women's) space, with corresponding roles and responsibilities for each.³⁴ Many men and women, particularly in the rural areas, are satisfied with this arrangement in relation to one another.

The inevitable advent of globalisation, however, with its influx of large amounts of aid and the opening up of markets and media, forces Afghanistan to join the international community. It is to be expected that these traditional gender roles will change as a result. Decades of conflict have also modified traditional gender roles, as women have been forced to take on unaccustomed roles as heads of household because of the death, displacement, or departure for combat of their customary male providers. These women have managed lands, properties, agricultural activities and families. To see Afghan women as only victims grossly underestimates their growth and contribution.



The causes of gender inequity are complex everywhere, but they are especially so in Afghanistan, due to a combination of factors that include poverty, the effects of war, local customs, and various cultural traditions. Emancipation of women has been controversial in Afghanistan's history. Reforms initiated by King Amanullah in the 1920s and in the communist revolution in the late 1970s provoked a backlash from traditionalist elements in society. Traditional Afghan "cultural" institutions, which some see as the main source of the present Afghan problems, have on the other hand preserved the family and community structure surprisingly intact in spite of more than two decades of dislocation and war. The considerable degree of social cohesion achieved as a result is a major asset for Afghanistan. This illustrates both the strategic importance attached to the gender issue and its complexity in the Afghan context.

Serious impediments to "gender mainstreaming" remain in the areas of national reconstruction and development, arising in part from limited awareness of how to bring about change. Gender mainstreaming is not an end in itself but a means to achieving the goal of women's empowerment and gender equality. Gender mainstreaming is both a technical and political process that requires shifts in organisational culture and ways of thinking as well as in organisational structures and their resource allocation decisions.

Recent increase in girls' enrolment is insufficient to overcome traditional discrimination

Regional comparisons of primary school completion rates and progress toward the MDG goal showed Afghanistan to be the only country out of 16 ranked as seriously off track³⁵ in large part as a consequence of past Taliban edicts that seriously reduced school enrolment for boys and eliminated it for girls. In 1990 the gross primary enrolment ratio for boys was 35% and for girls 19%. By 1995, the ratios had risen to 63% for boys and 32% for girls, but by 1999, under the Taliban, they again had declined to 40-60% and 3-6% respectively.³⁶ Following the back-to-school campaign in 2003, school enrolment increased to more than 4 million students, with net enrolment reaching 40% for girls and 67% for boys.

The data to assess gender disparity in education in Afghanistan comes from three sources and is fairly consistent across the sources. The MICS 2003 estimate remains the best estimate and is used as a baseline for the indicator. But all data show a similar trend of increasing disparities moving from primary to secondary to tertiary education (Table 6.1). Thus, in spite of the recent upsurge in enrolment, there are still only about 60 girls to 100 boys at the primary level and 33 girls to 100 boys at the secondary level. At the tertiary level, it drops further, to only 21 girls for every 100 boys.

The massive increases in enrolment rates are very welcome, and have increased almost at a uniform rate for both boys and girls (Chart 6.1). Thus, gender difference in enrolment


rates is still not converging, and considerable distance still needs to be covered to eliminate gender disparities. To have any prospect of meeting the MDG target of eliminating gender disparity in education, Afghanistan will have to ensure that 5 girls are enrolled at the primary stage for every 3 boys, and 3 girls for every boy at the secondary stage. This is unlikely to happen quickly, but the policy directions to reach the targets are clear.

Table 6.1: Increasing gender disparity with increase in education level

Data source	Ratio of girls to boys enrolled		
	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary
EMIS 2002*	0.46	No data	No data
EMIS 2003*	0.50	0.29	No data
NRVA 2003	0.45	0.29	0.12
MICS 2003	0.60	0.33	0.21
EMIS 2004*	0.52	0.32	No data

*Source: Education Management Information System (EMIS), Ministry of Education

Chart 6.1: Gender disparity refuses to narrow in spite of increase in gross primary school enrolment rate



Source: RALS, various years

Lack of disaggregated data for the baseline year does not assist in indicating how much progress has been achieved to date, or the rate of progress. Total gross enrolment ratio in primary education, however, has increased over 50% in the past 14 years in Afghanistan. Afghanistan has, by far, the lowest ratio rate of female to male enrolment in primary and secondary school, amongst neighbouring, South Asian, landlocked in Asia and post-conflict countries. There is a gap of 18% between Afghanistan and the second lowest rate in countries sampled in Sierra Leone with 70% ratio (Table 6.2).

NRVA 2003 estimates show a 19% ratio of literate females to males in the 15-24 age-group. This survey covers only rural Afghanistan and is not nationally representative. The MICS 2003 estimate shows 36 literate females per 100 literate



males amongst the same age-group, which is very high (Table 6.3). Although the MICS 2003 urban sample is overweighted, the survey still remains more representative than NRVA 2003 and provides the best estimate available. The difference between both estimates can, in general, be

attributed to better access to facilities and educational opportunities in urban areas than in rural. It does seem, however, that urbanisation benefits women by increasing their access to educational opportunities.

Table 6.2: **Gender differences: international comparisons**

	Ratio of female to male enrolments in primary and secondary school %		Paid work in non-agricultural sector % (c)	Youth literacy rate (15-24 year olds)				Women in Parliament (d)	
	Base year (1990-91)	Latest year (a) (2002-3)		Male %	Female %	Base year (1990)	Latest year (2002)	Base year (1990)	Latest year (2004)
Afghanistan	-	52	17 (1)		50 (2)		18 (2)	4	25(e)
Neighbours									
Iran	85	96	---	92	96	81	92	2	4
Pakistan		71	8.2	63		31		10	22
Tajikistan		88	50.4	100	100 (3)	100	100 (3)		13
Turkmenistan			---					26	26
Uzbekistan	94	98	41.8	100	100	100	100		7
South Asia									
Bangladesh	77	107 (b)	25.0	51	58	33	41	10	2
Bhutan			---						
India	70	80	17.5	73	80	54	65	5	9
Maldives			---						
Nepal	57	83	---	67	78	27	46	6	6
Pakistan		71	8.2	63		31		10	22
Sri Lanka	102	103 (b)	44.6	96	97	94	97	5	4
Landlocked Countries in Asia									
Bhutan			---						
Lao PDR	75	83	---	70	77	43	55	6	23
Mongolia	109 (b)	110 (b)	47.4	99	97	99	98	25	11
Nepal	57	83	---	67	78	27	46	6	6
Post-Conflict Countries									
Bosnia and Herzegovina			---		100		100		17
Cambodia	73	85	53.2	81	185	66	76		10
Haiti	95		---	56	66	54	67		4
Mozambique	73	79	---	66	77	32	49		30
Sierra Leone	67	70	---						15
Sudan	77	86	14.7	76	84	54	74		10
Timor-Leste			---						

Sources: All data from WDI (2005) unless otherwise stated

- (1) From UNCTAD (2002)
 (2) From UNICEF/CSO MICS (2003)
 (3) National estimates based on census data

- Notes:**
- a Break in series between 1997 and 1998 due to change from International Standard Classification of Education 1976 (ISCED76) to ISCED97
 - b Ratio rate above 100% is due to older girls, not falling under official corresponding school age for primary and secondary education, enrolling in primary and secondary school too
 - c Women's paid work in non-agricultural sector refers to women wage employees in the non-agricultural sector as a percentage of total non-agricultural employment
 - d Percentage of parliamentary seats in a single or lower chamber occupied by women
 - e Provision made for a minimum of 25% (1 per province = 34 seats) in the National Constitution 2004, and likely to be met after the September 2005 Parliamentary Elections




Table 6.3: Literate females to males (15- to 24-year-olds)

Group	MICS* 2003	NRVA** 2003
Female	18%	9%
Male	50%	47%
Ratio	34%	19%

Sources: * Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2003
** National Risk & Vulnerability Assessment 2003

Economic Disparity

Available data suggests that female employment makes up only 17% of the total employment in the non-agricultural sector. Women's participation in broader economic sphere is constantly challenged through social perceptions and socio-cultural conditions. It is also challenged through the lack of existing legislation protecting women's rights, particularly in employment, equal pay, and property and inheritance rights. Self-employment of Afghan women has also been limited, probably for the lack of access to credit and bank loans and facilities, for which data is scarce. Wage employment in the broader economic sphere offers more security and access to other economic benefits.

Gender responsive economic growth measured by the increase in the number of women in employment, in the government for example, could address women's share in wage employment and works towards achieving gender equality.

The percentage share of women in wage employment in non-agricultural sectors remains low in developing countries in general and data seems to be missing for most countries. Amongst those countries for which data is available, however, women's share in non-agricultural wage employment in Afghanistan is almost double that of Pakistan, which had the lowest percentage amongst all countries (Table 6.2).

Disparity in Political Participation

Afghanistan has enshrined gender equality in the Constitution (Article 22) to ensure that women have a minimum representation of 25% in the National Assembly (Articles 83 and 84). The Government has provided significant leadership roles for women, including the appointment of three women ministers, 14% women representatives in the first *Loya Jirga*, and women's participation in the constitutional drafting commission, the Judicial Commission, and the Electoral Commission. The Constitutional Loya Jirga in December 2003 provided for equality between women and men before the law, and allocated to women, on average, two seats per province in the Lower House and half of the one-third members of the Upper House, to be appointed by the President. This will secure for women a total minimum share in the National Assembly of at least 25%. Constitutional provisions are likely to be met in the parliamentary elections due in September 2005.

Women are already exercising their right to participate in local and national level politics, including through the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) where women are at par with men to elect (and contest) members of the Community Development Councils. The NSP and the scheduled elections are two new mechanisms that constitute channels for women's participation in democratic governance.

Although the ongoing voter registration was hampered by lack of security and resources (disproportionately affecting women), the percentage of female registration has been higher than expected. Women comprise 32% of the total number of voters registered for national elections so far, but there is great regional variation. In Kandahar, for instance, women comprised less than 10% of registered voters.


The September 2005 parliamentary elections represent a significant test of Afghan women's ability to exercise their political rights: many women say they expect to face threats from commanders and their supporters if they run for parliament.³⁷

Regionally, Afghanistan has among the highest percentages of seats allocated for women in the national parliament. Among post-conflict countries, Mozambique has the highest percentage, 30%, almost double that of its baseline year of 1990 (Table 6.2). While encouraging in and of itself, increased parliamentary representation will do little to increase women's overall political participation unless women can contribute to local-level decision-making. At present, women are poorly represented at the sub-national level and in local governance bodies.

REVISED TARGETS AND INDICATORS

Eliminating gender inequalities requires that men and women enjoy equal rights, equal economic opportunities, equal use of productive assets, control over time of assets and representation in decision making bodies, including those on the local level.

Decades of war have placed Afghanistan behind many of its neighbouring countries, and in the region. To meet Goal 3, Afghanistan will need to add new indicators to capture other important dimensions of gender equality and also reflect local realities. Indicators such as violence against women in all its forms, access to economic opportunities, use of productive assets and resources, wider and equal representation in elected and appointed governance bodies (including those on the local level), access to justice, security and vulnerability to conflict, have to be addressed. In fact, this issue is not limited to Afghanistan, but has emerged as a common concern among many developing countries such as Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Ghana.³⁸



AFGHANISTAN'S REVISED MDG TARGETS, INDICATORS AND BASELINES

Target	Indicator	Baseline year	Data source	Baseline value	Targets	
					2015	2020
Target 4. Eliminate gender disparity in all levels of education no later than 2020	Ratio of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education	2003	MICS	P 0.6 S 0.33 T 0.21	1.0 at all levels	
	Ratio of literate females to males (15- to 24-year-olds)	2003	MICS	0.34	1.0	
Target 5. Reduce gender disparity in economic areas by 2020	Ratio of female to male Government employees			Central 29% Provincial 17%	1:2	1:1
Target 6. Increase female participation in elected and appointed bodies at all levels of governance to 30% by 2020	Proportion of seats held by women in national, provincial and district representative bodies	2004	Constitution	Minimum of 25% for National Assembly		30%
Target 7. Reduce gender disparity in access to justice by 50% by 2015 and completely (100%) by 2020	Adoption, review and amendment of legislation that protects the rights of women, particularly in employment, family rights, property and inheritance and in accordance with the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan	NA	NA	NA		
	Adoption of legislation that criminalizes all forms of gender and sexual-based violence	NA	NA	NA		

Disparity in Economic Areas

In Afghanistan, the civil service is one of the largest providers of employment.³⁹ Although private sector development creates employment for both women and men, measuring the ratio of female to male government employees would be an indicator of the increase in economic opportunities for women.

Female participation in elected and appointed bodies at all levels to at least 30%

The United Nations Economic and Social Council endorsed having 30% women in decision-making positions by 1995. Although the target has not been met in most countries, 30% remains the minimum representative percentage women are advocating for. While a lot more needs to be done for enhancing women's political participation, the inclusion of adequate numbers of women in decision-making bodies is a necessary first step.

Access to Justice and Addressing Violence Against Women

"The rule of law is the woman's best ally."

- Yakin Erturk, UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its causes and consequences

Although the Constitution has enshrined gender equality before the law (Article 22), socio-economic and cultural contexts limit women's access to justice. Adoption, review

and amendment of legislation that protects the right of women should address disparity in access to justice, and ensure that international standards for the protection of women's rights are incorporated. The protection of the rights of women in employment, family rights, property and inheritance rights, would greatly contribute to increased equality and a reduction in disparity in access to justice.

Violence against women is a widespread problem in Afghanistan. To combat this problem, putting in place suitable legislation is a necessary first step. But adoption of legislation that criminalizes all forms of gender and sexual-based violence poses a real challenge in the absence of data and awareness of what constitutes violence against women. Violence against women has been pervasive in Afghanistan (Box 6.1) and is attributable to low status of women, combined with long exposure to hostilities and conflict. It is an obstacle to achieving gender equality, and a silent epidemic that takes many shapes, such as forced marriages, domestic violence, honour killings, kidnappings, harassment and intimidation, many of which are blamed on the women themselves.



Box 6.1: Violence against women in Afghanistan

- ◆ According to the 2004 Amnesty International Report, there are many reports of kidnapping and raping of girls by men belonging to armed groups in Afghanistan.
- ◆ In most cases, the men then force the girls to marry them.
- ◆ Amnesty International says that many cases of violence against women are not reported because victims' complaints about the people involved causes them to face retaliatory actions, punishment or other violent reactions.
- ◆ This leads to less investigation and study on violence against women or no judicial inquiry into it.
- ◆ In the meantime, judges' decisions are also subordinate to traditional structures of society.
- ◆ Amnesty International says that in almost all parts of Afghanistan, particularly in the western parts of the country such as Herat province, hundreds of women commit self-burning in order to avoid domestic violence.

- Source: UNIFEM (2005)

Increasing women's access to justice would require reform of the criminal justice system, the police system and recruitment of women into the police force. Judicial institutions and their implementing bodies will need to be improved. National awareness about violence against women and within judicial institutions is essential for the improvement of women's access to justice. Capacity building of law enforcement bodies to handle reported violence against women, as well as awareness on the mechanisms to legally address them also need to be tackled.

MEETING THE TARGETS

Meeting targets on gender equality will require additional system wide changes, beginning with a huge increase in the number of female teachers and schools girls can attend. In the 13 provinces surveyed, currently less than 30% of all teachers are women⁴⁰, while over 70% of households identified the unavailability of schools as the main reason for girls not attending them.⁴¹

Decades of conflict have severely affected women's potential in participating in the broader economic sphere beyond agricultural and informal sectors such as service industry, governmental and private sectors. High percentage of illiteracy, poor health, widespread poverty and lack of access to justice are major challenges that need to be addressed for achieving the MDG.

The major challenge is in increasing the share of women's representation to include all elected and appointed bodies of governance. Security can also be perceived as a challenge to women's participation since women have been on the receiving end of threats and intimidations either through exercising their rights to run or their right to vote (Box 6.2).

Box 6.2: Women's right to vote

A recent survey found that 87% of Afghans said that women would need to obtain permission from their husband or head of the family to vote. Eighteen percent of the men surveyed said they would not let their wives vote at all, and in the south, almost 1 in 4 men surveyed felt that way. However, Community Development Council elections data from five provinces (Bamyan, Farah, Herat, Kandahar and Parwan) indicate that 76% of voting-age women cast ballots in those contests and that, of the total delegates elected, 38% were women.⁴²

- Asia Foundation (2004)

Enhancing security and the rule of law creates an enabling environment to support women's enjoyment of rights and access to justice. Cultural and social barriers however pose a major threat to this enjoyment of rights, and will take longer to transform.


Adopting new legislation is necessary but insufficient to protect women's rights and increase their access to justice. Implementation of the laws has always been the major challenge, for which suitable mechanisms need to be in place. However, coping with a lack of awareness of the issues and limited capacity within the law enforcement system to address the problems, combined with the low status of women in Afghanistan, the lack of reporting mechanisms and the perception that some forms of violence against women are culturally accepted and therefore do not constitute a violation are serious challenges.

To overcome gender disparity in education, there is a need to address interconnected factors contributing to the existing disparity between females and males in education. Suggested actions include:

- ◆ Conduct activities to eradicate stereotypical gender discrimination in education.
- ◆ Revise school curricula
- ◆ Adoption of legislation protecting the rights of girls and women to education
- ◆ Address conditions keeping girls out of school
- ◆ Establish vocational training initiatives
- ◆ Monitor the access to formal and non-formal education
- ◆ Support the establishment of pre-primary schooling institutions

Promoting equality in economic life and economic opportunity and full integration of women in the economy in all sectors is critical for the developmental process. Suggested actions include:

- ◆ Promote the employability of women in various sectors
- ◆ Conduct awareness raising and training activities
- ◆ Establish sex-disaggregated statistical units
- ◆ Gender mainstreaming in economic programmes



- ◆ Adoption of legislation protecting the rights of women in employment
- ◆ Monitor progress in employment and women's access to credit


The overall outcome of the constitutional provisions made in the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan has been very positive. Suggested actions to meet the target of increasing participation in elected and appointed bodies at all levels of governance to 30% by 2020 include:

- ◆ Promote awareness on gender discrimination
- ◆ Assess the influence of electoral systems, legislations and quota systems
- ◆ Monitor progress in composition of governance bodies, including local governance bodies


Reducing gender disparities and improving women's access to justice and their full enjoyment of social rights is crucial for the overall developmental process. Suggested actions include:

- ◆ Adoption of legislation protecting the rights of women
- ◆ Monitoring of implementation and progress
- ◆ Mainstream gender equality
- ◆ Carry out national awareness raising and training activities
- ◆ Establish mechanisms for the collection of data on Violence Against Women

The attainment of the MDG on gender equality is largely dependent upon institutional transformation – in the rules and regulations that specify how resources are allocated and how tasks, responsibilities and values assigned in society. Such institutional transformation is also an essential element for achieving and sustaining gender equality and women's empowerment across the country. The government has the responsibility to create an enabling environment that will allow women and men to share in the development responsibilities, process and benefits on equal terms.



Chapter 7:
REDUCE CHILD
MORTALITY
(Goal 4)







REDUCE CHILD MORTALITY (Goal 4)

- ◆ *One out of every five Afghan children dies before its fifth birthday. In only three other countries in the world are the chances of survival of under-five children worse than in Afghanistan.*
- ◆ *Most deaths among children under five years of age in Afghanistan result from vaccine preventable diseases, diarrhoea, and acute respiratory infections which together account for nearly 60% of deaths.*
- ◆ *Neonatal deaths account for over one third of all deaths in children under the age of five years in*

Afghanistan; not enough attention is paid to reducing these deaths. Afghanistan is among the ten countries with the highest neonatal mortality rate.

- ◆ *Due to much higher immunisation coverage of children in urban as opposed to rural areas, infant and child mortality rates in cities are around 20% lower.*
- ◆ *The measles immunisation programme has been a success in Afghanistan, with 75% children aged less than 12 months having being immunised.*



Chapter 7

CAN AFGHANISTAN MEET THE TARGET FOR REDUCING CHILD MORTALITY?


	Will the target be met?	State of policy environment?
<p>Target 8. Reduce by 50%, between 2003 and 2015, the under-5 mortality rate, and further reduce it to 1/3 of the 2003 level by 2020</p>	<p>Potentially</p>	<p>Fair</p>
<p>Assessment scale</p>	<p>Probably Potentially Unlikely Lack of data</p>	<p>Strong Fair Weak but improving Weak</p>

SUMMARY

- ◆ The infant and under-five mortality rates in Afghanistan are among the highest in the world. Only Angola, Liberia and Sierra Leone have higher rates.
- ◆ The Under-5 Mortality Rate (U5MR) and the Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) are targeted to reduce by 50% of the 2003 levels by 2015 and by two-third by 2020.
- ◆ While progress in immunisation coverage worldwide and better awareness levels among parents on good child rearing practices and hygiene have contributed to the decline in U5MR, overall infant mortality remains high because of the high level of neonatal deaths.
- ◆ Most deaths among children under-five years of age in Afghanistan result from infectious causes, with diarrhoea, acute respiratory infections and vaccine-preventable illnesses accounting for nearly 60% of deaths.
- ◆ Lack of access to a clean water source and poor sanitation are the major contributory factors to poor health outcomes, with the majority of the population having no access to improved drinking water and improved sanitation facilities.
- ◆ Immunisation coverage of children has increased, but overall it is much higher in urban than in rural areas, and specifically so in major cities. Not surprisingly, infant and child mortality rates are around 20% lower in urban areas than in rural areas.
- ◆ The measles immunisation programme has been a success, with 75% children aged less than 12 months have been immunised. The values are similar for boys and girls.

Meeting the targets

- ◆ With a supportive policy environment, the MDG target on reducing child mortality will potentially be met. Implementing the Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) is critical for achieving the MDG on reducing child mortality.
- ◆ In the short-term a range of low-cost, quick-impact measures to reduce child mortality can be undertaken. These include: immunisation; increased availability of antibiotics and oral re-hydration solution to prevent diarrhoea deaths; promotion of exclusive breastfeeding during the first six months of a baby's life; promotion of micronutrient supplementation to prevent malnutrition and strengthen children's resistance; and wide distribution of insecticide-treated mosquito nets.
- ◆ A specific focus is needed on providing better care for mothers and babies before and after the birth to address the challenge of neonatal deaths. Reducing neonatal deaths will help reduce both the infant and the under-five mortality rates significantly.



GLOBAL MDG TARGET AND INDICATORS

==> *Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-5 mortality rate*

- ◆ Under-5 mortality rate
- ◆ Infant mortality rate
- ◆ Proportion of 1-year old children immunised against measles

AFGHANISTAN'S REVISED MDG TARGET AND INDICATORS

==> *Reduce by 50%, between 2003 and 2015, the under-5 mortality rate, and further reduce it to 1/3 of the 2003 level by 2020*

- ◆ Under-5 mortality rate
- ◆ Infant mortality rate
- ◆ Proportion of 1-year old children immunised against measles

CHILD MORTALITY IN AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan has a long history of high levels of child mortality

Afghanistan suffered from very high mortality and morbidity even before the Soviet invasion of 1979. The under-five mortality rate (U5MR) in 1960, estimated at 360 per 1,000 live births, was 30% higher than the average of the least developed countries at the time and more than 60% higher than the average for developing countries.⁴³ During the 1970s the infant mortality rate (IMR) was estimated at 157 per 1,000 live births, and nearly 60% of deaths occurred before the age of 5, with malaria, diarrhoea and respiratory infections being the primary causes.

Twenty-three years of war meant that little progress was made in improving health service delivery and the Taliban period worsened an already difficult health situation. Girls and women had very limited access to services since most women health workers were not allowed to work. From 1990 to 2002 the under-five mortality rate hardly changed and Afghanistan is today where most developing countries were 40 years ago. High infant and under-five mortality rates are major contributing factors to the low average life expectancy in Afghanistan, estimated at 44.5 years⁴⁴ in 2002, which is almost 20 years less than the regional average for South Asian countries.⁴⁵

While on-going efforts are contributing to some progress in improving health status, the overall situation remains grim. Based on UNICEF data, U5MR and IMR have been estimated as 230 and 140 per 1,000 live births respectively,⁴⁶ and have been adopted as the benchmark for Afghanistan's MDG Report with 2003 as the baseline year. Only Angola, Liberia and Sierra Leone have higher U5MR and IMR values than Afghanistan (Chart 7.1).


Vaccine preventable diseases, diarrhoea and acute respiratory infections are responsible for the high levels of child morbidity and mortality in Afghanistan. Poor access to improved water sources and poor standards of hygiene and sanitation are also major contributors.

Most deaths among children under-five years of age in Afghanistan result from diarrhoea, acute respiratory infections and vaccine-preventable diseases, which account for nearly 60% of deaths.⁴⁷

Lack of access to an improved water source and poor sanitation are the major contributory factors to poor health outcomes. Sixty nine percent of rural and 39% of urban households have no access to drinking water from an improved source, and 41% and 13% of rural and urban households respectively do not have access to improved sanitation facilities.⁴⁸

The spread of diarrhoea among children is very high and is one of the major reasons for under-five mortality. Other parasitic diseases are also very common,⁴⁹ and are one of the main reasons of anaemia among school-age children. Cholera outbreaks are frequently seen during the summer season in different regions of Afghanistan, including Kabul.

Chart 7.1: IMR and U5MR in selected countries




Note: All values for 2002, except for Afghanistan, where the value is based on 2003 data.

Source: UNDP HDR website (<http://hdr.undp.org>) and Globalis website (<http://globalis.gvu.unu.edu>)



Thirty percent of children under the age of five in both urban and rural areas had suffered from diarrhoea in the 15 days before the survey,⁵⁰ but only 31% of mothers of under five-year olds in urban and 12% in rural areas used water and soap/ash to always wash their hands after their own or their child's defecation. Furthermore, 29% of households in urban and 50% in rural areas have no fixed place for disposal of child faeces (Chart 7.2). This suggests a widespread lack of awareness of environmental and personal hygiene as well as poor health practices among the population.

Chart 7.2: Poor state of personal hygiene and sanitation



Source: MICS 2003

CHILD MORTALITY: REVISED MDG TARGETS FOR AFGHANISTAN

With no reliable data available for the baseline year of 1990, and only 10 years up to 2015, the global target for reducing child mortality needs to be adapted to the local context. The Government has revised the global target of the under-five mortality rate and is aiming for a 50% reduction of the 2003 baseline value by 2015, and a two-third reduction of the 2003 level by 2020. Progress is likely to slow down after the first 10 years, once some of the critical but easier interventions, such as immunisation and the introduction of exclusive breast-feeding of infants have been made. Social and cultural factors that can carry the momentum forward will take longer.

AFGHANISTAN'S REVISED MDG TARGET, INDICATORS AND BASELINES

Target	Indicator	Baseline year	Data source	Baseline value	Targets	
					2015	2020
Target 8. Reduce by 50%, between 2003 and 2015, the under-5 mortality rate, and further reduce it to 1/3 of the 2003 level by 2020.	Under 5 mortality rate	2003	UNICEF Best Estimates	230	115	76
	Infant mortality rate	2003	UNICEF Best Estimates	140	70	46
	Proportion of 1-year old children immunised against measles	2003	UNICEF/CSO MICS	75	90	100

To analyse what reduction of its child mortality rates Afghanistan can realistically achieve in the next 10 to 15 years, it is useful to look at two comparable groups of countries with similar characteristics as Afghanistan – Landlocked Least Developed Countries (LLDCs) in Asia, and other post-conflict countries.

INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON ON CHILD MORTALITY

There are three LLDCs in Asia - Bhutan, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and Nepal. Between 1990 and 2002-03, these countries on average reduced their IMRs by 31.4%, and the U5MRs by 45.5% (Table 7.1). All three countries, however, started from much lower baseline values than Afghanistan. Progress in reduction of mortality rates tails off more with lower baseline values. This means that Afghanistan, with its much higher baseline, has a prospect of a higher pace of reduction than these three Asian LLDCs. To reduce the under-five mortality rate by 50% within the time span of 10 years is thus possible for Afghanistan. But it can only be achieved if there is both sustained political and financial commitment.

Table 7.1: Trends in IMR and U5MR in Asian LLDCs

	IMR		U5MR	
	1990	2002	1990	2002
Bhutan	107	74	166	85
Lao	120	87	163	91
Nepal	100	64	145	82
Average reduction between 1990 and 2002-03 (%)	31.4		45.5	

Source: Globalis website (<http://globalis.gvu.unu.edu>)

Examining the group of seven post-conflict countries⁵¹ (Table 7.2), it appears that between 1990 and 2003, these countries only achieved a reduction by 14.1% in their IMR and 15.7% in their U5MR which is much lower than what was achieved by the LLDCs in Asia. If Afghanistan were to follow the trajectory of these post-conflict countries because of lack of political will, it is unlikely to even come close to meeting the revised MDG targets by 2020.




Table 7.2: Child mortality: international comparisons

	Under 5 mortality rate (per 1000 live births)		Infant mortality rate (0-1 year) (per 1000 live births)		Proportion of 1 yr-old children immunised against measles (%)	
	Base year (1990)	Latest year (2003)	Base year (1990)	Latest year (2003)	Base year (1990)	Latest year (2003)
Afghanistan	...	230	...	140	...	75
<u>Neighbours:</u>						
Iran	72	39	54	33	85	99
Pakistan	130	103	100	81	50	61
Tajikistan	128	118	99	92	84*	89
Turkmenistan	97	102	80	79	76*	97
Uzbekistan	79	69	65	57	84*	99
<u>South Asia:</u>						
Bangladesh	144	64	96	46	65	77
Bhutan	166	85	107	70	93	88
India	123	87	84	63	56	67
Maldives	115	72	80	55	96	96
Nepal	145	82	100	61	57	75
Pakistan	130	103	100	81	50	61
Sri Lanka	32	15	26	13	80	99
<u>Landlocked countries in Asia:</u>						
Bhutan	166	85	107	70	93	88
Kyrgyzstan	80	68	68	59	94*	99
Laos	163	91	120	82	32	42
Mongolia	104	68	74	56	92	98
Nepal	145	82	100	61	57	75
<u>Post-conflict countries:</u>						
Bosnia and Herzegovina	22	17	18	14	52*	84
Cambodia	115	140	80	97	34	65
Haiti	150	118	102	76	31	53
Mozambique	235	158	158	109	59	77
Sierra Leone	302	284	175	166	79**	73
Sudan	120	93	74	63	57	57
Timor-Leste	160	124	110	87	47***	60


* Data for 1992 ** Data for 1996 *** Data for 2002
 Source: United Nations Statistics Division - Millennium Indicators

While progress in immunisation coverage worldwide and better awareness levels among parents on good child rearing practices and hygiene have contributed to the decline in U5MRs, infant mortality remains more difficult to reduce because of the high levels of neonatal deaths. Currently, child survival programmes focus on preventing pneumonia, diarrhoea and malaria, which are important causes of death after the first month. Of all deaths among children under the age of five years, 38% occur during the first four weeks.⁵² Two-thirds of all such deaths occur in only 10 countries, one of which is Afghanistan.⁵³

At the global level, direct causes of neonatal death include infections, pre-term birth, asphyxia, congenital diseases, and other causes (Chart 7.3). Low birth weight is an important indirect cause of infant death. Maternal complications in labour carry a high risk of neonatal death, and poverty is strongly associated with an increased risk. Countries with the highest neonatal mortality rates were generally found to have the lowest skilled attendance and institutional delivery rates. In Afghanistan, close to 90% of women delivered their last child at home and less than 15% of births were attended by a skilled birth attendant.⁵⁴ In rural areas, more than 95% of births are at home, and less than 7% of births take place with

the help of a skilled birth attendant. However, programmes such as the NSP show that a majority of communities throughout the country see health as one of their priority issues, demonstrating an interest in taking ownership and being accountable for management of their community's development.

Chart 7.3: Globally, infections are the single largest cause of neonatal deaths



Source: Lancet 2005



IMMUNISATION COVERAGE

Afghanistan's efforts to immunise its children against the most threatening childhood illnesses have met with mixed success so far


The best coverage countrywide has been achieved in measles immunisation, which is one of three indicators that are tracked under the MDG to reduce child mortality. A country-wide measles mortality reduction campaign was conducted in 2002. Approximately 11.5 million children aged between six months and 12 years have been immunised against measles, saving an estimated 30,000 lives annually. In June 2003, about 5 million children aged between nine months to 59 months received measles vaccines. Preliminary data indicates a significant reduction in the number of reported measles cases (3,609 cases in 1999 to only 718 cases in 2003).⁵⁵

In 2004, measles' immunisation coverage stood at around 60% of one-year-olds and it increased to 75% in 2005. The values are similar for boys and girls. However, this has been achieved through emergency immunisation campaigns, which may be difficult to sustain over long periods of time. With immunisation rates much higher in urban than in rural areas, and specifically so in major cities, it is no surprise that infant and child mortality rates are around 20% lower in urban areas than in rural areas.

Similarly, 73% of children under the age of five years in urban areas, but only 55% in rural areas, are immunised against childhood tuberculosis. Forty-eight percent of children between one and two years of age in urban and 23% in rural areas are protected against diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus. Of the same age group, 71% and 43% are immunised against polio in urban and rural areas respectively.⁵⁹

There are large disparities in immunisation coverage among provinces and, in some instances, even among districts within the same province (Map 7.1). While Uruzgan and Zabul, two provinces in the south affected by widespread insecurity are among the least immunised provinces, some safer provinces such as Kunduz in the northeast or Bamyan in the central highlands region show almost equally low values.

Map 7.1: Proportion of one year-olds without measles immunisation



Source: MICS 2003

MEETING THE TARGETS

Child mortality is closely linked to poverty: advances in infant and child survival have come more slowly to people in poor countries and to the poorest people in wealthier countries. Improvements in public health services are key, including safe water and better sanitation. Education, especially for girls and mothers, saves children's lives. Raising incomes can help, but little will be achieved unless services reach those who need them most.

- UNDP (2005)

Health facilities are still not available to everyone in the country, even though maternal and child health, and safe motherhood specifically, is at the top of the government's priority list. Through the establishment and support of the basic package of health services (BPHS), the Ministry of Public Health aims at reducing morbidity and mortality. BPHS (a package of services covering maternal and newborn health, child health and immunization, public nutrition, and communicable disease control) coverage is expected to reach 90% of the population by 2010 and 95% by 2015. At present, only about 40% of Afghans live in coverage areas of basic health facilities.⁵⁷

Sixty-eight percent of parents in urban areas and 73% in rural areas did not seek medical advice or treatment from a health facility during acute respiratory infections of their children aged five or younger.⁵⁸ This may stem from a lack of trust in the government facilities and the low capacity and skills of the staff, but peoples' access to and willingness to approach the medical system will have to increase appreciably for Afghanistan to have a realistic chance of achieving for the MDG on reducing child mortality.

To achieve the crucial MDG targets on child mortality, a range of immediate quick impact measures should be implemented, at the same time as access to improved water sources and improved sanitation is made available to all Afghans, and systems are set up to ensure access to basic health services for all people, and especially the poor. Cost-effective quick-impact measures include


- ◆ immunisation;
- ◆ enhancing the wide availability of antibiotics and oral re-hydration solution to prevent infant deaths from diarrhoea;
- ◆ skilled attendance at delivery for mothers and promotion of exclusive breastfeeding during the first six months of a baby's life;
- ◆ raising awareness of basic hygiene concepts and practices at the community level;
- ◆ providing micronutrient supplementation after the first six months to prevent malnutrition and strengthen children's resistance to infection; and
- ◆ wide distribution of insecticide-treated mosquito nets in areas at-risk of malaria.




Expanding access to improved drinking water sources and sanitation and particularly ensuring access to basic health services for all people takes time, is difficult and is costly. The success of the BPHS depends on sustained funding from the donor nations. Increased access to improved drinking water and sanitation in particular, requires major investment in public works for water and sewage management.

Afghanistan aims to reach 90% measles immunisation coverage of 1-year-old children by 2015, and 100% by 2020 which maybe an ambitious target, given the fact that the population is expected to grow quickly. Also, it must be achieved through routine health care systems that are available and accessible for the entire population throughout the country. The level of routine immunisation is a reflection of the effectiveness of the health care system. A functioning health care system, available and accessible for all, requires sustained financial resources.

To address the challenge of neonatal deaths, a specific focus is needed for providing better care for mothers and babies before and after the birth. Reducing neonatal deaths will help reduce both the infant and the under-five mortality rates significantly.



Chapter 8:
IMPROVE
MATERNAL HEALTH
(Goal 5)








IMPROVE MATERNAL HEALTH (Goal 5)

- ◆ *Afghanistan has one of the world's highest maternal mortality ratios, equal only to the most poor, conflict-affected countries in the world. In some regions of the country, such as in Ragh district of Badakhshan province, it is the highest in the world with an estimated 65 women dying of pregnancy related causes per 1,000 live births.*
- ◆ *It is estimated that nearly 78% of the maternal deaths can be prevented by increasing the proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel with referral capacity to comprehensive emergency obstetric care, and implementing the Safe Motherhood Package nationally on a priority basis. Afghan women need universal access to reproductive health care, including family planning.*
- ◆ *An estimated 1 in 7 Afghan girls is married under the age of 15 years and almost 1 in 2 Afghan girls under the age of 18. In some provinces more than half of all parents marry their daughters off at an early age for economic reasons or debt repayment.*
- ◆ *Meeting the challenge of reducing maternal mortality will require education, communication and changes in cultural practices. Due to cultural factors there is very little communication about reproductive health and sexual behaviour at the family level.*



CAN AFGHANISTAN MEET THE TARGET FOR IMPROVING MATERNAL HEALTH?

	Will the target be met?	State of policy environment?
Target 9. Reduce by 50% between 2002 and 2015 the maternal mortality ratio, and further reduce the MMR to 25% of the 2002 level by 2020	Potentially	Fair
Assessment scale	Probably Potentially Unlikely Lack of data	Strong Fair Weak but improving Weak

SUMMARY

- ◆ At 1600 deaths per 100,000 live births, the maternal mortality ratio (MMR) in Afghanistan is equal only to the most poor, conflict-affected countries in the world.
- ◆ The highest mortality ratio in Afghanistan was measured in Ragh district of Badakhshan province, in the northeast, where an estimated 65 women die from pregnancy-related causes per 1,000 live births. A similar ratio can be expected in other remote and under-served provinces such as Ghor and Daikundi.
- ◆ Qualified female health workers are missing in over one third of all health facilities countrywide, thereby constraining women's access to health care. The lack of available health care in addition to factors that constrain women and their families' ability to access care results in almost 9 out of 10 deliveries taking place at home, and almost 8 out of 10 deliveries being attended by unskilled personnel.

Meeting the targets

- ◆ The most important constraint in meeting the target for improving maternal health is women's unmet need for skilled delivery care and inadequate access to comprehensive emergency obstetric care arising out of the inadequate number of qualified female staff and equipped facilities, especially in rural areas.
- ◆ Since most pregnancy-related deaths occur close to the time of delivery, or relatively soon after a termination, increasing the proportion of births that are attended by skilled health personnel should be prioritised. This will require:
 - ◆ Investment in the training of female health workers as skilled attendants, especially midwives,
 - ◆ A significant expansion of the BPHS to ensure that women everywhere have timely and affordable access to the emergency obstetric care they need.
- ◆ Priority should also be given to increasing awareness of and access to birth control, and improving the quality and availability of antenatal care.
- ◆ Improving the availability of health services must be coupled with measures to address the geographic and social barriers to accessing health care by building roads and developing transport systems, and educating and empowering women to make decisions about when to seek care.



GLOBAL MDG TARGET AND INDICATORS

==> Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio

- ◆ Maternal mortality ratio
- ◆ Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel

AFGHANISTAN'S REVISED MDG TARGET AND INDICATORS

==> Reduce by 50% between 2002 and 2015 the maternal mortality ratio, and further reduce the MMR to 25% of the 2002 level by 2020

- ◆ Maternal mortality ratio
- ◆ Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel
- ◆ Fertility rate
- ◆ Proportion of women receiving professional ante-natal care

MATERNAL HEALTH IN AFGHANISTAN

A tragic combination of poverty, conflict and cultural tradition has left women in Afghanistan, particularly in the remote rural areas, very vulnerable. The poor state of maternal health is characterised by a high maternal mortality ratio (MMR) and reflects the low status of women, poor infrastructure, and a barely functioning curative health care system.

The MMR is difficult to calculate. The best available estimate for Afghanistan comes from a study by the Centres for Disease Control (CDC) and UNICEF in 2002 in four districts, in four provinces.⁵⁹ These districts are representative of urban, semi-rural, rural, and remote rural locations. The results from the four study sites were applied to all districts of similar population density to generate a national maternal mortality ratio estimate. Since the MMR for Ragh in Badakhshan province (6,507 per 100,000 live births) was the highest ever recorded, two national estimates were calculated – providing an upper estimate of 2,200, which includes the Badakhshan data and a lower, conservative estimate of 1,600, without Badakhshan.


Even with a lower estimate of 1,600, Afghanistan has one of the highest maternal mortality ratios in the world, comparable only with the poorest, conflict-affected countries (Chart 8.1). The MMR for Afghanistan towers over its neighbours in Asia (Chart 8.2), with the next closest, in neighbouring Pakistan, measuring less one than one-third that of Afghanistan.

The CDC study estimated that 78% of the maternal deaths investigated could have been prevented. Since most pregnancy-related deaths occur around the time of delivery, or soon after a termination,⁶⁰ increasing the proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel and with referral capacity to emergency obstetric care will significantly reduce maternal mortality.

The major causes of maternal mortality in Afghanistan are

haemorrhage, obstructed labour, pregnancy-induced hypertension, and sepsis (Chart 8.3). In addition, a number of “environmental” factors play a crucial role in increasing a woman's risk of pregnancy-related death in Afghanistan (Box 8.1).

Chart 8.1: Maternal Mortality Ratio in conflict-affected countries



Based on data from the UNDP Human Development Report 2004, which uses adjusted ratios to take account of well-documented problems of under-reporting. Afghanistan data from Bartlett et al (2005)






Chart 8.2: Maternal Mortality Ratio in selected countries



Based on data from the UNDP Human Development Report 2004, which uses adjusted ratios to take account of well-documented problems of under-reporting. Afghanistan data from Bartlett et al (2005)

Chart 8.3: Causes of maternal mortality in Afghanistan



Adapted from: Bartlett et al (2005)

Box 8.1: Certain 'environmental' factors are also responsible for pregnancy-related deaths in Afghanistan

Health care availability and quality: Many communities have no access to qualified and skilled health personnel. In 2002, 60% of the population was without access to basic healthcare and two-thirds of all districts lacked maternal and child health services. More than two decades of violent conflict has further reduced access to health services and destroyed infrastructure. Skilled personnel left Afghanistan as refugees and the education system was unable to train new staff.

Education: The school curriculum is one means of increasing knowledge about health. Women in the reproductive age group of 15–49 are highly likely to have abandoned their education and many are illiterate. The de facto exclusion of women from the school system has meant that there are few trained female health workers.

Geographic accessibility: The MMR varies widely with geographic location. Women living in the rural areas are less likely to have access to health facilities, less likely to be literate and have primary education, are more likely to be food insecure and therefore at greater risk of disease and poor health.

Poverty: Economic status affects health care choices. According to NRVA 2003, two-thirds of those in the lowest consumption quintile sought no medical attention, and those that did went to a traditional healer. In contrast, those from better off households sought care from a private doctor as well as the traditional healer. Thirty seven percent of the households surveyed cited cost as their primary reason for not seeking medical assistance. Female-headed households are concentrated in the poorest quintile of the population. Poverty manifests itself in many ways, including food insecurity. The poor nutritional status of women leaves them vulnerable to malaria and tuberculosis, two major causes of maternal mortality.

Traditional status of women in society: In many parts of the country, treatment of women by male doctors is strongly discouraged, and due to discrimination against women in access to education, there are few qualified female physicians and midwives. Almost half of all existing health facilities do not have female staff. Nineteen districts were found to have no health care facilities at all in 2002. Furthermore, even where facilities exist, women may not be empowered to make a decision about whether or not to seek medical attention.


- Source: UNCT (2005)



Other factors are also strongly correlated with the maternal mortality ratio are fertility rate and access to antenatal care (ANC). Avoiding unwanted pregnancies is a means of reducing maternal mortality. Improving access to and the quality of antenatal care is perceived to be pivotal in the

early identification of high-risk pregnancies and potential complications. As evident from Chart 8.4, MMR is higher in countries which have high fertility rates, but few doctors (a proxy for antenatal care) and a low proportion of births attended by skilled personnel per 1,000 population.

Chart 8.4: Inter-relationship among factors affecting MMR



Source: UNDP Global Human Development Report 2004. Afghanistan data from Bartlett et al (2005) and the UNDP National Human Development Report 2004.

The average number of medical doctors per 1,000 people in Afghanistan is 0.1, against 1.1 for all developing countries. There is great inequality between provinces and districts. In Balkh for instance, there is one doctor per 1,000 people, while in Uruzgan there is 1 doctor per 100,000 people. This situation is particularly unfavourable for female patients, as it is very unlikely that their reproductive health care needs are met.


Delivery care is an important element in reducing maternal mortality. Only 18% of the health facilities countrywide have female health workers,⁶⁶ the required equipment and offer the necessary services. Until 2002 Nimroz, Khost, Zabul, Paktika and Nuristan had no BPHS health facility offering delivery services with at least one female clinical staff member. Even though provision of emergency obstetric care is mandatory as part of the BPHS,⁶⁷ less than 5% of provincial and district hospitals have an emergency kit.

Only 13% of Afghan babies were delivered in government, NGO or private clinics. The remaining 87% of deliveries occurred at home.⁶⁸ Less than 15% of deliveries are attended by a doctor, nurse or midwife, and only 10% are attended by TBAs. The remaining 75% are attended by relatives or friends, thereby sharply increasing the likelihood of fatal complications at the time of the delivery.

The majority of women in Afghanistan do not have easy access to health facilities. While 80% of facilities provide some kind of ANC, less than 30% have a female health worker. This reflects in part the difficulty of recruiting qualified female staff, which is one of the main constraints to improved health service delivery to Afghan women. Only 65% of the facilities provide the basic set of antenatal care services, including tetanus vaccination, iron supplementation and blood pressure check, while half reported no delivery related services.

Although haemorrhage during pregnancy or childbirth is the most frequent cause of death in Afghanistan, less than a quarter of the hospitals in the country have a blood bank. Only 28% of the BPHS facilities offer all activities recommended for newborn care, which requires equipment and female staff. There is a great difference between provinces; for example, in Laghman 83% of the health facilities claim to offer basic ANC services, while there is no facility offering ANC services in Nimroz.

Apart from resource constraints, trained female health staff, especially trained community midwives, are absent in rural remote areas and would need to be trained quickly to enable the public health system to staff the rural clinics. It is estimated that only 16% of pregnant women were visited by




a doctor/nurse/midwife for antenatal care; and 10% were visited by a trained birth attendant (TBA). The rest did not have any access to antenatal care.

Unsurprisingly, Afghanistan fares poorly against other countries in Central Asia (Chart 8.5). But what is striking, and


disturbing, is that even the conflict-affected countries such as Angola and Sudan have higher proportion of births attended by skilled personnel than Afghanistan (Chart 8.6).

Chart 8.5: Proportion of last live births attended by skilled health personnel in selected countries



Source: UNDP (2003). Data for Afghanistan from Bartlett et al (2005)

Chart 8.6: Proportion of last live births attended by skilled health personnel in conflict-affected countries



Source: UNDP (2003). Data for Afghanistan from Bartlett et al (2005)

REVISED TARGETS AND INDICATORS

The target and indicators for monitoring progress on improving maternal health have been “localised” in two ways. One, the target itself has been revised to account for the fact that Afghanistan, after having lost the last 25 years to conflict, is a late entrant to the development process. There is no reliable data for the 1990 baseline, and with only 10 years until 2015, the global target to reduce the MMR by three-quarters of the 1990 value is inappropriate for Afghanistan. So the government has decided to set itself a target of reducing the MMR by 50% by 2015 from the baseline of 2002. However, the Government is keeping the

original target of reducing the MMR by three-quarters within sight and intends to reach that target not by 2015 but by 2020.

To reflect local reality, two new indicators have been added to the list of the original global indicators. These pertain to (i) fertility rate, and (ii) proportion of women receiving antenatal care. Both factors are strongly correlated with the maternal mortality ratio. Avoiding unwanted pregnancies reduces the risk of maternal mortality and improving access to and quality of antenatal care is critical in the early identification of high-risk pregnancies and potential complications.



AFGHANISTAN'S REVISED MDG TARGET, INDICATORS AND BASELINES

Target	Indicator	Baseline year	Data source	Baseline value	Targets	
					2015	2020
Target 9. Reduce by 50% between 2002 and 2015 the maternal mortality ratio, and further reduce the MMR to 25% of the 2002 level by 2020	Maternal Mortality Ratio	2002	UNICEF/ CDC	1600	800	400
	Proportion of births attended by skilled personnel	2002	MICS 2003	14.3%	50%	75%
	Fertility rate (number of live births per woman)	2002	UNICEF/ CSO/MICS	6.3	4.7	3.1
	Proportion of women receiving professional ante-natal care	1999	WHO	12%	25%	50%

MEETING THE TARGETS

The most important constraint in meeting the target for improving maternal health is women's unmet need for skilled attendance at delivery, and access to emergency obstetric care when complications occur arising out of the inadequate number of qualified female staff and equipped, accessible facilities, especially in rural areas. Unmet needs for ante-natal and post-natal care also contribute substantially to the high maternal death risk in Afghanistan. A combination of historical, social and cultural reasons has made it difficult to recruit and retain female health workers. At present, less than 30% of existing health facilities has a female health worker. This in turn makes it difficult for women to attend health clinics and access trained personnel for health-related needs. Equitable, effective and efficient delivery of the BPHS needs well-trained female health staff of all levels, especially so in the rural areas.

Universal access to reproductive health care, including family planning, is the starting point for improving maternal health. Access to information about and use of contraceptives is hampered by socio-cultural factors. Male heads of household in Afghanistan generally approve of family planning for economic and health reasons, although this is often conditional on having a certain number of sons already. However, women are required to seek permission from their husbands to attend family planning clinics, and must give persuasive arguments to justify using reproductive health services. Other key barriers include the perceived harmful effects of family planning, and women's expectation that their husbands want larger families, an assumption that does not always match the husbands' actual attitudes and beliefs.⁶⁹

Due to cultural factors, there is probably no or very little communication about reproductive health and sexual behaviour at family-level. An estimated 16% of girls are

married under age of 15, and 52% are married under the age of 18. In Badghis, Herat, Kabul, Kandahar, and Nangarhar, the majority (>50%) of parents married off their daughters at an early age, mostly for economic reasons or debt payments.⁷⁰

To achieve the Goal on improving maternal health, it is crucial to make implementation of the Safe Motherhood Package a national priority. The MDG provides for improved obstetric care, and also for much-needed counselling, information-sharing and awareness-raising at community level. The package of services includes:

- ◆ Skilled assistance during childbirth, including care for obstetric complications, post-partum care, management of abortion complications, and post-abortion care,
- ◆ Antenatal care,
- ◆ Counselling and promotion of maternal nutrition,
- ◆ Family planning counselling, information and services,
- ◆ Community education, and
- ◆ Reproductive health education and services for adolescents.

In addition, the Ministry of Public Health has committed, in its Strategic Framework for 2005-2009, to ensuring that all provincial and regional hospitals will offer 24-hour emergency maternity services; and that 95% of districts in Afghanistan will have a health care facility, provided by the government or an NGO.



Chapter 8


Table 8.1: Maternal mortality: international comparisons

	Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births)		Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel (%)	
	Base year (1990)	Latest year (2000)	Base year (1990)	Latest year (2000-02)
Afghanistan		1600		14
<u>Neighbours:</u>				
Iran	120	76	-	90
Pakistan	340	500	-	23
Tajikistan	130	100	-	71
Turkmenistan	55	31	-	97
Uzbekistan	55	24	-	96
<u>South Asia:</u>				
Bangladesh	850	380	-	14
Bhutan	1600	420	-	24
India	570	540	-	43
Maldives		110	-	70
Nepal	1500	740	-	11
Pakistan	340	500	-	23
Sri Lanka	140	92	-	97
<u>Landlocked countries in Asia:</u>				
Bhutan	1600	420	-	24
Kyrgyzstan	110	110	-	98*
Laos	650	650	-	19
Mongolia	65	110	-	99
Nepal	1500	740	-	11
<u>Post-conflict countries:</u>				
Bosnia Herzegovina		31	-	100
Cambodia	900	450	-	32
Haiti	1000	680	-	24
Mozambique	1500	1000	-	48
Sierra Leone	1800	2000	-	42
Sudan	660	590	-	86**
Timor Leste		660	-	24


* 1997

** 1993

Source: UN Statistical Division



Chapter 9:
COMBAT HIV/AIDS,
MALARIA, TB AND
OTHER DISEASES
(Goal 6)







COMBAT HIV/AIDS, MALARIA, TB AND OTHER DISEASES (Goal 6)

◆ *Afghanistan is a potentially high-risk country for the spread of HIV/AIDS. The high levels of heroin production (with most users injecting drugs through shared needles), lack of systematic screening of blood, and low levels of awareness are a potent combination for the spread of HIV/AIDS. Women are particularly at risk of HIV/AIDS with three-fourths of women under-50 years of age never having heard of any contraceptive method.*

◆ *Malaria is prevalent in more than 60% of the country, putting over 13 million Afghans at risk. In 2004, an estimated 2-3 million people contracted the disease, with the trend increasing over the years. Afghanistan is poorly equipped to meet the challenge of malaria.*

◆ *Afghanistan is one of the 22 highest tuberculosis-burdened countries in the world. At the end of 2003, an*

estimated 56% of the population had access to facilities offering Directly Observed Treatment - Short Course (DOTS). But latest data suggests that only 24% of the suspected cases had been detected and cured and only one in four cases was successfully treated under DOTS in 2004.

◆ *Access to health services, increased awareness and specific policies and strategies will be key to combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and other diseases. Simple strategies implemented on a large enough scale-- such as large-scale distribution of insecticide-treated bed-nets for malaria prevention-can go some way to meeting this challenge.*



CAN AFGHANISTAN MEET THE TARGETS TO COMBAT AIDS, TB AND MALARIA?

	Will the target be met?	State of policy environment?
Target 10. Have halted by 2020 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS	Lack of data	Fair
Target 11. Have halted by 2020 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases	Potentially	Fair
Assessment scale	Probably Potentially Unlikely Lack of data	Strong Fair Weak but improving Weak

SUMMARY

- ◆ Even though current levels are low, Afghanistan is a potentially high-risk country for the spread of HIV/AIDS. Drug abuse is prevalent; most users inject drugs through shared needles but are unaware of the dangers. There is no systematic testing for HIV before blood transfusion and less than 30% of transfused blood is screened. Low use stems from a lack of awareness of contraceptives. Nearly three-fourth of married women under-50 years of age have never heard of any contraceptive methods.
- ◆ Malaria is endemic in elevations below 1500 metres and is prevalent in more than 60% of the country, with over 13 million people at risk. In 2004, the annual incidence of malaria was around 2-3 million.
- ◆ All age groups are equally affected, except in the eastern region where those under 15 years of age are more affected. In most parts of the country, the transmission season is April to November. There is some evidence that malaria incidence is on the increase.
- ◆ The total caseload of Tuberculosis (TB) is estimated at 333 active cases and 91 fatalities per 100,000 population per year. Young adult women appear to be a highly vulnerable group, and account for 70% of all adult cases of morbidity and mortality of TB reported by public health facilities.
- ◆ Factors that contribute to the high prevalence of malaria and TB include:
 - ◆ Population movements,
 - ◆ Lack of health infrastructure,
 - ◆ Poor access to health care,
 - ◆ Use of poor quality and counterfeit medicines,
 - ◆ Lack of adherence to treatment regimes,
 - ◆ Malnourishment, and
 - ◆ Increasing resistance of vectors to chloroquine, the most widely used anti-malarial drug.

Meeting the targets

- ◆ The formulation of effective policies to combat HIV/AIDS in Afghanistan is hampered by the lack of reliable data on prevalence, incidence and ways of transmission. As the country can be considered at high-risk of quick spread of the disease, surveys to fill the data gaps are needed on a priority basis.
- ◆ A key future challenge is to reduce the large incidence of malaria, through ensuring availability of and people's access to quality health services provided at no-cost. This should be complemented with large-scale distribution of insecticide-treated bed nets as well as their free periodic re-treatment.
- ◆ Successful halting of the spread of tuberculosis also hinges on availability of and people's access to quality health care. In addition, there is lack of adherence to treatment regimes. This should be tackled by increasing awareness of negative consequences within the population.
- ◆ In the case of malaria as well as TB, the severity of disease and mortality is higher among malnourished people who have little physical resistance capacity. It is therefore critical to focus on the poor in any strategy to halt and reverse the spread of these two diseases.



GLOBAL MDG TARGETS AND INDICATORS

==> Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS

- ◆ HIV prevalence among 15- to 24-year-old pregnant women
- ◆ Contraceptive prevalence rate
- ◆ Number of children orphaned by AIDS

==> Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases

- ◆ Prevalence and death rates associated with malaria
- ◆ Proportion of population in malaria risk areas using effective malaria prevention and treatment measures
- ◆ Prevalence and death rates associated with tuberculosis
- ◆ Proportion of TB cases detected and cured under DOTS

AFGHANISTAN'S REVISED MDG TARGETS AND INDICATORS

==> Have halted by 2020 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS

- ◆ HIV prevalence among blood donors
- ◆ Proportion of blood samples screened for HIV/AIDS and STDs
- ◆ Condom use rate of the contraceptive prevalence rate
- ◆ Contraceptive prevalence rate
- ◆ % of population aged 15-49 with comprehensive correct knowledge of HIV/AIDS
- ◆ Proportion of women's unmet needs for family planning met
- ◆ Proportion of IV drug users in treatment by 2015

==> Have halted by 2020 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases

- ◆ Prevalence and death rates associated with malaria
- ◆ Proportion of population in malaria risk areas using effective malaria prevention and treatment measures
- ◆ Prevalence and death rates associated with tuberculosis
- ◆ Proportion of TB cases detected and cured under DOTS

CURRENT STATUS AND TRENDS

Even though current levels are low, Afghanistan is a potentially high risk country for the spread of HIV/AIDS

There is no reliable data on the prevalence of sexually transmitted infections (STI) and HIV due to absence of an appropriate surveillance system in Afghanistan. The estimated number of adults (15-49 years old) living with HIV was below 0.01% at the end of 2002.⁷¹ There were 22 HIV sero-positive cases up to 2003.⁷² While this is a relatively low number, the statistics are unreliable and may underestimate the extent of HIV prevalence.⁷³ Rough estimates place the actual number at around 200-300.⁷⁴

Two decades of conflict and human displacement, a history of discrimination against women, large numbers of injecting drug users, the poor state of blood transfusion facilities, the extremely poor social and public health infrastructure, and the prevalence of sexually transmitted infections make Afghanistan a potentially high risk country for the spread of HIV infection.


Drug abuse is prevalent, most users inject drugs through shared needles but are unaware of the dangers

Afghanistan is one of the world's largest producers of opium. There is currently no data on the number of Afghans

who inject drugs, although indicators suggest there is an increase in the practice in areas such as Kabul, Gardez, Farah and Herat. Recent reliable reports from Gardez town in Paktya province suggest that there are well over 100 drug injectors of heroin, morphine and sosegon (pentazocine) there. Neighbouring countries such as Iran, Tajikistan and China have reported outbreaks of HIV among intravenous drug users, and a similar outbreak may occur in Afghanistan.

There are about 8,000 heroin addicts in Kabul City, of whom almost 500 are drug injectors.⁷⁵ Of the Pakistani and Afghan drug users at high HIV risk, only 16% of the participants had heard of HIV/AIDS.⁷⁶ But a significantly higher proportion of Afghan drug users, compared to the Pakistani sample, were more likely to have used an opiate as the first illicit drug, to have other drug users in the family and to inject drugs and share needles.

Furthermore, the Afghan drug users are also less likely to be aware of the dangers of sharing needles. All Afghan drug users who had sex reported never having used a condom. Most heroin addicts in Peshawar and Quetta reported smoking or inhaling as the main method of ingesting heroin but that may be as a result of an increase in price of heroin. Although only 6% of the respondents



had reported drug injection, 43% of this group had shared injecting equipment, on average with 4 to 6 users at one time. Heroin abuse is widespread in Kabul. More recent data is awaited but the exposure to risk and even prevalence is likely to be high.

There is no systematic testing for HIV before blood transfusion and less than 30% of transfused blood is screened


The poor state of blood transfusion facilities throughout the country is of primary concern in the control of the spread of AIDS. An estimated half of the country's hospitals that perform surgery do not systematically test the blood for HIV before transfusions, and less than 30% of transfused blood is screened. Neither the number of transfusions carried out in Afghanistan nor the number screened for transmissible agents is well documented. The figures usually quoted are around 60,000 transfusions per year with 12-16,000 in Kabul alone, of which no more than 30% have been tested for transmissible agents, including HIV/AIDS. There are 19 centres testing for HIV by the government but the supplies are limited, particularly of HIV/AIDS testing kits. Some NGOs are also supporting blood screening for HIV/AIDS. Consequently blood transfusion is a major concern - not only for the spread of HIV/AIDS but also for Hepatitis.

Nearly three-fourth of married women under-50 years of age have never heard of any contraceptive methods

Apart from reducing the risk of HIV/AIDS, contraceptives can prevent unwanted pregnancies and consequently have a positive effect on maternal mortality reduction. But only about 2% of married women in South Eastern region and 8% of married women in the Eastern region use contraceptives. Condoms are available through mother and child health clinics, pharmacies, shops, even from street-side sellers. Some NGOs such as Marie Stopes International are initiating social marketing in the country. However, the use of contraceptives is uncommon yet in Afghanistan and it is either due to lack of access to or lack of knowledge about contraceptives. Cultural factors are the main limiting factor for access to contraceptives.


Though there are no statistical data on heterosexual multi-partner activities in Afghanistan or on knowledge of HIV/AIDS, the latter is likely to be quite low. Although not an end indicator, the rates of lack of awareness of contraceptive methods are very high in Afghanistan. Nationally nearly three-fourth of married women under-50 years of age have never heard of any contraceptive methods including traditional ones, and this rises to 78% in rural areas. Only 10% of this group of women currently use contraception. The regional distribution of contraceptive awareness among women is shown in the Map 9.1. The pill is the most popular type of contraception used in Afghanistan (Chart 9.1).

Chart 9.1: Types of contraceptives used in Afghanistan



Source: MICS 2003

Map 9.1: Proportion of women who have not heard of family planning




Source: MICS 2003

Malaria is prevalent in more than 60% of the country putting over 13 million people at risk. In 2004, the annual incidence was estimated to be 2-3 million

Malaria is endemic below 1,500 meters and is prevalent in more than 60% of the country, putting over 13 million people at risk. In 2004, the annual incidence was estimated to be 2-3 million, of which about 20% was due to the *Plasmodium falciparum* strain.

Malaria transmission in Afghanistan is intensely seasonal and unstable in many parts of the country. The duration and intensity of transmission is dependent on altitude, temperature and rainfall. The highest intensity of transmission is at altitudes below 1,500 meters around rice growing areas of the east and the northeast. Transmission is absent at the highest altitudes. Currently fourteen provinces record moderate and high transmission, with an estimated 13 million population at risk.



All age groups are equally affected, except in the eastern region where those under 15 years of age are more affected, suggesting more intense transmission in this area. In most parts of the country, the transmission season is April to November. Incidence is bimodal, that is, malaria occurs twice, with *Plasmodium vivax* malaria incidence usually peaking in July or August, and *falciparum* malaria in October.

Malaria incidence is on the increase

There is some evidence that malaria incidence may be on the increase, though reliable data are unavailable. Of the 3 million estimated cases of malaria per year in Afghanistan (Chart 9.2), in 2002 some 0.6 million suspected and confirmed cases were reported from all sources, indicating an annual national incidence of 204 per 10,000 population in 2002. Recorded incidence ranged from less than 10 per 10,000 population per year (South West and Central regions) to more than 500 per 10,000 population per year (Eastern and North Eastern regions). The reporting system is unreliable, however, and these data are probably an under-estimate.

Outbreaks are now reported from many parts of the country, including at high altitudes where they were not previously recorded, such as at Yakawlang, at 2,300 metres in central Afghanistan, in 2000. In 2002, several outbreaks were confirmed in the north. This is likely to be as a result of climate warming, which increases the altitude at which malaria transmission can take place.

The proportion of *Plasmodium falciparum* infections has increased, and now accounts for some 20% of the recorded infections. As diagnostic capacity and reliability of species differentiation is not known, these data should be interpreted cautiously.

Vivax infections are not radically treated with primaquine, as the delivery mechanisms to ensure adherence to treatment are not in place. An infected patient treated with chloroquine alone will relapse about three times. Thus one infection of *vivax* malaria may present as four cases of the disease. The *vivax* burden is likely to be a large contributor to chronic ill health, poor maternal and child health and increased maternal and child mortality.


Contributing factors to the high prevalence of malaria, particularly *falciparum* malaria, include

- ◆ Lack of health infrastructure,
- ◆ Poor access to health care,
- ◆ Use of poor quality and counterfeit medicines,
- ◆ Malnourishment, and
- ◆ Increasing resistance of vectors to chloroquine, the most widely used anti-malarial drug.

The data gives the official malaria figures based on positive *Plasmodium identification* from serum samples. Many


malaria cases are not captured through this official reporting mechanism, as many Afghans seeking treatment for malaria go to private doctors and traditional healers. Therefore the actual malaria caseload is likely to be significantly higher than those captured by the official Ministry of Public Health statistics.

Chart 9.2: Estimated cases of malaria per year



Source: Ministry of Public Health Information System, various years

Chart 9.3: Official caseload of malaria cases



Source: Ministry of Public Health Information System, various years

The official caseload is represented as a prevalence rate in Chart 9.3. In recent years, incidence of malaria has declined because of:

- ◆ Publication and implementation of national malaria treatment guidelines in 2003, which recommends ACT (Arteminsine based combination therapy) for *Plasmodium Falciparum*, and simple chloroquine for *Plasmodium Vivax* as there is no chloroquine resistance currently in Afghanistan.
- ◆ Increased availability of treatment and extension of health services generally.



Chapter 9

- ◆ Increased coverage with bed nets: 700,000 nets distributed over the last eight years covering approximately 18% of the high-risk population, assuming one net benefits three people. The majority of the nets distributed were conventional nets needing annual re-treating. A smaller number of PermaNets were long lasting (~5 years). In the future almost all of the mosquito nets to be distributed in Afghanistan will be of the longer lasting PermaNet type.
- ◆ Seasonality and climatic factors: Low incidence of malaria can be expected in drought years. Winter length is also important in determining the prevalence of malaria, with northern Afghanistan typically having a much shorter malarial season than the south.

Afghanistan is one of the 22 highest tuberculosis-burdened countries in the world

Afghanistan is probably the highest TB-burdened country in the Eastern Mediterranean Region and one of the 22 highest TB-burdened countries in the world. With an estimated Annual Risk of Infection (ARI) of 2.55%, the incidence of sputum positive cases is calculated at 143 patients, all active cases at 333 and fatalities at 91 per 100,000 population per year. Assuming a population of around 20 million, this would mean an annual incidence of 65,000 active cases of TB. If little or no treatment is available, an estimated 15,000 people would die per year. Over 10,000 of these would be young adult women, a highly vulnerable group that accounts for 70% of all adult cases of TB that are reported by public health facilities.

The difference in case numbers between men and women could result from men seeking treatment from non-DOTS private practitioners whereas women would use DOTS public health facilities that report statistics. This possible explanation, however, has not been tested yet. Evidence also suggests a high incidence of tuberculosis in Afghanistan's prisons, but no exact data is available about its magnitude. TB cases in prisons may account for up to 25% of a country's overall tuberculosis burden. Late diagnosis, inadequate treatment, overcrowding, poor ventilation and repeated prison transfers encourage the transmission of tuberculosis.

In November 2000, the NGO Medair conducted a tuberculin skin test survey in Kabul and found that the estimated prevalence of TB was 4.3% and thus the average ARI was 0.62%. These findings indicate a marked decrease from the estimated ARI of 2.55% but further studies will be required to establish ARI in other urban and rural areas and get a correct picture of TB incidence across the country.

Factors contributing to the high incidence and prevalence of TB include

- ◆ population movements,
- ◆ lack of health infrastructure,

- ◆ poor access to health care,
- ◆ lack of adherence to treatment regimes,
- ◆ use of poor quality and counterfeit medicines, and
- ◆ malnourishment.

REVISED TARGETS FOR AFGHANISTAN

The characteristics of the HIV/AIDS and extent of awareness of the disease in Afghanistan are little known at present.

To date, Afghanistan seems to be a low-prevalence but nevertheless at-risk country, in which the reality on the ground is different from that in the high HIV/AIDS-burdened countries of sub-Saharan Africa. For instance, there are few or no AIDS orphans in the country, which makes collecting data on school attendance by AIDS orphans of little relevance for Afghanistan.

To better reflect the case of Afghanistan, a revised list of indicators was developed by the Government after extensive consultations within the Technical Working Group for this MDG. The new indicators aim to track the spread of HIV/AIDS through blood transfusion and intravenous drug use, since these appear to be among the major causes for the potential spread of the disease in Afghanistan. Also, the indicator on the level of awareness of HIV/AIDS now includes the age group of 15 to 49 year-olds, which is the sexually active population.

Malarial death rates are very difficult to determine. It was therefore decided that Afghanistan will not report on malarial deaths.


MEETING THE TARGETS

The formulation of effective policies to combat HIV/AIDS in Afghanistan is hampered by the lack of reliable data on prevalence, incidence and ways of transmission. As the country can be considered at high-risk of quick spread of the disease, surveys to fill the data gaps are needed on a priority basis.

A key challenge for the future is to reduce the large incidence of malaria, through ensuring availability of and people's access to quality health services, which are provided free. This should be complemented with large-scale distribution of insecticide-treated bed nets as well as their free periodic re-treatment.

Successful halting of the spread of tuberculosis also hinges on availability of and people's access to quality health care. In addition, there is lack of adherence to treatment regimes. This should be tackled by increasing awareness of negative consequences within the population.


Overall, the severity of disease and mortality is higher among malnourished people who have little physical resistance capacity, in the case of malaria as well as TB. It is



AFGHANISTAN'S REVISED MDG TARGETS, INDICATORS AND BASELINES

Target	Indicator	Baseline year	Data source	Baseline value	Targets	
					2015	2020
Target 10. Have halted by 2020 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS	HIV prevalence among blood donors		No data	To be decided		
	Condom use rate of the contraceptive prevalence rate	2003	UNICEF/CSO MICS	5%		
	% of population aged 15-49 with comprehensive and correct knowledge of HIV/AIDS		No data	To be decided	≥50%	
	Contraceptive prevalence rate	2003	UNICEF/CSO MICS	National - 6% Urban - 10% Rural - 6%		National-10%
	Proportion of blood samples screened for HIV/AIDS and STDs		No data	To be decided		100%
	Proportion of women's unmet needs for family planning met		No data	To be decided		50%
	Proportion of IV drug users are in treatment by 2015		No data	To be decided		60%
	Prevalence and death rates associated with malaria	2003	WHO	Reported cases represent 2.67% of the total population. It is difficult to clearly attribute deaths to malaria		
Target 11. Have halted by 2020 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases	Proportion of population in malaria risk areas using effective malaria prevention and treatment measures	2003	WHO	18%		80%
	Prevalence and death rates associated with tuberculosis	2005	WHO	Active cases: 333/100,000 population per year. Deaths: 100/100,000 population per year		
	Proportion of TB cases detected and cured under DOTS	2005	WHO	Cases detected and cured: 24%		70% detected and 85% treated

therefore critical to focus particularly on the poor in any strategy to halt and reverse the spread of these two diseases.



Chapter 10:

ENSURE

ENVIRONMENTAL

SUSTAINABILITY

(GOAL 7)







ENSURE ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY (GOAL 7)

- ◆ *Afghanistan has experienced significant environmental degradation over the last twenty-five years. Its forest cover is fast declining. Between 1978 and 2002, conifer forests in the provinces of Nangarhar, Kunar and Nuristan have been reduced by an average of 50%.*
- ◆ *More than half of all Afghans living in urban centres have no access to drinking water from improved water sources. In rural areas, it is estimated that 4 out of every 5 Afghans may be drinking contaminated water. Environmental degradation limits the availability of safe drinking water. Lack of access to clean water is often a cause of water-borne diseases.*
- ◆ *Since the drought of 1999-2002, the water table has sunk significantly in many areas, forcing Afghans to build more expensive tube wells to access deeper water. In some areas water use is not sustainable.*
- ◆ *With a large increase in the number of vehicles and generators running on poor quality fuel, there has been a drastic increase in air pollution in the major cities.*
- ◆ *Only 1 in 3 Afghans in urban areas has access to improved sanitation. In rural areas, the situation is much worse, with only 1 out of 10 Afghans having access to improved sanitation.*
- ◆ *Nearly three-fourths of the urban population is estimated to live in slums.*



Chapter 10

CAN AFGHANISTAN MEET THE TARGETS FOR ENSURING ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY?


	Will the target be met?	State of policy environment?
Target 12. Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources	Lack of data	Weak but improving
Target 13. Halve, by 2020, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and sanitation	Potentially	Fair
Target 14. By 2020 to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of all slum dwellers	Lack of data	Fair
Assessment scales	Probably Potentially Unlikely Lack of data	Strong Fair Weak but improving Weak

SUMMARY

- ◆ Environmental degradation affects growth in the agriculture sector and negatively affects the lives of the poor. The most vulnerable, such as female-headed households, households with physically disabled members, landless households or those farming only small rain-fed plots suffer the most. This is true of both the urban and rural poor, who suffer from lack of access to safe water, basic sanitation, and sustainable energy sources.
- ◆ The forests and woodlands of Afghanistan supply important sources of firewood and construction materials critical for cooking, shelter and overall survival. Afghans in rural areas rely almost entirely on solid fuels. With an increasing population, there will be growing use of wood for cooking and thus an increasing loss of forest cover, if no urgent action is taken. Also, illegal commercial timber logging constitutes a massive threat for the survival of forests in Afghanistan.
- ◆ With the loss of forests and vegetation, and excessive grazing and dry land cultivation, soils are being exposed to serious erosion from wind and rain. Land productivity is declining, driving people from rural to urban areas in search of food and employment.
- ◆ In urban centres, poor waste management practices and the lack of modern sanitation and sewage systems are the primary environmental factors affecting human health. Moreover, levels of air pollution in Afghan cities, particularly in Kabul, Kandahar and Mazar-i-Sharif, appear to be high.
- ◆ Environmental degradation has a significant impact on the availability of and access to clean drinking water. Lack of access to improved water sources and poor sanitation is a major contributory factor to poor health outcomes, for children in particular. More than half of all Afghans living in urban centres have no access to water from improved water sources. In rural areas, it is estimated that 4 out of every 5 Afghans may be drinking contaminated water.
- ◆ Only 1 in 3 Afghans in urban areas has access to improved sanitation. In rural areas, only 1 out of 10 Afghans has access to improved sanitation. In rural areas, the focus is on the need for hygiene education and improved latrines; in urban areas there is greater need for increasing access to functioning sewage systems.
- ◆ Nearly 75% of the urban population, estimated at close to 5 million, may be living in slums. Afghanistan also has the highest rate of urbanisation in Asia, 6% per year, which puts a high burden on the already weak service delivery in urban centres.

Meeting the targets

- ◆ Afghanistan must increase the proportion of land area under protected forests and the forest and vegetation cover, while developing a system capable of genuinely implementing forest protection in the face of resistance from powerful timber mafias. The Afghan population must have access to cheap non-solid fuels. Examples of other poor countries show that it is possible to achieve a transition from the use of coal and wood toward gas and solar energy over a period of 20 years. Also, rural electrification should be actively developed.
- ◆ Increased access to improved water sources and improved sanitation will not only contribute to achieving the MDG on environmental sustainability but also enable the achievement of other goals through reducing the overall disease burden of the population, and especially child morbidity and mortality.



GLOBAL MDG TARGETS AND INDICATORS

==> *Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources*

- ◆ Proportion of land area covered by forest
- ◆ Ratio of area protected to maintain biological diversity to surface area
- ◆ Energy use (kg oil equivalent) per US\$1,000 GDP (PPP)
- ◆ Carbon dioxide emissions (per capita) and consumption of ozone-depleting CFCs
- ◆ Proportion of population using solid fuels

==> *Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and sanitation*

- ◆ Proportion of population with sustainable access to an improved water source, urban and rural
- ◆ Proportion of population with access to improved sanitation, urban and rural

==> *By 2020 to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of all slum dwellers*

- ◆ Proportion of households with access to secure tenure

AFGHANISTAN'S REVISED MDG TARGETS AND INDICATORS

==> *Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources*

- ◆ Proportion of land area covered by forest
- ◆ Ratio of area protected to maintain biological diversity to surface area
- ◆ Energy use (kg oil equivalent) per US\$1,000 GDP (PPP)
- ◆ Carbon dioxide emissions (per capita) and consumption of ozone-depleting CFCs
- ◆ Proportion of population using solid fuels

==> *Halve, by 2020, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and sanitation*

- ◆ Proportion of population with sustainable access to an improved water source, urban and rural
- ◆ Proportion of population with access to improved sanitation, urban and rural

==> *By 2020 to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of all slum dwellers*

- ◆ Proportion of households with access to secure tenure

The targets within the Goal of Ensuring Environmental Sustainability encompass sustainable development, access to safe drinking water and improvement in the lives of slum dwellers. In Afghanistan, there is a notable general lack of reliable and recent data on environmental indicators such as the forest cover, protected areas, energy use and carbon dioxide emissions.

STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN AFGHANISTAN

Of Afghanistan's almost 650,000 square kilometres of total land area, only 12% is arable, with 5% irrigated and 7% un-irrigated.⁷⁷ An additional 46% is under permanent pasture and some 2.1% under forest cover. Of the total arable area, not more than half is cultivated annually, mainly because of lack of access to irrigation.

In a country where over 80% of the population relies directly on the natural resource base to meet its daily needs, widespread environmental degradation poses an immense threat to livelihoods (Box 10.1). The depletion of forests and vegetation through illegal harvesting, widespread grazing and dry land cultivation increases soil and riverbank erosion and draws down the water table (Box 10.2). This leads to further decrease in productivity of the land base and

increased flood risk. It also causes hills around villages to become unstable, which contributed to deadly mudslides in the spring of 2005. Moreover, habitats for animals and plants disappear, which further strains food sources. All these factors contribute to accelerated rural out-migration.⁷⁸ Environmental degradation in Afghanistan is both the result of and one of the causes of socio-economic inequities.

Box 10.1: Environmental degradation: The vicious cycle

In certain circumstances, poverty and environmental damage are caught in a downward spiral - i.e., past resource degradation deepens today's poverty, while today's poverty makes it very hard to care for or restore the vitality and the carrying capacity of the ecosystems. [...] People in poverty are forced to deplete resources to survive, a process that further impoverishes them [...]. When this self-reinforcing downward spiral peaks, poor people are forced to move in increasing numbers to other ecologically fragile lands of the country. Such was the case of displacements of tens of thousands of poor people from the provinces of Badghis and Ghor during the recent years of drought to the barren lands of Herat; or the displacements of tens of thousands of people from Nimroz and Farah provinces, which are ecologically extremely poor and fragile parts of Afghanistan, in the aftermath of the sandstorms of 2002 and 2003 [...], respectively.

- Saba (2004)



Box 10.2: Water is the key

Water is key to the health and well-being of Afghanistan's people, and essential to maintain agricultural productivity [...]. However, both surface and groundwater resources have been severely affected by the drought, as well as by uncoordinated and unmanaged extraction. Water resources across the country are also threatened by contamination from waste dumps, chemicals and open sewers. Many of the country's wetlands are completely dry and no longer support wildlife populations or provide agricultural inputs. Furthermore, wind-blown sediments were in-filling irrigation canals and reservoirs, as well as covering roads, fields and villages, with an overall effect of increasing local vulnerability to drought. Improved water resource management will, in many regions, be an essential first step in rebuilding rural communities and improving human health. Maintaining water quality and quantity should be the overriding goal of all land-use planning activities and integrated water basin planning should be implemented across the country.

- Source: UNEP (2003)

Wood is Afghanistan's oil, but the forests are dwindling

In the 1960s and 1970s, 4-6% of the land was reportedly covered by forest. There has been no primary data since the FAO Land Cover Assessment in 1993, which showed the proportion of land covered by canopy-closed forest systems as 2.1%. Between 1978 and 2002, conifer forests in the provinces of Nangarhar, Kunar and Nuristan have been reduced by an average of 50%.⁷⁹ The growing scarcity, along with surging demand from Kabul's revived economy, has increased prices of firewood fivefold and of construction timber sevenfold since Taliban times. "Wood is Afghanistan's oil - a key resource that everyone worries is running out."⁸⁰ Most of Afghanistan's forest cover is on the monsoon-fed mountain slopes facing east toward Pakistan, and demand also comes from timber merchants in Pakistan, who collaborate with Afghan partners to cut timber illegally in Afghanistan and export it to Pakistan.

It is difficult to set realistic goals for 2015 and 2020 due to the complexity of the problem, the lack of data, and the lack of experience of the government in this area. The government is formulating a new land-use policy to help curb illegal logging - a major problem, especially along the border with Pakistan. The 'forest management' model has been proposed, by which local people receive limited rights to cut trees, giving them a stake in managing the forests.⁸¹ Putting areas under legal protection and enforcing this protection can also help safeguard forests. Currently, only 0.34% of the total land area in Afghanistan is protected by law.⁸² The Government aims to increase this proportion to 0.5% of the total land area by 2015.

There is currently no data available on energy use in Afghanistan, although the HIES and the NRVA 2005 are likely to yield some useful information on this aspect. Cooking with gas is much more frequent in urban than rural areas. With an increasing population, there will be growing use of wood as a

combustible and a corresponding loss in forest and vegetation cover. The proportion of the population using solid fuels is as high as 100% in rural areas⁸³ and should be brought down to 90% in rural areas and 80% in urban areas by 2015. Achieving this objective depends on the availability of alternative energy sources as well as the level of awareness of communities.

Afghan cities are unhealthy environments

In urban centres, poor waste management practices (including medical wastes), the lack of modern sewage systems,⁸⁴ dust and vehicle and generator emissions are the main environmental factors affecting human health. Most vehicles are old and poorly maintained, and generators run on poor quality fuel. During winters, this is compounded by the use of ovens, stoves and open fires by the population, and toxic fumes that result from the burning of plastic and tires when people face a shortage of firewood and electricity. Even the small amount of data currently available shows that 'the levels of air pollution in Afghan cities are above recommended international norms'.⁸⁵

The Government recognises that "high levels of air pollution can cause such illnesses as severe bronchitis, emphysema, allergies and asthma as well as cardiac problems"⁸⁶ It is believed that "there are also high levels of lead in the air, which has been shown to slow the physical and intellectual growth of children."⁸⁷


Unlike in many other countries, carbon dioxide emissions and consumption of ozone-depleting CFCs, with a value of less than or equal to 0.046 metric ton per capita in 1999, do not contribute to environmental degradation in Afghanistan.⁸⁸ As it is not a heavily industrialised country, there is no need for setting a target for this indicator. But Afghanistan does have an obligation to develop, periodically update and publish national inventories of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases and to formulate and implement programmes for climate change mitigation and national adaptation plans.

Lack of access to clean drinking water and poor sanitation is a major contributory factor to morbidity and mortality among Afghans

"Water and sanitation is one of the primary drivers of public health. [This] means that once we can secure access to clean water and to adequate sanitation facilities for all people, irrespective of the difference in their living conditions, a huge battle against all kinds of diseases will be won."

Source: WHO Director-General

Environmental degradation has an important impact on the availability of and access to clean drinking water. Lack of access to clean water together with poor sanitation are major contributory factors to poor health outcomes, for children in particular. According to WHO, 88% of diarrhoeal diseases globally - one of the main killer diseases of children under five years of age - is attributed to unsafe water supply, inadequate sanitation and hygiene.




It is estimated that only 23% of households in Afghanistan have sustainable access to an improved water source (Map 10.1).⁸⁹ There is a clear urban-rural divide, with 43% of households in urban areas having access against only 18% in rural areas.⁹⁰ The government has set the benchmark to halve the proportion of Afghans without sustainable access to an improved water source to 38.5% by the year 2020. The rural water and sanitation programme of the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development and the ongoing water supply project in 12 urban centres of Afghanistan will contribute to achieving this target.

According to the MICS 2003, 26% households have a water source and 35% have a latrine within their compound. Among those households with a water source within their compounds, 67% of the water sources are at a distance of 15 metres or less from the latrine. These cannot be considered safe. In urban centres, a "large majority of urban residents draws water from wells or traditional canals and streams, which are at great risk of contamination from sewage and other pollutants."⁹¹

The issues for sanitation are different in urban and rural areas. In rural areas, there is a focus on the need for hygiene education and improved latrines. In urban areas there is more a need for functioning sewage systems. Nationally only 12% of households have access to improved sanitation.⁹² While 28% of urban dwellers have access, the proportion in rural areas is as little as 8%. The government has set the target in Afghanistan to halving the proportion of people without access to improved sanitation to 44% by 2020.

Map 10.1: A large proportion of households do not have access to an improved drinking water source



Source: MICS 2003

Three-fourths of urban Afghans live in slums

Communities living in areas with poor quality housing, high-density housing environments lacking in services, and often with insecure rights can broadly be considered to live in slums. The internationally agreed definition of a slum is a composite definition covering these different aspects (Box 10.3).

The urban population in Afghanistan is estimated at 4.9 million, which corresponds to approximately 20 to 25% of all Afghans living inside Afghanistan. Afghanistan also has the highest rate of urbanisation in Asia, 6% per year, which puts a high burden on the already weak service delivery in urban centres. The five cities of Kandahar, Jalalabad, Herat, Mazar and Kabul are estimated to house 80% of Afghanistan's urban population. The proportion of the urban population that lives in slums in Afghanistan is estimated to be slightly over 76%.⁹³ A baseline will be established from NRVA 2005 information on secure tenure.

Box 10.3: What is a slum?

A slum is defined as an area or community lacking in any one or more of the internationally agreed five slum sub-indicators:

1. **Access to Water:** Water supply must be safe water that does not require undue effort to obtain.
2. **Access to Sanitation:** Access to adequate sanitation where excreta disposal systems are in the form of private toilet or are available to a reasonable number of household members.
3. **Secure Tenure:** Secure tenure is the right of all individuals and groups to effective protection by the State from forced evictions. People are insecure if a) If they lack documentary evidence of secure status b) If they have perceptions of insecurity from forced evictions.
4. **Durable Housing:** Housing is durable if it is located in a non-dangerous location (for example a non-flood area) and provides adequate protection against climatic conditions for example against: heat, rain, cold and humidity.
5. **Sufficient Living Area:** Provision of enough living area so houses are not overcrowded.

Source: UN-Habitat (2005)



AFGHANISTAN'S REVISED MDG TARGETS, INDICATORS AND BASELINES

Target	Indicator	Baseline year	Data source	Baseline value	Targets	
					2015	2020
Target 12. Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources	Proportion of land area covered by forest	1993	FAO	2.1%		
	Ratio of area protected to maintain biological diversity to surface area	2004	CSO	34%	0.5%	
	Energy use (kg oil equivalent) per US \$1,000 GDP (PPP)	2005	No data	To be decided		
	Carbon dioxide emissions (per capita) and consumption of ozone-depleting CFCs	2005		No data		
	Proportion of population using solid fuels	2003	NRVA	Rural 100%	Rural 90%	Urban 80%
Target 13. Halve, by 2020, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and sanitation	Proportion of population with sustainable access to an improved water source, urban and rural	2003	MICS; UNICEF Best Estimate 2005	23%		61.5%
	Proportion of population with access to improved sanitation, urban and rural	2003	MICS; UNICEF Best Estimate 2005	12%		66%
Target 14. By 2020 to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of all slum dwellers	Proportion of households with access to secure tenure	2005	NRVA	To be decided		

MEETING THE TARGETS

To achieve the MDG on environmental sustainability, a number of measures must be urgently undertaken. Besides increasing the proportion of land areas under protection and ensuring effective protection as well as increased afforestation, the Afghan population must have access to cheap non-solid fuels. Examples of other poor countries show that it is possible to achieve a transition from the use of coal and wood toward gas and solar energy in 20 years.

Also, increasing electrification should be pursued in rural areas. Currently, only 6% of the Afghan population have access to a regular supply of electricity, "and electricity consumption per capita at 12 kwh/year is among the lowest in the world; only 234,000 customers are connected to the public grid, approximately 30% of whom are in Kabul. The other provinces have even less access, and rural areas are virtually un-served."⁹⁴ Modern or efficient energy services are a pre-requisite for increasing productivity and improving the quality of life. "Gender equity and energy issues are also intertwined. For example, measures to reduce the gender gap in education will be difficult as long as girls' time is taken up with fuel collection instead of attending school. With increasing urbanisation and migration of rural poor in search of jobs and income, access to energy will be of major concern even in the urban and peri-urban areas. While increasing consumption is imperative, it will bring its own challenges."⁹⁵

It is anticipated that by 2010, energy consumption in the South Asian region will account for one-fifth of global consumption. This could translate into increased pressure on fossil fuels and the forests for fuel wood collection, impairing the goal of

reaching environmental sustainability, should alternative strategies not have been put in place. Strategies must aim at improving access to pro-poor, pro-environment and pro-women sources of energy, promoting its efficient use, and devising ways of financing sustainable energy development.⁹⁶

Achieving the MDG on environmental sustainability and contributing to the achievement of other Goals, through reducing the overall disease burden of the population and more particularly child morbidity and mortality, requires better access to safe drinking water and improved sanitation while at the same time raising awareness of the population on hygiene practices.

Challenges for natural resource and environmental management consist in still weak institutional capacities and the absence of legislation in many areas. Linked to this is the need to develop awareness and monitoring systems, which would allow the government to establish a link between the quality of health and environmental conditions. On the part of the communities, there is a lack of awareness of sound environmental practices, which needs to be addressed at the same time as their livelihoods and economic conditions are improved. Communities must become owners of their natural resource base and feel that they actively participate in economic growth.

All major cities have outgrown their Master Plans, and settlements have developed in unplanned areas and on government land. Security of tenure will dramatically improve the lives of slum dwellers and facilitate provision of urban services and investment in settlement areas.



Chapter 11:
DEVELOP A GLOBAL
PARTNERSHIP FOR
DEVELOPMENT
(Goal 8)







DEVELOP A GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR DEVELOPMENT (Goal 8)

- ◆ *The state's ability to undertake even medium-term fiscal planning is severely limited, with disbursements continually falling short of pledges and no means of predicting future revenues over several years.*
- ◆ *Investments in the social sectors, particularly in health, education, and management of key resources such as water, and the proportion of aid going for reconstruction and development, will have to increase sharply for Afghanistan to have a reasonable chance of achieving the MDGs.*
- ◆ *Nearly three-fourths of the ODA to Afghanistan is in the form of tied aid. Evidence from other countries shows that tied aid is 25% less effective than untied aid. Donor assistance that goes through the Government budget enables the state to develop capacity and enhance its legitimacy. Increased proportion of international assistance should support the national budget either directly or through trust funds.*
- ◆ *To enable Afghanistan to embark on the path toward sustainable development, per capita ODA needs to double and be sustained at this level for over seven years.*
- ◆ *While sustained external financial assistance is critical for Afghanistan's development, increased mobilisation of domestic revenue is equally important to reduce long-term aid dependence.*
- ◆ *Afghanistan and its neighbours need to transform their relationship from one based on fears of destabilisation to one based on a common interest in cooperation. Key to this change is the transformation of Afghanistan to a land bridge for the region through investment in regional transport infrastructure, simplification and harmonisation of border procedures, management of water resources, and management of population movements, including for labour migration purposes.*



CAN AFGHANISTAN MEET THE TARGETS FOR DEVELOPING A GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR DEVELOPMENT?

	Will the target be met?	State of policy environment?
Target 15. Deal comprehensively and influence the provision of foreign aid through appropriate measures to enable Afghanistan to develop sustainably in long-term	Potentially	Fair
Target 16. Develop an open, rule-based predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system including a commitment to good governance, development and poverty reduction	Potentially	Fair
Target 17. Develop and implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth	Lack of data	Weak but improving
Target 18. In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable essential drugs	Lack of data	Weak but improving
Target 19. In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications	Potentially	Fair
Assessment scale	Probably Potentially Unlikely Lack of data	Strong Fair Weak but improving Weak

SUMMARY

- ◆ Donors disbursed US \$8.4 billion for Afghanistan between January 2002 and March 2005. This is less than what was pledged. Furthermore, many of the disbursed funds are spent on overhead and technical assistance (foreign consultants), while there are lengthy delays in expenditure and implementation. If these trends continue over the next years, the government's ability to undertake medium-term fiscal planning will be adversely affected.
- ◆ To meet the MDGs in Afghanistan, the level of investment in the security sector, transport and infrastructure must be maintained. At the same time, MDG achievement also hinges on a significant increase of investments in the social sector.
- ◆ The proportion of tied aid is three times more than the proportion of untied aid. This needs to be reversed, since research shows that tied aid is 25% less effective than untied aid. In addition, tied aid undermines government authority and does not build government capacity.
- ◆ ODA needs to be increased to as much as US \$168 per capita from the current US \$83 and sustained at this level over a 7 year period to make Afghanistan a financially self-sustaining state with the capacity to meet basic social needs and embark on the process of poverty eradication. The larger amounts of aid should increasingly go to build government legitimacy and capacity through direct or indirect support of the government budget.
- ◆ Donors must support region-wide investments in transport infrastructure, customs and security cooperation, a manpower and labour regime, and management of natural resources (especially water) to help Afghanistan mitigate the disadvantages that result from its situation as a landlocked country. This may require donors to create regional entities within their own bureaucracies and budgets to assure that regional planning and investment takes place.
- ◆ A much greater proportion of assistance will be needed for capacity building of government at both the national and sub-national levels in financial planning and management, accounting and auditing systems, and in effectively opening up and broadening decision making processes so that investments meet the real needs of local peoples and communities.
- ◆ The development of the Interim ANDS in 2005 and the full ANDS in 2006 provides the opportunity for donors to support the government in prioritising policy choices for the period until 2010. However, this involvement also obliges donors to enhance the overall effectiveness of aid by better aligning their support around the priorities articulated in the ANDS, and by harmonising and simplifying their policies and practices.



GLOBAL MDG TARGETS AND INDICATORS

- ==> ***Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system***
- ==> ***Address the special needs of the Least Developed Countries***
- ==> ***Address the special needs of landlocked developing countries and Small Island Developing States***
- ==> ***Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term***
 - ◆ Net ODA as % of DAC donors' GNI
 - ◆ Proportion of ODA of OECD/DAC donors to basic social services (basic education, primary health care, nutrition, safe water and sanitation)
 - ◆ Proportion of ODA that is untied
 - ◆ Proportion of ODA for environment in Small Island Developing States
 - ◆ Proportion of ODA for transport sector in landlocked countries
 - ◆ Proportion of exports admitted free of duties and quotas
 - ◆ Average tariffs and quotas on agricultural products, textiles and clothing
 - ◆ Domestic and export agricultural subsidies in OECD countries
 - ◆ Proportion of ODA provided to help build trade capacity
 - ◆ Proportion of official bilateral HIPC debt cancelled
 - ◆ Debt services as a percentage of exports of goods and services
 - ◆ Proportion of ODA provided as debt relief
 - ◆ Number of countries reaching HIPC decision and completion points
- ==> ***In cooperation with developing countries, develop and implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth***
 - ◆ Unemployment rate of young people aged 15-24 years, each sex and total
- ==> ***In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable essential drugs in developing***
 - ◆ Proportion of population with access to affordable essential drugs on a sustainable basis
- ==> ***In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications***
 - ◆ Telephone lines and cellular subscribers per 1,000 population
 - ◆ Personal computers in use per 100 population and Internet users per 1,000 population

AFGHANISTAN'S REVISED MDG TARGETS AND INDICATORS

- ==> ***Deal comprehensively and influence the provision of foreign aid through appropriate measures to enable Afghanistan develop sustainably in long-term***
 - ◆ Proportion of total bilateral, sector-allocable ODA of OECD/DAC donors to basic social services (basic education, primary health care, nutrition, safe water and sanitation)
 - ◆ Proportion of bilateral ODA of OECD/DAC donors that is untied
 - ◆ ODA received as proportion of its GNI
 - ◆ Proportion of ODA provided to help build trade capacity
- ==> ***Develop an open, rule-based predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system including a commitment to good governance, development and poverty reduction***
 - ◆ Percentage of total export to countries with which Afghanistan has a preferential trade agreement
- ==> ***In cooperation with developing countries, develop and implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth***
 - ◆ Unemployment rate of young people aged 15-24 years, each sex and total
- ==> ***In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries***
 - ◆ Proportion of population with access to affordable essential drugs on a sustainable basis
- ==> ***In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications***
 - ◆ Telephone lines and cellular subscribers per 1,000 population
 - ◆ Personal computers in use per 100 population and Internet users per 1,000 population



The UN Millennium Declaration and the Monterrey Consensus make it clear that countries are primarily responsible for achieving Goals 1-7. Goal 8 aims to leverage global commitments to reducing poverty by building on mutual responsibilities between poor and rich countries. Thus, rich countries should increase assistance for poor countries that demonstrate good-faith efforts to mobilise domestic resources, undertake policy reforms, strengthen institutions and tackle aspects of weak governance.⁹⁷ This framework of global partnership is essential for Afghanistan.

Afghanistan is committed to achieving the MDGs, but it cannot do so on its own. Large injections of donor financing will be needed to invest much more in the social sectors, agriculture, infrastructure and water and sanitation. Afghanistan cannot wait until economic growth generates enough domestic savings and raises household incomes. In fact, these core investments are needed to lay the foundation for economic growth. Thus, sustained support of the international donors is vital for Afghanistan's future development and security and progress towards the MDGs.

International assistance to Afghanistan is not charity. It is an investment in stability, peace building, and development at local, regional, and global levels, which will enhance regional stability, reduce the global threats of drugs and terrorism, and lower the associated defence and security-related costs of many nations. However, to analyse the progress in moving towards the various targets within this Goal, it is necessary to adapt them to the Afghan context. All targets are not relevant for Afghanistan. The subsequent discussion will focus on the revised set of targets and indicators for developing a global partnership for Afghanistan's development.

CHARACTERISTICS OF AID FLOW TO AFGHANISTAN

The increasing gap between pledges and disbursements as well as the reluctance or inability of donors to make multi-year commitments limit the government's ability to plan ahead

Donor pledges for the period January 2002 - March 2005 totalled nearly US \$11 billion, with commitments reaching slightly over US \$10 billion. Close to 80% of the amount pledged has been disbursed.⁹⁸ The overall amount of funding disbursed for Afghanistan per year has increased from US \$2.4 billion to US \$3 billion between 2002-03 and 2004-05, but the gap between pledges and disbursements has also increased during this period (Box 11.1 and Chart 11.1). While not necessarily an indication of donor fatigue, the uncertainty surrounding the amount of money to be received limits the heavily aid-dependent government's ability to undertake medium-term fiscal planning and can affect the delivery of programmes and services to achieve the MDGs.

Many governments also commit themselves to aid only for their current annual budgetary cycle. This constrains the ability of the Afghan government to plan multi-year projects or to project what its resources will be. For instance, it cannot plan how many schools or clinics to build without knowing how many teachers or health-care workers it will be able to pay.

Investments in the health and education sectors must be stepped up to attain the MDGs

Currently, investments in the security sector, transport and infrastructure outweigh those in the social sectors.⁹⁹ Of the disbursements in the period January 2002-March 2004, just about 10% were spent on the health and education sectors (Chart 11.2). While the spending on security and provision of infrastructure for growth of the private sector is necessary under the present circumstances, achievement of many MDGs hinges on significant investments in the social sectors, in particular for primary education; improved maternal and child health; and reducing the incidence and prevalence of major diseases.

Box 11.1: Aid terminology

Pledge: Grant or loan resources promised by a donor to Afghanistan.


Commitment: Written agreement of a donor to provide funds for a programme, project or Trust Fund.

Disbursement: Transfer of funds from the donor to the Afghan Treasury, a United Nations entity, an NGO, a private contractor or to a Trust Fund.

Expenditures: Actual spending of disbursed funds.


Source: Ministry of Finance

Chart 11.1: Growing gap between aid pledges and disbursements (2002-05)



Source: Data provided by Ministry of Finance

Chart 11.2: Education and health were allocated only 10% of the national budget between January 2002 and March 2004



Source: Data provided by Ministry of Finance


The proportion of aid going for reconstruction and development will have to increase sharply to improve Afghanistan's chances of meeting the MDGs

Since the early-1990s, Afghanistan has been dependent on external aid, which was purely for emergency purposes until 2001. The Bonn Agreement in December 2001 signified a change of focus of the international community, with increased amounts going for reconstruction, development and the building of democratic political institutions. But emergency assistance remains the biggest proportion of external funding at present. Of the US \$ 1.4 billion disbursed by the United Nations System in Afghanistan between January 2002 and December 2004, 73% was spent on humanitarian assistance,¹⁰⁰ 10% on supporting political processes (Emergency Loya Jirga, Constitutional Loya Jirga, Voter Registration, Presidential Election), 7% on supporting Government programmes and building capacity, 6% on the DDR programme, and 4% on the Afghan Interim Authority Fund (AIAF) programme to pay salaries of civil servants during the first six months of 2002 (Chart 11.3). The proportion of aid for reconstruction and development will have to increase sharply to improve Afghanistan's prospects of meeting the MDGs.

More assistance should be channelled through the Government Budget to develop the state's capacity and enhance its legitimacy

A particular feature of the aid flow to Afghanistan is that most of the external assistance is channelled through United Nations entities, non-government organisations (NGOs) and private contractors. The Government of Afghanistan distinguishes its core budget – that part executed by the government itself—from an “external national development budget.” The former, including both ordinary recurrent

Chart 11.3: Most UN assistance to Afghanistan in 2002-04 was for humanitarian purposes



Source: Data provided by United Nations Country Team (2005)

expenditures and capital outlays for development, is what other countries simply call the budget. In an attempt to gain some strategic leverage over the far larger expenditures that are executed directly by donors, international agencies, NGOs, and contractors, the Afghan government conceives of these expenditures as composing an “external” budget, over which it has no direct control, but which it seeks to make conform to official priorities.

During the period January 2002 – March 2004, 71.5% of international assistance (a sum of more than US\$ 3 billion) flowed through the External National Development Budget, rather than through the Government's Core Budget (Treasury). Even though resources that bypass the Government Budget still finance key national priorities and projects contained in the National Development Budget, this trend is a reflection of a lack of donor confidence in the government's ability to manage funds and oversee programme implementation on a large scale. It is expected that this share will decrease progressively in the coming years.

The core budget includes expenditures financed by donors through the trust funds which are managed by international organisations: the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) managed by the World Bank, and LOTFA and the Counter Narcotics Trust Fund managed by UNDP. The advantage of these arrangements is that donors can support the government budget without depositing money directly to the Treasury. Instead, they give their aid to the agencies managing the funds, which then disburse it to the government in return for adequately documented and accountable qualifying expenditures. This process thus empowers the Government as a decision maker and also requires it to build its capacity for accountability.

Nearly two-thirds of the aid is “tied” and thus not as effective as it could be


A large proportion of aid to Afghanistan comes as tied aid. In 2004-05 discretionary, or un-tied, donor commitments (including donations to trust funds) comprised only 26% of the total, and non-discretionary, or tied, funds made up the remaining 74%. For 2005-06 these proportions have not changed much (Chart 11.4). Tied aid is costly for recipient countries as it limits their ability to make decisions on the allocation and use of resources. Recent research has found that tied aid is 25% less effective than untied aid.¹⁰¹ Donors should, in line with the 2001 OECD/DAC recommendation on untying ODA to LDCs, untie their assistance to Afghanistan to the greatest extent possible for improved aid effectiveness and to build the capacity and legitimacy of the government.

MAGNITUDE OF AID FLOW

Per capita ODA needs to double from its 2002 value and be sustained at this level for seven years

In 2002 net per capita ODA received was just above US \$83 (Chart 11.5). This is higher than the average of US \$25 for Least Developed Countries as a whole but is far less than the amounts received by post-conflict countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, East Timor and Serbia-Montenegro three to seven years after the end of conflict. Afghanistan's requirement for reconstruction and poverty reduction was estimated at US \$28 billion over 7 years, which amounts to approximately US \$168 per capita per annum.¹⁰² This amount needs to be met and sustained over seven years to attain the basic development goals.

Chart 11.4: Most of the external funding is tied aid




Source: Data from Ministry of Finance

On its part, Afghanistan needs to strengthen its domestic capacities for planning and project implementation, improve monitoring and evaluation, ensure better institutional coordination among government agencies involved in negotiating and utilising aid, and achieve greater decentralisation of project implementation, where feasible and desirable.¹⁰³

But long-term aid dependence must be avoided through increased mobilisation of domestic revenue

Although still very modest, domestic revenue has continuously increased during 2001-05 (Table 11.1). Achieving fiscal self-sufficiency is one of the cornerstones of state building in Afghanistan and the government aims to meet its own domestic wage bill by 2010-11. But the state needs adequate funding to effectively carry out its functions and ensure delivery of services until domestic revenues are high enough to finance the bulk of the operating budget.¹⁰⁴

Chart 11.5: Afghanistan's ODA per capita is much less than that of other post-conflict countries



Note: The years in brackets indicate the end of conflict and/or conclusion of peace agreement.
Source: UNDP Human Development Reports 1995-2003

Table 11.1: Growth in domestic revenue (2002-06)

	2002-03	2003-04	2004-05	2005-06**
Domestic revenue (US \$million)	132	208	262	352***
Foreign assistance (US \$million)	2441*	2424	2932	3181
GDP (US \$million, excluding narcotics sector)	4084	4585	5941	7095
Domestic revenue as % of total funding	5.4	8.5	8.9	11.1
Domestic revenue as % of GDP	3.2	4.5	4.4	5.0***
Foreign assistance as % of GDP	59.8	52.9	49.4	44.8

* This figure is for a 15-month period (January 2002-March 2003)

** Target

***In its fourth review under the staff-monitored programme for the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the IMF projects domestic revenue in 2005-06 at US\$ 368 million. This would bring it at 5.2% of GDP.

Source: MoF, IMF for GDP figures

Despite recent increases, domestic revenue “is still less than 5% of GDP, compared with a normal level of 11-14% in poor developing countries.”¹⁰⁵ The domestic revenue target is US\$ 352 million for the period 2005-06.¹⁰⁶ This falls well short of resources required to cover the present operating budget (projected by IMF as 9.3% of GDP in the current fiscal year). For 2005-06, an estimated sum of US \$3.2 billion in foreign assistance is required. While Afghanistan will continue to require increased external assistance because it will be unable to meet its basic needs from domestic resources in the next 10 to 15 years, it is at the same time important to increase domestic resource mobilisation to avoid long-term aid dependence.

Moving toward fiscal sustainability will require a continuing and strong long-term partnership between Afghanistan and the international community, building on the very good partnership that already exists. This will involve not only financial support but also cooperation and the strongest possible efforts by all stakeholders to make the assistance work better. Besides revenue mobilisation, key challenges will be the large impact of the security sector on fiscal sustainability, the need to maintain control over the civilian government wage bill, and the need for consistency of expenditure plans across government within the medium-term resource envelope.¹⁰⁷

TRADE

The removal of trade restrictions for facilitation of exports of LDCs has the potential to make a very significant contribution to raising incomes, boosting long-term economic growth, increasing financial flows for development, and thereby increasing the scope of domestic policy for reducing poverty. In the long run trade, when made part of an overall development strategy at the national level, provides a possible means by which countries can grow more sustainably, reducing their dependence on aid and debt relief.

Source: UNESCAP/UNDP (2005)

Though Afghanistan suffers from the hardships common to landlocked least developed countries, it could also potentially benefit from its strategic location. For centuries Afghanistan has been a hub connecting Asia, Europe and the Middle East. With the proper infrastructure, the country could function as a land bridge, connecting landlocked countries to the north and the Iranian and Pakistani seaports to the south. For the central Asian republics and the Russian industrial centres of western Siberia, Afghanistan is potentially the shortest route to the open sea. Sharing borders with six neighbours, Afghanistan could link the region into an extended market of more than two billion consumers.¹⁰⁸ Yet, landlocked countries such as Afghanistan are particularly disadvantaged in trade-related infrastructure (Box 11.2).

Trade does not obviate the need for large-scale ODA-supported development investments, but an open, equitable trading system can be a powerful driver of economic growth and poverty reduction, especially when combined with adequate aid.¹⁰⁹ Afghanistan's imports in 2003-04 totalled US \$2.1 billion, or 47% of non-drug GDP; non-drug exports amounted to just US \$144 million, representing a massive and unsustainable trade deficit of 43% of GDP (Charts 11.6, 11.7 and 11.8). The deficit is covered by foreign donor assistance, the operational expenditures of foreign entities in Afghanistan, remittances from Afghans abroad, and narcotics exports.¹¹⁰ The share of these various sorts of financing is not known, though the World Bank has attempted to make some estimates.

Afghanistan has had preferential trade agreements for a number of goods with the United States, Japan, Canada, India and the European Union respectively since 2003. A preferential trade pact between Afghanistan and Pakistan was proposed in February 2005. In addition, the Government of Afghanistan has concluded two trilateral transit and trade agreements with Iran and Turkmenistan, and Iran and Tajikistan respectively, as well as four bilateral transit and trade agreements with Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and India.



Box 11.2: Afghanistan: Carrying the burden of a landlocked state

Afghanistan is one of 16 landlocked countries classified as least developed.¹¹¹ The economic performance of landlocked developing countries is generally hampered by their geographical situation. Landlocked developing countries are mostly among the poorest of the developing countries, with the lowest growth rates, and are typically heavily dependent on a limited number of commodities for their export earnings.¹¹² In most cases, distance to the sea is excessive. Kazakhstan has the longest distance from the sea (3,750 km), followed by Afghanistan, Chad, Niger, Zambia and Zimbabwe with distances from the nearest seacoast in excess of 2,000 km. Transit time for goods of landlocked developing countries is long because of the long distances, difficult terrain, generally poor road and railway conditions and inefficiency of transit transport. The cost and time of transport for landlocked countries is a function not only of geographical distance to the sea, but also of the need for goods and people to cross international borders. Customs and migration controls often add as much time and cost to transport as the poor condition of roads, and may be made more efficient with a small financial investment, though only with political effort.

The key aspects of the landlocked countries' development are investments in transport infrastructure and effective regional cooperation. Investments in infrastructure development in landlocked countries within the regional context are crucial, and there is a need for a shift in evaluation of investment projects from a purely commercial focus to an approach that accounts for development and social needs.

Afghanistan's landlocked status puts a heavy burden on trade development, as there is a correlation between distance and costs for transporting goods. High transport costs erode the competitive edge of landlocked developing countries and trade volume. On average landlocked developing countries spend almost twice the average spent by developing countries on transport and insurance services and three times more than the average of developed economies.


Source: OHRLLS (<http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrls/lldc/default.htm>)

In future, Afghanistan needs to pursue dialogue with neighbouring states to enhance and sustain its integration into the regional economy and markets. To build trade competitiveness, the ANDS needs to emphasise investments in agricultural productivity, trade-related infrastructure and competitive export industries.

Empowering Afghanistan to become an integral part of the regional economy and beyond warrants focused financial and technical assistance by the international community to build capacity in trade negotiations and trade policy formulation. Also, supply-side constraints need to be addressed "that inhibit export responsiveness in LDCs and limit potential gains from trade liberalisation."¹¹³


Turning Afghanistan's landlocked position into a strategic position as a land bridge will require regionally coordinated investments. At present neither the region nor the donors have structures adequate to plan and finance projects that will pay off regionally rather than to just one state. Donors need to establish regional planning structures and budgetary lines, and the countries of the region need to develop a working group on these issues. Establishment of a multi-donor trust fund exclusively for regional projects might help create a focal point for such planning.

Chart 11.6: Afghanistan's imports dwarf its legal exports (US\$ million)




Source: Data from Ministry of Commerce

Chart 11.7: Afghanistan's export structure 2003-04 (excluding narcotics)



Source: IMF (2004)

Chart 11.8: Afghanistan's import structure (2003-04)



Source: IMF (2004)

YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT

"Rising unemployment takes a heavy toll among young people who are particularly vulnerable to shocks in the labor market. Lay-offs, restructuring and insufficient opportunities to enter the world of work condemn many to a life of economic hardship and despair. We have seen, all too often, the tragedy of young lives misspent in crime, drug abuse, civil conflict, and even terrorism."

Source: Annan (2003)

With an estimated 57% of its population under the age of 18, the MDG target to develop and implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth is critical for Afghanistan. However, until the data from the HIES and the NRVA 2005 surveys become available, there is no information on unemployment available for the specific age group 15-24 years as required by the global MDG indicator. It will thus be possible to monitor this indicator only from the next Progress Report to be produced in 2007.

ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE ESSENTIAL DRUGS

Essential drugs are one of the most cost-effective instruments in modern health care and their potential health impact is remarkable. Each year close to 10 million deaths occur globally that are due to acute respiratory infections, diarrhoeal diseases, tuberculosis, and malaria - all conditions for which safe, inexpensive, essential drugs can be life-saving. Simple iron-folate preparations can reduce maternal and child mortality from anemia of pregnancy; treatment of sexually transmitted diseases reduces transmission of the AIDS virus; and treatment of hypertension reduces heart attacks and strokes.¹¹⁴ But over one-third of the world's population, in the poorest parts of Africa and Asia, still lacks access to essential drugs. Fifty to ninety percent of drugs in developing and transitional economies are paid for out-of-pocket. The burden falls heaviest on the poor, who are not adequately protected by current policies.¹¹⁵

In Afghanistan the proportion of population with access to affordable essential drugs on a sustainable basis was estimated in the range of 50-80% in 1999.¹¹⁶ The WHO Action Programme on Essential Drugs interviews relevant experts in each country about the pharmaceutical situation. Therefore, the estimates are based on information from key informants only. This estimate, however, seems unrealistic given the overall very low figures for other health indicators. Possibly, the methodology used by the Action Programme on Essential Drugs may not be appropriate for Afghanistan and therefore leads to incorrect estimates.

INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY

The new information and communications technologies are among the driving forces of globalisation. They are bringing people together, and bringing decision makers unprecedented new tools for development. At the same time, however, the gap between information "haves" and "have-nots" is widening, and there is a real danger that the world's poor will be excluded from the emerging knowledge-based global economy.

Source: Annan (2002)

Information technology is a powerful force that can and must be harnessed to our global mission of peace and development. Over the long run it can only be productive and sustainable if it spreads worldwide and responds to the needs and demands of all people.¹¹⁷ World leaders have committed to "ensure that the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communication technologies, are available to all".

Overall, the country's tele-density (telephones per 1,000 population, both mobile and landline) is projected to increase from 1.6 in 2003 to 49 in 2010 and 120 in 2015.¹¹⁸ Targets for telephone and computer use are related to the expected rise in per-capita GDP. According to information from UNDP/ICT 2005, there are 900,000 mobile phone users and 100,000 users of landlines in Afghanistan. Already, this represents a tele-density of 4.2 fixed lines and 37.5 mobile phones.

To upgrade the use of information and communication technologies and to ensure access across Afghanistan, expansion of reliable electrical power and the modernisation and rapid expansion of telecommunications networks and services must be achieved. The government "sees information and communication technologies as a sector that can create opportunities for disadvantaged groups (including, among others, women and the disabled)", and will invest on an ongoing basis in developing these opportunities. Improved telecommunications can also improve the access of the rural poor to markets, whether by improving their knowledge on price movements or enabling them to sell handicrafts direct to consumers over the Internet.




AFGHANISTAN'S REVISED MDG TARGETS, INDICATORS AND BASELINES

Target	Indicator	Baseline year	Data source	Baseline value	Targets	
					2015	2020
Target 15. Deal comprehensively and influence the provision of foreign aid through appropriate measures to enable Afghanistan develop sustainably in the long term	Proportion of total bilateral, sector-allocable ODA of OECD/DAC donors to basic social services (basic education, primary health care, nutrition, safe water and sanitation)	MOF		To be decided		
	Proportion of bilateral ODA of OECD/DAC donors that is untied	2004-05	MOF	26%		
	ODA received as a proportion of GDP	2004-05	MOF, IMF	49%	To be decided	
	Proportion of ODA provided to help build capacity			Not available		
Target 16. Develop an open rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system that includes a commitment to good governance, development and poverty reduction	Percentage of total export to countries with which Afghanistan has a preferential trade agreement			Not available		
Target 17. Develop and implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth	Unemployment rate of young people aged 15-24 years, each sex and total			Not available		
Target 18. In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable, essential drugs	Proportion of population with access to affordable essential drugs on a sustainable basis	1999	WHO	50-80%		100%
Target 19. In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications	Telephone lines and cellular subscribers per 1,000 population	2003		1.6 & 37.5	120	
	Personal computers in use and Internet users per 1,000 population			Not available		



Chapter 12:
ENHANCE
SECURITY
(Goal 9)







ENHANCE SECURITY (Goal 9)

- ◆ *Enhancing security is essential for Afghanistan to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. Without security there is a real danger of reversal of the gains made in the last four years as seen from the evidence of other conflict-affected countries.*
- ◆ *Significant progress has been made in disarmament and demobilisation of the Afghan Military Forces but there remains a major challenge of disarming the illegal armed groups.*
- ◆ *The Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) are costly to maintain and will pose a significant challenge to fiscal sustainability. Although over time the amount allocated to the ANA from the national budget can be expected to decline, donor assistance will continue to be needed for some years to come.*
- ◆ *Many Afghans still face risks from landmines and unexploded ordnances, though there has been a decline in the number of incidents since 1979. Over 50% of all recent victims are children under the age of 18 years.*
- ◆ *About 2 million people rely on poppy production for their livelihoods. Eliminating poppy production will require effective strategies to provide farmers with alternative livelihoods and income generating opportunities. Failure to adopt a pro-poor approach risks increasing poverty in the short-term.*
- ◆ *Security sector reform must be accompanied with the rule of law if people are to feel more secure and for widespread development. Reforms in both the security and justice sectors must be sequenced and synchronised.*
- ◆ *Securing Afghanistan requires promoting economic growth with employment opportunities and investment in effective security sector reforms.*

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Chapter 12

CAN AFGHANISTAN MEET THE TARGETS FOR ENHANCING SECURITY?

	Will the target be met?	State of policy environment?
Target 20. Reform and professionalise the Afghan National Army by 2010	Probably	Fair
Target 21. Reform, restructure and professionalise the Afghan National Police by 2010	Potentially	Fair
Target 22. Reduce the misuse of weapons, and reduce the proportion of illegally held weapons by 2010	Potentially	Fair
Target 23. All emplaced antipersonnel mines destroyed by 2013. All other explosive contaminants destroyed by 2015	Probably	Fair
Target 24. All stockpiled antipersonnel mines destroyed by 2007. All other abandoned or unwanted explosive stocks destroyed by 2020	Potentially	Fair
Target 25. Reduce the contribution of opium to the total economy to less than 10% by 2015 and to less than 5% by 2020	Potentially	Weak but improving
Assessment scale	Probably Potentially Unlikely Lack of data	Strong Fair Weak but improving Weak

SUMMARY

- ◆ Security is critical for Afghanistan's reconstruction. Without an adequate level of security, not only will the country fail to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, but also progress achieved during the last four years will be reversed, increasing the likelihood of resumption of large-scale conflict.
- ◆ Considerable progress has been made by the Ministry of Defense, supported by the United States, to recruit, train, equip and field the Afghan National Army (ANA). The ANA has established nationwide presence since 2003 and fielded a brigade into each regional command. This has greatly facilitated the expansion of central government authority and the rule of law, supported DDR and will support revenue collection and counter-narcotics efforts.
- ◆ Establishing effective control over the use of armed forces is the foundation for all other progress in Afghanistan. Challenges to the creation of the new ANA include the training, equipping, fielding and paying of the Army. An estimated 17% of the GDP was allocated in the 2004-05 national budget for ANA. Over the next 15 years this is targeted to come down to 3-5%. Comparable to other developing countries, this is targeted to come down to 3-5% over the next 15 years.
- ◆ ANBP has been quite successful in the disarmament and demobilisation components of the DDR process. But in a fragile security environment, it will be impractical to aim for complete disarmament. Forcible disarmament of commanders and other powerful individuals may lead to increased insecurity.
- ◆ With the passing of a new gun law, a license is now required to possess a firearm. The licensing process offers an opportunity to reduce the incidence of firearms misuse and gun crime.
- ◆ The human resource requirements for the ANP are substantial. In 2002, less than 10% of police officers were properly equipped and more than 80% of the infrastructure had been destroyed during the years of conflict. At the current rate, the training programmes are expected to meet the target of 62,000 trained personnel by late 2006.
- ◆ There are serious concerns about the fiscal sustainability of the proposed reforms, especially given the shortfall for LOTFA during its recent second phase, when only 40% of requested funds were received. The major donors are beginning to signal a shift away from completely underwriting the full recurrent budgetary expenses of the ANP. Further, the pace of proposed reforms in the justice sector has to be aligned with attempts to reform and restructure the police to increase the prospects of the police to reduce crime rates and instil confidence among the public.
- ◆ Landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) currently affect some four million Afghans. Only 2 provinces are wholly free of the problem. The unit cost of clearing the remaining identified and surveyed minefields in Afghanistan has been estimated at \$1 per square metre. In a situation where there is a large movement of population, and development and reconstruction projects impeded by mines/UXO, it is necessary to expand the de-mining programme and make faster progress toward eliminating the problem of landmines.
- ◆ Opium dominates the national economy. It accounts for one-third of estimated total GDP and 50% of legal GDP. The total area under poppy cultivation increased by nearly two-thirds during 2003-04. Even as the government attempts to reduce and eventually eliminate poppy cultivation, there is a risk that targeting poor farmers and landless labourers involved in poppy cultivation with elimination and law enforcement measures may increase poverty in the short-term, until genuine and sustainable alternative livelihoods can be developed.
- ◆ The cost of securing Afghanistan from terrorism, insurgency and tribal conflicts, organised crime, narcotics production and trafficking is high. The government needs to follow a two-pronged approach of sustaining high levels of economic growth while increasing domestic revenue to ensure long-term fiscal sustainability of the security-sector reforms.



AFGHANISTAN'S MDG TARGETS AND INDICATORS

==> Reform and professionalise the Afghan National Army by 2010

- ◆ Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP
- ◆ Professionally trained ANA
- ◆ Nationwide fielding of the ANA
- ◆ Operational capability of the ANA and ability to operate independently or with less support from Coalition/ISAF forces

==> Reform and professionalise the Afghan National Police by 2010

- ◆ Citizens' confidence in the ANP's ability to provide security and access to justice
- ◆ Reported crime to conviction ratio

==> Reduce the misuse of weapons and the proportion of illegally-held weapons by 2010

- ◆ Numbers of weapons licensed under the new gun law
- ◆ Gun crime as a proportion of overall crime

==> All emplaced antipersonnel mines destroyed by 2013. All other explosive contaminants destroyed by 2015

- ◆ Number of Highly Impacted Communities
- ◆ Total Number of Impacted Communities
- ◆ Number of Afghans Directly Affected
- ◆ Number of the mine/UXO victims (injured or dead)

==> All stockpiled antipersonnel mines destroyed by 2007. All other abandoned or unwanted explosive stocks destroyed by 2020

- ◆ Number of stockpiled antipersonnel mines destroyed
- ◆ Number of ERW stockpiles remaining to be destroyed

==> Reduce the contribution of opium to the total (licit and illicit) GDP to less than 5% by 2015 and to less than 1% by 2020

- ◆ Eliminate poppy cultivation by 2020
- ◆ Reduce the number of Afghans dependent on opium for their livelihood by 75% by 2015 and by 90% by 2020 from the 2004 level

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Chapter 12

PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFGHANISTAN

"We will not enjoy development without security, we will not enjoy security without development, and we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights."

- UN (2005)

"The responsibility for ensuring security throughout Afghanistan ultimately rests with the Afghans themselves."

- Bonn Agreement, 2001

Over the last three years important initial steps have been taken to enhance security and establish the rule of law in the country. Achievements that have laid a foundation for continued and accelerated reform include: the inauguration of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP); the commencement of major reform in the Ministry of Defense; the implementation of a disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) programme; the cantonnement of heavy weapons nationwide; the initiation of Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups; the formulation of a National Drug Control Strategy; the initiation of a comprehensive review of the country's judicial infrastructure; and progress in de-mining. But these constitute only a beginning, and in order to guarantee further progress a significant expansion and acceleration of security sector reforms is necessary.

Furthermore, while considerable success has been achieved in rebuilding state institutions and stimulating economic growth in Kabul and some other cities, adverse security conditions have prevented similar progress elsewhere, particularly in the rural areas. This has fragmented the reconstruction process, creating a situation in which up to one-third of the population may be deprived of a peace dividend.¹¹⁹

The subsequent discussion on Afghanistan's MDG on Enhancing Security focuses national attention on the various aspects of national security, as well as analyses progress and reviews the challenges in meeting the targets.

Peace is more than an absence of armed conflict: stable and secure livelihoods are a key determinant in the security perceptions of local communities

Security is very hard to measure objectively (Box 12.1). Groups and individuals are prepared to tolerate different levels and manifestations of insecurity. A recent survey of community perceptions of security in Afghanistan showed that Afghans have a very sophisticated understanding of security, which encompasses not just physical safety, but also livelihood security, human rights and equality. The

study found that “negative peace – the absence of armed conflict – is an important consideration, but the absence of positive peace – stable and secure livelihoods – is the key determinant in the security perceptions of local communities.”¹²⁰ The majority of Afghans surveyed¹²¹ agreed that the presence of Coalition Forces and ISAF has improved security. However, they continue to feel threatened by commanders, despite the formal disarmament process, and cited conflicts over land and property, bribery and corruption and police brutality amongst their key concerns.

Box 12.1: Sources of insecurity in Afghanistan

Insecurity in Afghanistan has many sources and facets. One source of insecurity is common crime, or banditry, which can be the product of individuals or armed groups opportunistically taking advantage of the absence of effective Afghan security institutions. Other major sources of insecurity include: anti-Government and/or anti-Coalition groups, who are responsible for more than their fair share of crime against their fellow Afghan citizens; the illegal drug economy that provides financial support for both terrorist groups and factional commanders; and neighbouring and regional powers, many of whom support and wield influence through client insurgents or factional commanders.

- Source: AREU (2004)

The efforts of the government and international community to enhance security in Afghanistan hinge upon:

- ◆ Reform and professionalisation of the Afghan National Army
- ◆ Reduction of the misuse of weapons and the proportion of illegal arms
- ◆ Reform, restructuring and professionalisation of the Afghan National Police
- ◆ Destruction of emplaced and stockpiled landmines and other explosives
- ◆ Reduce the contribution of opium to the total economy

REFORM AND PROFESSIONALISATION OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

Establishing effective control over the use of armed forces is the foundation for all other progress in Afghanistan. Without it, there is a constant risk of reversal in building a functioning state as in the decade of the 1990s, when rampant lawlessness provided a fertile environment for the growth of violent extremism. Reform and professionalisation of the ANA is a high priority to ensure progress towards enhancing security.

The strategic role and missions of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the ANA are to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national interests and values of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan; to support and defend the Constitution of Afghanistan; to defeat insurgency and terrorism in Afghanistan; and to support Afghanistan's

reconstruction and reintegration into the regional and international community. The ANA will be a volunteer force, under a unified Command structure and ethnically balanced. The total defense sector will consist of 70,000 personnel (military and civilian), including 43,000 ground combat forces, 3,000 Air Corps personnel, Supporting Commands and Ministry of Defense Staff.

Challenges

Challenges to the creation of the new Afghan National Army include the training, equipping, fielding, sustaining and paying of units. The MOD has assumed responsibility for the training of ANA soldiers and Officers, with continuing Coalition support. With a national army of approximately 30,000 soldiers and officers today, the training schedule was accelerated throughout 2004, enabling up to 3,000 soldiers to be trained simultaneously, in order to achieve nationwide fielding. Recent plans aim to promote the quality of the force through better training, training validation and leadership. The government expects to reach its target of 70,000 personnel (including 43,000 ground combat troops for the ANA) by May 2008.

In October 2004, MOD released its first National Military Strategy, progressively outlining the broad objectives, role, composition, and requisite reforms of the new Afghan National Army. The strategy focuses on improving standards for establishing a more de-politicised and multi-ethnic army, and acknowledges the need for the new army to conform to “modern standards and principles practiced in coalition and democratic countries.”¹²² The annual review of the National Military Strategy is scheduled for completion by October 2005. The Strategy provides the cornerstone of a comprehensive annual MOD Strategic Planning and Force Management cycle, including programming and budgeting. The reform of the Defense sector is scheduled for completion in 2009.

Setting MDG targets and indicators

Internationally, military spending as a percentage of GDP is a commonly tracked indicator to assess the burden of the military establishment on the national budget. Military expenditure for most countries is within the range of 1-5%, and for post-conflict countries it sharply declines within 5 years of cessation of conflict (Table 12.1). Reducing military spending as a proportion of the GDP is an eminently desirable objective of democratic countries, as it frees up resources for investing in economic growth and for social sector spending. In Afghanistan, an estimated 17% of the GDP was allocated in the 2004-05 national budget for ANA (including the Ministry of Defense).¹²³ This figure consists largely of foreign donor contributions to support the one-off capital expenditure required to create an entirely new defense sector. Operating costs to support the ANA after initial stand up are targeted to be between 3-5% of GDP by 2015. The gradual transition of responsibility for



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sustainment and operating costs of the ANA to the government will require a large increase in actual government expenditure over the next 5-10 years. Military spending as a percentage of GDP will therefore only be reduced with dramatic increases in revenue collection.

The delivery of an operationally capable, nationally orientated, disciplined and professional ANA will largely depend on their training. The MOD, together with the United States, the United Kingdom and France, have established institutions and courses to provide for the professional training of ANA soldiers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Officers, including the Kabul Military Training Centre, the National Military Academy and the Command and General Staff College. In addition, Officers and NCOs receive training in a wide range of foreign countries. Currently around 42% of the total proposed defense sector (30,000 of the planned total of 70,000) have received training. It is planned that all personnel will have received training by 2009.

The nationwide fielding and basing of the ANA enables the ANA to deliver security throughout the country. In 2005, one Brigade has been fully established in each of the Regional Commands (Kandahar, Gardez, Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif) and two Brigades in Central Corps. To deliver security

throughout the country requires the wider establishment of Brigade garrisons and Forward Operating Bases. The MOD plan for the fielding of the ANA will deliver all 13 Brigades of the ANA by 2009. This will include 2 Brigades each under the Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat Commands, and 3 Brigades each under the Kabul, Gardez and Kandahar Commands.

The ability of the ANA to provide for the security of Afghanistan will ultimately depend on its operational capability and ability to operate independently or with less support from Coalition/ISAF forces. The ANA currently operates alongside Coalition and ISAF forces, and with Embedded Training Teams from the Coalition. In order to assume responsibility for security and enable the drawdown of international military forces from current levels, the ANA will need to complete and validate its basic tactical capabilities at Battalion level. The ANA must also develop its maneuver, mobility, fire support and sustainability capabilities, as well as specialised elements such as Special Operations forces, Military Intelligence and Military Engineers. The ANA is currently scheduled to achieve Full Operational Capability with all Battalion training validated by September 2009. Plans for the improvement of ANA capabilities to achieve better independent operations are under development.

Table 12.1: Military expenditure in selected countries

Country ^a	Income group ^b	Military expenditure (% of GDP)					
		1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Africa							
Angola	Low	11.3	21.4	4.8	3.1	3.7	4.7
Burundi	Low	6.6	6.3	6	8	7.6	5.9
Eritrea	Low	35.3	37.6	36.4	24.8	23.9	19.4
Ethiopia	Low	6.7	10.7	9.6	6.1	5.3	4.3
Guinea-Bissau	Low	1.4	..	4.4	3.1
Liberia	Low	-7.7	-7.5	..
Rwanda	Low	4.4	4.6	3.6	3.7	3.3	2.8
Sierra Leone	Low	[4.1]	2.2	1.5	1.7
Zimbabwe	Low	2.5	4.5	4.9	2.9	2.9	2.1
Americas							
Colombia	Middle	3.1	3.5	3.4	3.8	4.1	[4.4]
Asia and Oceania							
Cambodia	Low	4.1	3.6	3.3	2.8	2.7	2.5
Pakistan	Low	4.8	4.6	4.5	4.7	4.7	4.4
Sri Lanka	Middle	4.2	3.6	4.5	3.9	3.1	2.7
Europe							
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Middle	4.3	2.9
Serbia and Montenegro	Middle	4.4	4.5	5.9	4.9	4.8	..
Middle East							
Iran	Middle	3.2	4.1	5.4	5.7	3.8	3.8
Lebanon	Middle	4.3	5	5.4	5.5	4.7	[4.3]
UAE	High	5.1	4.3	3.4	3.4	3.5	3.1
Yemen	Low	6.2	5.2	5	[5.6]	7.2	7.1

a Countries have been selected on the criterion that the share of their military expenditure was known to be higher than 4.0% in any of the years 1998-2003.

b Based on GNI per capita in 2003.

Sources: Military expenditure as a share of GDP: SIPRI Yearbook 2005, Appendix 8A, table 8A.4; Income group: World Development Indicators 2004.



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AFGHANISTAN'S MDG TARGET, INDICATORS AND BASELINES

Target	Indicator	Baseline year	Data source	Baseline value	Targets	
					2015	2020
Target 20. Reform and professionalise the Afghan National Army by 2010	Military expenditure as a % of GDP	2005	NSC, IMF	17%	3-5%	3-5%
	Professional Training of the ANA	2005	MOD	42%	100%	100%
	Nationwide fielding of the ANA (total of 13 Brigades)	2005	MOD	6/13 (46%)	13/13 (100%)	13/13 (100%)
	Operational Capability (Battalions with validated capability)	2005	MOD	0%	100%	100%

REDUCTION OF THE MISUSE OF WEAPONS AND THE PROPORTION OF ILLEGALLY HELD WEAPONS

After more than two decades of violent conflict, Afghanistan is unsurprisingly a highly armed society where weapons are used to protect and to provide even after the cessation of violence. In the fragile post-conflict environment that prevails in Afghanistan, weapons are often used to extort money, or gain access to scarce resources in the absence of viable and legal livelihood opportunities. Vulnerable communities may also use weapons to provide protection.

The disarmament process has been spearheaded by Afghanistan's New Beginnings Programme (ANBP), which is

a donor-funded project of UNDP established in 2003 to assist the Government in the DDR of the Afghan Military Forces (AMF). The AMF were a loose network of military units comprised of men who fought against the Soviets and the Taliban, and those who joined the military soon after the collapse of the Taliban. For the new national army to succeed, a comprehensive DDR programme is a pre-requisite.

The DDR process was designed to pave the way for the formation of a formally trained and ethnically balanced national army and many former AMF fighters are now trained ANA soldiers. However, not all ex-combatants could join the ANA. The majority of ex-combatants are disarmed and demobilised from military duties, and reintegrated into civil society (Box 12.2).

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Box 12.2: DDR and ANBP: What do they do? How do they relate?

ANBP works with various implementing partners, largely NGOs on agriculture, vocational training and small business opportunities. ANBP refers ex-officers and soldiers to the ANA or ANP and works with the Ministry of Education on a teacher-training component. There are also private sector opportunities through the Ministry of Communications and mobile phone companies in owning and operating public call offices.

The Reintegration Process

Following demobilisation, former fighters are provided with career counselling and the opportunity to choose from a range of reintegration packages such as:

- ◆ Short-term public infrastructure wage-labour employment as a bridging activity;
- ◆ On-the-job vocational training courses tied to job placement, including basic literacy;
- ◆ Specialised literacy and numeracy training for AMF officers who wish to apply for officers in the ANA;
- ◆ Opportunities to join an elite community-based de-mining corps;
- ◆ Agricultural packages including seeds, fertilizer, agricultural tools and training;
- ◆ Support to start up small businesses, e.g. construction contracting or crop processing;

Efforts are made to match available opportunities with the career goals of individual ex-combatants.

Challenges

Weak commitment of local commanders to the new government, animosity among armed groups, and a lack of public confidence in the productive and sustainable alternatives are some of the key challenges.

Dismantling existing relationships between factional leader and their lower-level troops, presents a complicated political challenge for the process. The challenge is to alter the relationship of commanders with communities through robust economic interventions, specifically targeting the middle ranks of the commanders, and to provide employment opportunities for the ex-officers/soldiers as incentives.

The success of DDR requires substantial financial and security support from the international community. It also requires government ownership and effective implementation of the reform plan for the MoD.

Linkages also need to be developed between the ANBP and other programmes such as the National Area Based Development Programme, the National Solidarity Programme, the National Emergency Employment Programme, the National Programme for Action on Disability, and mine action to create sustainable employment for former officers/soldiers and engage them in the national reconstruction efforts.

- Source: www.anbpfafg.org and the ANBP Post-Reintegration Support Survey, June 2005

Deployment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) was originally planned as a vehicle for international military engagement in support of DDR and nascent reconstruction efforts. These units were allocated to regions and provinces beyond the capital considered particularly unstable, and vital to the general stabilisation effort. As such, they were

not part of a centrally controlled system and had minimum central supervision. However, in the absence of a country-wide peacekeeping or stabilisation force, the concept of PRTs has become very popular among the international donors (Box 12.3).

Box 12.3: PRTs : Merging of political and military objectives

By the end of 2004, there were a total of 19 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Each PRT operates differently, reflecting national approaches meant to emphasise, variously, peacekeeping or stabilisation operations, 'hearts and minds' relief activities designed to generate greater local consent for security operations, and reconstruction and government support. Increasingly, policy debate surrounding the 'PRT system' suggests they should be more reactive to situational context and afford a greater measure of central direction, complementing the National Priority Programmes of the Government of Afghanistan, which in turn support donor agendas for stabilisation, rule of law and international accountability. 'The difficulties of developing a common approach stem from the large number of countries involved in PRTs, the presence of two separate military operations and commands in Afghanistan (ISAF/NATO and the Combined Forces Command – CFC-A), and different approaches to civil-military activities.' (DFID, 2005) Establishment of a dedicated PRT Secretariat at the Ministry of Interior, in conjunction with the internationally composed Executive Steering Committee may go some way towards achieving greater coherence of PRT activities.


Engagement in relief and development activities has sometimes led PRTs into areas where they do not enjoy a 'comparative advantage' (Osorio, 2004). For instance, PRT mounting of Quick Impact Projects and humanitarian relief have been widely regarded among the NGO community and academic observers as, at the very least, unsustainable, and in more critical analyses as downright dangerous. Conditionality for relief supplies and politically motivated disbursement of aid have 'blurred the lines' between humanitarian and political action, a development which some believe is responsible for the rising number of lethal attacks against aid agencies. Another result has been confusion among national and international assistance actors who are hard pressed to discern 'from one PRT to the next what to expect in terms of expertise, level/sustainability of engagement, or focus.' In addition, 'as more nations have entered PRTs the different interpretations of the initial concept by PRT commanders have only been magnified.'

The United Kingdom's focus on peacekeeping and security sector reform activities may present a model in the development of a more uniform, systematic approach in PRT governance. In contrast, the CFC's engagement in relief and reconstruction has been widely criticised, although Coalition PRTs are regarded as more significant political actors, presumably due to their ease of access to powerful 'over the horizon' air support in the event of hostilities. Initiatives are often independently conceived, and the degree of collaboration with provincial government authorities has been irregular.

The troop size and funding allocated to each PRT varies according to contributing nations' commitment to the operation and military approach. Most PRTs consist of between 200 and 1,000 troops (although a large portion of these often serve in a force protection role); frequently they feature 'embedded' civilian advisors seconded from national development agencies such as DFID or USAID. Civilian secondees often serve on the senior management team and play a key role in ensuring that the military effort reaches towards the political goals mandated by national foreign policy. Attainment of such generic goals are currently regarded as determinant of an 'exit' point, but whether PRTs are subsequently transferred to Afghan Government control, or phased out completely, is currently undecided. The magnitude of the development and governance challenge in Afghanistan is such that PRTs appear likely to remain a more or less permanent feature of the provincial landscape for at least the next few years.

ANBP has been quite successful in the disarmament and demobilisation components of the DDR process. The disarmament aspect of DDR was officially completed on 30

June 2005 with the disarming of 63,380 officers and soldiers from the Afghan Military Forces. Of these, a total of 56,706 have been successfully demobilised and 54,995 have



entered (or in some cases completed) the reintegration process. By July 2005, 248 units had been decommissioned. Over 100,000 personnel from the Afghan Military Forces have been de-financed from the ministry's payroll, dissolving the Afghan Military Forces, and saving the government over US\$100 million annually. And over 10,000 Heavy Weapons have been safely collected and cantoned.

Challenges

DDR is normally one of the most complicated and risky activities in any peace process. Among the major challenges faced by the Afghanistan programme are: i) determining the actual number of AMF militiamen to be demobilised; ii) dismantling the relationship between factional leaders and their troops by specifically targeting senior and mid-level commanders; iii) coordinating with the Afghan National Police and Afghan National Army to provide security following the demobilisation of the AMF in a region; iv) overcoming an initial reluctance by the US and Europeans to leverage the militia groups or provide international military observers;¹²⁴ and v) establishing confidence in the economy and alternative livelihood opportunities among those entering the programme as compared to the profits to be made by illicit activities associated with militia life.¹²⁵

Large-scale civilian disarmament, without the strengthening and reform of the police and justice systems, is likely to be both difficult and may also increase peoples' vulnerability and perception of mistrust of the state. Registration and regulation of small arms may be a more viable option at this stage.¹²⁶

Setting MDG targets and indicators

In a fragile environment, characterised by partial disarmament and low public confidence in the institutions of the state as they undergo reform, it will be impractical to aim for complete disarmament. At this time of rapid change, forcible disarmament of commanders and other powerful individuals may lead to increased insecurity. The recently promulgated Law on Fire Weapons, Ammunition and Explosive Ordnance recognises the right of Afghan citizens to bear arms for self-protection. However, a license is now required, which should reduce the incidence of firearms misuse and gun crime.

Encouraging those who currently own weapons to apply for licenses, and identifying and punishing those who fail to comply with the new law will be a resource-intensive process. An effective licensing process will be facilitated by the electoral registration – more Afghans have a nationally recognized form of identification than ever before. A community-level survey of weapons ownership is also under consideration. However, the capacity of the Ministry of Interior to process applications, document the licensing process and maintain records may require additional support.

The licensing process offers an opportunity to collect data on legal civilian-held weapons. It is also proposed that licensing of weapons and statistics on gun crime be monitored as indicators of a reduction in the misuse of weapons. There are no accurate estimates on the number of civilian-held weapons in circulation.



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AFGHANISTAN'S MDG TARGET, INDICATORS AND BASELINES

Target	Indicator	Baseline year	Data source	Baseline value	Targets	
					2015	2020
Target 21. Reduce the misuse of weapons and reduce the proportion of illegally held weapons by 2010	Proportion of firearms licensed	2005	To be decided	To be decided	To be decided	To be decided
	Gun crime, as a proportion of overall reported crime	2005	To be decided	To be decided	To be decided	To be decided

REFORM, RESTRUCTURING AND PROFESSIONALISATION OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

The police force is responsible for policing borders, safeguarding infrastructure and preventing and investigating criminal activity. It is also expected to be capable of maintaining domestic order, protecting the rights of Afghan citizens, and denying safe haven to terrorists.

Efforts are underway to reform, restructure and professionalise the ANP. The human resource requirements for the ANP are substantial. In 2002, less than 10% of police officers were properly equipped and more than 80% of the infrastructure had been destroyed during the years of conflict.¹²⁷ By February 2005, more than 50,000 personnel had been trained, albeit through a "crash course" format.¹²⁸ At the current rate, the training programmes are expected to meet the target of 62,000 trained personnel by late 2006.

Notably, the grading structure has to be brought in line with that of the Afghan National Army, to reduce competition between the two for attracting recruits, and to boost the morale and motivation of the force. This will be coupled with pay increases at all ranks, to reduce the likelihood of

corruption and the misuse of police power and equipment for money. At present, ANP is a top-heavy organization with one officer for every two sergeants and patrolmen. The current and proposed numbers and pay scales are as in Table 12.2.

Table 12.2: Squashing the Middle: Number and Salary Reform in ANP

Rank	Numbers (% of total force)		Monthly Salary (US\$)			Salary as proportion of the highest rank	
	Current	Proposed	Current	Proposed	Increase (%)	Current	Proposed
Generals (Star rank)	311 (0.5)	189 (0.3)	101	650	550	1	1
Colonels, Lt Col and Majors	8232 (13.3)	620 (1.0)	96	550	473	0.95	0.85
Captains and Lieutenants	17705 (28.6)	6820 (10.9)	81	250	209	0.80	0.38
Sergeants (or Satanmen)	4843 (7.8)	9300 (14.8)	64	140	119	0.63	0.21
Patrolmen (or Satunkai)	30852 (49.8)	45880 (73.0)	30	70	133	0.30	0.11
Total	61943	62809					
Total Wage Bill			3,491,300	6,682,450	91.4		

Source: Ministry of Interior

In the proposed reforms, there will be an increased focus on mentoring in the provinces. Basic training will be expanded to include firearms training, and more equipment will be made available.¹²⁹ Additional reforms are needed for i) the expulsion of corrupt and anti-government elements in the Afghan National Police; ii) an in-depth reform of the ANP's existing structure to improve civilian oversight; and iii) post-deployment monitoring and assistance.¹³⁰

Besides a lack of training and basic equipment, another fundamental issue for the revived national police force has been the payment of recurrent budgetary expenses. In response to this need, the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) was created in 2002, and managed by UNDP. With contributions from multiple donors, the LOTFA channelled over US \$125 million, to the ANP between November 2002 and March 2005.¹³¹ Apart from paying the salaries, LOTFA has also aided the ANP in the procurement of non-lethal equipment, the rehabilitation of police facilities, staff capacity-building, and institutional development. Priority activities for the next phase of LOTFA include: i) computerisation of the Ministry of Interior's payroll system; ii) issuance of identification cards to all police personnel; and iii) and procurement of vital equipment, as well as rehabilitation of eleven provincial police headquarters.¹³²

Challenges

Questions of financial sustainability abound, as police salaries and other vital needs of the police force continue to be funded by the LOTFA. The total annual budgetary requirement for the proposed wage increases is around US\$ 79 million. Given the large shortfall of US \$88 million for the LOTFA during its recent second phase (April 2004 through March 2005)—a period in which only 40% of requested funds were received, the major donors are beginning to signal a shift away from completely underwriting the full recurrent budgetary expenses of the ANP.

The pace of proposed reforms in the justice sector has to be aligned with attempts to reform and restructure the police to improve the prospects of the police reducing crime rates and instil confidence among the public.

Setting MDG targets and indicators

The ANP, as opposed to the ANA, is concerned with internal security and public safety. The real measure of effectiveness of the police force is the extent of confidence of the public in the ability of the police to tackle ordinary crime and instil security in the community.

In the absence of quantitative assessments of effectiveness, such as the proportion of reported crimes leading to successful prosecution, qualitative assessments of



perceived security, and the role of the police in contributing to security can be made. Such qualitative assessments are best made through independently designed and administered surveys. Although the Bonn Agreement calls for a multi-ethnic police force, the ethnic composition of the force is not systematically monitored. The extent to which the ethnic make-up of the ANP reflects the areas in

which units are deployed could also be measured in future.

No baseline data is available. Special surveys will have to be designed or, special modules may be added in other household surveys to be conducted at regular intervals such as the NRVA 2005. These modules can help gauge public satisfaction with the police force.

AFGHANISTAN'S MDG TARGET, INDICATORS AND BASELINES

Target	Indicator	Baseline year	Data source	Baseline value	Targets	
					2015	2020
Target 22. Reform, restructure and professionalise the Afghan National Police by 2010	Citizen confidence in the police's ability to provide security and access to justice	2005	To be decided	To be decided	To be decided	To be decided
	Ratio of reported crime to convictions	2005	To be decided	To be decided	To be decided	To be decided

DESTRUCTION OF EMPLACED AND STOCKPILED ANTIPERSONNEL MINES AND OTHER EXPLOSIVES

Afghanistan is among the most mine-affected countries in the world. First used in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation (1979-89), landmines and UXO contamination continued during the period of the pro-Soviet ruling government (1989-92), during fighting between various factions in 1992-95, and during the Taliban era from 1996 until September 2001. Some very limited contamination also continues as a result of military operations by and against the American-led coalition and also as a result of ongoing factional fighting.

Landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) currently affect some four million Afghans living in, or planning to return to, one of 2,368 contaminated communities. These communities are spread across 32 provinces, leaving only two provinces completely free from mines/UXO contamination. The bulk of the mine-affected land area consists of agricultural and grazing land, together with a smaller number of roads and residential areas and small (but economically important) areas of irrigation systems and canals.

Landmines have taken a devastating toll of human lives, health, and livelihoods in Afghanistan. The total number of people killed or injured by landmines and UXO is estimated to be approximately 100,000 since 1979, including over 5,000 incidents since 2001. Records indicate that over 90% of Afghans who fall victim to landmines/UXO are male, 50% of the incidents are caused by UXO and most shockingly, over 50% of all victims are children under the age of 18.

Landmines and UXO adversely affect communities in a variety of ways. The recently completed Afghanistan Landmine Impact Survey (ALIS) identifies and categorizes these impacts and assigns each surveyed community an impact score indicating relative severity.¹³³ Impact scores are used to classify communities' impacts as low, medium, or high, using a framework common to all Landmine Impact Surveys worldwide.¹³⁴ Communities that fall in the high and medium impact categories are where the bulk of deaths and injuries occur. These communities need immediate assistance and timely mine/UXO clearance.

Communities classified as low impact seem to cope quite well with landmine and UXO contamination, and have found ways of minimising the risk posed.¹³⁵ For example, a community might divert a water source or leave contaminated land uncultivated. There are however, economic costs associated with such coping strategies, and mine clearance should enable communities to make fuller use of the assets and resources available to them, thereby creating an environment conducive to achieving other MDGs. Landmine and UXO clearance has socio-economic costs and benefits (Box 12.4) that can be useful to help prioritise de-mining activities.

The unit cost of clearing the remaining identified and surveyed minefields in Afghanistan has been estimated by UNMACA at approximately \$1 per square metre. In a situation where there is an end to conflict and large numbers of refugees and displaced persons return to their homes, land use and movements of people will increase with associated higher risks of mine accidents. So it makes sense to expand the de-mining programme and make faster progress toward eliminating the problem of landmines for



the bulk of the Afghan people. Approximately 30 square kilometres of high impact mine areas and about 70 square kilometres of high impact UXO-contaminated battle areas are proposed to be cleared during 2005-06.¹³⁶

Destabilised stockpiles of weapons, ammunition and landmines pose a much more unpredictable threat to

communities. A stockpile blew up in northern Afghanistan in May 2005, killing 30 people and injuring a further 70. An alarming trend which emerged in 2003, was the use of landmines as the basis for Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), used to target government officials, national and international aid workers, donors and the international military.

Box 12.4: Prioritising mine clearance

The socio-economic costs of landmines can be divided into three broad categories:

- (i) Loss of life, health, human production potential, and human welfare resulting from mine accidents;
- (ii) Denial of access to mine-infested land and loss of associated production or consumption benefits from the land concerned; and
- (iii) Distortion of behaviour due to the existence of mines with consequent socio-economic losses resulting from longer travel distances, journeys not undertaken due to greater distance and difficulty, and other distortions in behaviour.

On the benefit side, clearance of irrigation systems and canals carries the highest socio-economic returns, followed by roads, agriculture, and then, with much lower returns, grazing land. Clearance of residential areas also shows high benefit-cost ratios, but these are based on property values. Clearance of grazing land carries the lowest cost-benefit ratios, positive for dog teams but significantly negative for manual and mechanical de-mining techniques.

Thus, clearance of irrigation canals and roads is well justified, clearance of agricultural land and residential areas also is strongly justified if dog teams are used, and clearance of grazing land is justified only if dog teams or community de-mining is used but not other techniques.

Source: World Bank (2001)

Challenges

While among the cheapest in the world, Afghan de-mining per unit area is very expensive, and in order to meet the targets, the international community will be required to maintain support for Afghanistan at least at current levels for some years to come. Should this support prove difficult to secure, particularly once mines have been cleared from the highly-impacted communities, Afghanistan runs the risk of not achieving the relevant MDG targets. Therefore, the focus on building the capacity of an independent National Mine Action Agency will be critical in ensuring that the necessary skills, expertise and experience is available nationally to continue the critical work.

Setting MDG targets and indicators

Afghanistan has made a commitment to achieving a complete ban on anti-personnel mines. This includes the implementation of an overarching framework for mine action, including the clearance of anti-personnel mines within ten years, destroying all stockpiled anti-personnel mines, providing mine-risk education, assisting landmine survivors, and meeting reporting requirements.

The government's strategy to meet the targets for destroying all emplaced and stockpiled landmines and other explosives is being coordinated by the UN's Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan (UNMACA). The National Mine Action Strategy¹³⁷ includes: implementing a coordinated

strategy for mine action; equipping national authorities with the tools and expertise to assume a long-term coordination and policy-making role for mine-action in the country; providing mine-risk education; conducting mine surveys; clearing mines and UXO; and providing resource mobilisation and advocacy support to landmine and explosive remnants of war accident survivors.

Identification of stockpiled landmines is an additional challenge. Since 2001, new caches of weapons, ammunition and landmines have been uncovered on a regular basis. Hidden stockpiles are a typical feature of post-conflict countries. Such stockpiles are often considered "insurance" by the former commanders and militia forces that have little trust in the government and the efforts of the international community to bring lasting peace in Afghanistan.



AFGANISTAN'S MDG TARGETS, INDICATORS AND BASELINES

Target	Indicator	Baseline year	Data source	Baseline value	Targets	
					2015	2020
Target 23. All emplaced antipersonnel mines destroyed by 2013.* All other explosive contaminants destroyed by 2015	Number of high impacted communities	2005	UNMACA	281	0	0
	Total number of impacted communities	2005	UNMACA	2,368	0	0
	Number of Afghans directly affected	2005	UNMACA	4.2 million	0	0
	Number of mine/UXO victims (deaths and injuries)	2005	UNMACA month	100 per	0	0
Target 24. All stockpiled antipersonnel mines destroyed by 2007. All other abandoned or unwanted explosive stocks destroyed by 2020	Number of stockpiled anti-personnel landmines destroyed	2005	UNMACA	28,895	0	0
	Number of remaining ERW stockpiles to be destroyed.	2005	ANBP/ UNMACA	To be decided	To be decided	0

*This target is for achievement by 2013, in line with Afghanistan's commitments under the *Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction* (otherwise known as the Ottawa Treaty).

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Chapter 12

REDUCE THE CONTRIBUTION OF OPIUM TO THE TOTAL ECONOMY

Opium dominates the national economy. It is estimated that in 2004-05 Afghanistan's opium economy earned US\$ 2.8 billion, three quarters of which went to traffickers, not farmers. This is a fraction of the value of Afghanistan's opium sold on the international market estimated to be worth around US \$30 billion.¹³⁸ The income from narcotics exceeds the total official international assistance spent in the country and is more directly accessible to people than most foreign aid. In recent years the drug economy has grown more rapidly than the legal economy and is estimated to equal 50-60% of the legal economy and one-third to 40% of the total economy.

The total area under poppy cultivation increased by nearly two-thirds from 80,000 to 131,000 hectares from 2003 to 2004 (Table 12.3). By 2004, poppy was being cultivated in all provinces of Afghanistan for the first time. All provinces, except Wardak, reported an increase in poppy planting. However, due to unfavourable weather conditions and a higher incidence of disease, opium production was lower than might have been predicted and at 4,200 MT, did not surpass the record of 4,600 MT of 1999.

The bulk of opium poppy cultivation remains concentrated in six provinces, which together accounted for more than 70% of the country's poppy output in 2004. Three provinces (Helmand, Nangarhar and Badakhshan) account for 56% of the total cultivated area.

Table 12.3: Recent trends in poppy cultivation

	2002	2003	2004
Net area for poppy cultivation (hectares)	74,000	80,000	131,000
Number of provinces under cultivation	24	28	34**
Number of households involved in poppy cultivation	n.a.	264,000	356,000
Household average yearly income from opium of poppy growing families (US\$)	n.a.	3,900	1,700
Average amount of land dedicated to poppy per opium cultivating household (hectares)	n.a.	0.3	0.37

Source: Data from the UNODC Afghanistan Opium Surveys 2004 and 2002

**Two new provinces were created in 2004

The expansion of poppy cultivation was at the expense of wheat production, which declined severely in 2004.¹³⁹ This is unlikely to have a huge impact on food security nationally since the proportion of agricultural land devoted to poppy cultivation remains very low (3% in 2004, up from 1.6% in 2003). In some parts of the country, where agricultural land used for poppy cultivation is especially high (29% in Nangarhar, 28% in Badakhshan and 24% in Kunar), it may pose a more serious challenge to food security by crowding out other crops.

Challenges

Many poppy farmers are driven to opium cultivation by a combination of poverty, indebtedness and dependency. This is scarcely surprising when the price per hectare vastly outstrips the comparative price for wheat. Alternative livelihood options that can compete with poppy need to be promoted.

There is a risk that an overly draconian policy of targeting the poor farmers and landless labourers involved in poppy cultivation with elimination and law enforcement measures may increase poverty in the short-term, before genuine and sustainable alternative livelihoods can be developed. Moreover, a focus on the farmers, rather than middlemen, traffickers and corrupt officials involved in the opium trade will further erode popular support for the government.


The continued influence of commanders and the as yet limited ability of the state to command authority in some

of the provinces create a permissive environment for poppy cultivation. Powerful landlords or commanders coerce many farmers into cultivation. The threat of law enforcement is not sufficiently real to many, and some farmers simply do not believe that they will be prosecuted and punished. Furthermore, the provision of financial and other material support to former poppy farmers may cause an increase in cultivation, as the poor and vulnerable seek to qualify for assistance.

Setting MDG targets and indicators

The government launched an eight-point Counter-Narcotics Strategy in 2003. The main elements are institution-building;¹⁴⁰ conducting an information campaign to discourage people from getting involved in poppy cultivation and trafficking; providing alternative livelihoods to poppy farmers; improving law enforcement; developing an effective counter narcotics legal framework; undertaking targeted elimination; providing treatment facilities for drug addicts; and ensuring full co-operation with neighbouring countries within the framework of the Good Neighbourly Relations Regional Declaration on Counter Narcotics.

One means of reducing the profitability of poppy is to reduce demand. The government has established treatment centres for the rising numbers of opium addicts in Afghanistan, but the majority of Afghan produced opium ends up on the streets of Western Europe. Governments of these states must do more to address drug addiction and trafficking within their own borders.



AFGHANISTAN'S MDG TARGET, INDICATORS AND BASELINES

Target	Indicator	Baseline year	Data source	Baseline value	Targets	
					2015	2020
Target 25. To reduce the contribution of opium to the total GDP to less than 5% by 2015, and to less than 1% by 2020	Eliminate poppy cultivation by 2020	2004	UNODC Annual Opium Survey	131,000 hectares	0	0
	Reduce the number of Afghans dependent on opium for their livelihoods by 75% by 2015 and by 90% by 2020 from the 2004 level	2004	UNODC Annual Opium Survey	2.3 million	0.6 million	0.2 million

SUMMARY OF TARGETS, INDICATORS AND BASELINES

Target	Indicator	Baseline year	Data source	Baseline value	Targets	
					2015	2020
Target 20. Reform and professionalise the Afghan National Army by 2010	Military expenditure as a % of GDP	2005	NSC, IMF	17%	5%	2%
	Professional Training of the ANA	2005	MOD	42%	100%	100%
	Nationwide fielding of the ANA (total of 13 Brigades)	2005	MOD	6/13 (46%)	13/13 (100%)	13/13 (100%)
	Operational Capability (Battalions with validated capability)	2005	MOD	0%	100%	100%
Target 21. Reform, restructure and professionalise the Afghan National Police by 2010	Citizen confidence in the police's ability to provide security and access to justice	2005	To be decided	To be decided	To be decided	To be decided
	Ratio of reported crime to convictions	2005	To be decided	To be decided	To be decided	To be decided
Target 22. Reduce the misuse of weapons and reduce the proportion of illegally held weapons by 2010	Proportion of firearms licensed	2005	To be decided	To be decided	To be decided	To be decided
	Gun crime, as a proportion of overall reported crime	2005	To be decided	To be decided	To be decided	To be decided
Target 23. All emplaced antipersonnel mines destroyed by 2013. All other explosive contaminants destroyed by 2015	Number of high impacted communities	2005	ALIS (UNMACA)	281	0	0
	Total number of impacted communities	2005	ALIS (UNMACA)	2,368	0	0
	Number of Afghans directly impacted	2005	ALIS (UNMACA)	4.2 million	0	0
	Number of mine/UXO victims (deaths and injuries)	2005	ALIS (UNMACA)	100 per month	0	0
Target 24. All stockpiled antipersonnel mines destroyed by 2007. All other abandoned or unwanted explosive stocks destroyed by 2020	Number of stockpiled anti-personnel landmines destroyed	2005	UNMACA	28,895	0	0
	Number of remaining ERW stockpiles to be destroyed	2005	ANBP/ UNMACA	To be determined	To be decided	0
Target 25. Reduce the contribution of opium to the total economy to less than 5% by 2015, and to less than 1% by 2020	Eliminate poppy cultivation by 2020	2004	UNODC Annual Opium Survey	131,000 hectares	0	0
	Reduce the number of Afghans dependent on opium for their livelihoods by 75% by 2015 and by 90% by 2020 from the 2004 level	2004	UNODC Annual Opium Survey	2.3 million	0.6 million	0.2 million




MEETING THE TARGETS

Future reconstruction and development of Afghanistan will be seriously undermined if poverty is not significantly reduced. For successful reconstruction, one of the prerequisites is an improved security environment. At the same time, rising national incomes reduce the risk of war with a strong causal impact of poverty and adverse income

shocks on conflict (Chart 12.1). On average a negative economic growth shock of 5 percentage points increases civil war risks by about 50%.¹⁴¹ And the risk of violent civil conflict declines steadily as national incomes increase. While violent conflicts surely result from a combination of factors, poverty creates conditions for igniting and sustaining conflict. Thus, investing in development is especially important to reduce the probability of conflict.

Chart 12.1: Rising national incomes reduce the risk of war

Predicted probability of observing a new conflict within one year (%)



Source: UNDP (2005)

A key challenge in meeting the security-related targets is the fiscal sustainability of the security sector reform process. Given the financial limitations of the central government, it was clear from the start that extensive foreign assistance would be required to pay meaningful salaries to soldiers and police, and provide an incentive for them to shift their loyalties from the warlords to the Afghan state.¹⁴²

The cost of securing Afghanistan from terrorism, insurgency and tribal conflicts, as well as organised crime and narcotics production and trafficking is high, particularly because of the cost of re-habilitating or constructing infrastructure, establishing training programmes and procuring equipment (Table 12.4). External actors such as the Coalition Forces, ISAF and the PRTs have supplemented the Afghan security institutions over the past four years. As these organisations phase out over the coming years, the burden of providing security will shift wholly to the government. It is important that spending on security is commensurate with the perceived levels of risk, not to unnecessarily divert resources away from social spending.¹⁴³

It is estimated that the ANA and ANP will cost US \$600

million annually to maintain, which is an overall decrease in actual expenditure.¹⁴⁴ If economic growth continues to increase at an average annual rate of 10% as forecast¹⁴⁵, the expenditure will still account for 8-12% of GDP over the next five years. This is high even in comparison with other post-conflict low-income countries (Table 12.1).

The government aims to be able to meet its wage bill from domestic revenues within five years. In order to do so, security spending must be kept under control. The recently-proposed grade and pay reforms to align the ANP with the ANA will further extend the timeframe over which the government will be able to meet the cost of the security sector from domestic revenue. This means that even greater efforts must be made to maintain and improve the economic growth rate and in particular, to increase the ability of the state to capture revenues. At present, the revenue-GDP ratio is just 5%, falling far short of the average for least-developed countries (11-14%).¹⁴⁶ This two-pronged approach should ensure that enhancing security, while essential, does not dominate the national budget at the expense of investing in the achievement of the other MDGs.



Table 12.4: Budget Allocation for Enhancing Security

	Allocation (Core+External) for 2004-05 (US\$ million)	Proportion of 2004-05 budget* (%)	Proportion of estimated GDP** (%)
National Police and Law Enforcement (including counter-narcotics police)	493	9.6	10.48
Afghan National Army (including Ministry of Defence)	785***	15.3	16.7
DDR	80	1.5	1.7
Mine Action	81	1.5	1.7
National Directorate of Security	30#	0.5	6.38
National Security Council	3.5#	0.06	0.07
Total	1391.5	29.96	35.33

*Total budget for 2004-05 = US\$ 5.13 billion

** GDP for 2004-05 = US\$ 4.7 billion (World Bank Indicators Database 2005)


*** Revised estimates of the external budget is US\$ 923 million provided by CFC

Estimates from the National Security Council

Source: Ahady (2005)



Chapter 13:
CONSTRAINTS IN
MEETING
AFGHANISTAN'S
MDG TARGETS







CONSTRAINTS IN MEETING AFGHANISTAN'S MDG TARGETS

This report has presented where Afghanistan currently stands in relation to each of the goals and the “Afghanised” targets. The challenges are immense in virtually every goal and target. This is the legacy of Afghanistan, which the Afghan people now have to overcome. There are undoubtedly many constraints in meeting the Afghanistan MDG targets, key among which is the lack of domestic financial resources. The Afghan economy has been growing since 2001 but even with a growth rate of 10% per annum, Afghanistan will require an estimated US \$27.5 billion over the next seven years in external assistance.

Beyond the financial constraint, Afghanistan has to address four other sets of constraints on a priority basis: building capacity for planning and implementation; improving the database and statistical capacity; building infrastructure; and strengthening structures for democratic governance.

BUILDING CAPACITY FOR PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION¹⁴⁷

With whatever resources are available, it is important that there is implementation of the programmes and projects necessary for Afghanistan to achieve the MDGs. The government has identified a number of key areas where progress is expected: expediting the establishment of programme management capacity in key ministries; developing and strengthening implementation capacity at provincial/municipal and district levels; developing central capacity for project preparation and implementation support; making greater use of regional capacity; and developing local construction and consulting industries. Progress in many of these areas requires direction and a supportive administrative system. To achieve this the government will need to accelerate civil service reform.

Institutional capacity to implement programmes efficiently and effectively throughout the country remains weak

Existing skill-sets within the national labour pool are not yet matched to the structural requirements of national recovery. Early gains made over the past two years have not have been equitably distributed. As a result, many communities


have been excluded from participation in essential decision-making processes, and have not in any sense benefited from the peace dividend.

In Afghanistan, capacity in the government was very limited at the outset of the reconstruction process, although much more of the government structure, personnel, and institutional memory survived than was expected after a quarter of a century of debilitating conflict. In recognition of this situation, the government has defined its role as policy-maker and regulator, and decided to contract out implementation of the development programmes. To increase its capacity, the government has bought in technical support for key management functions of the reconstruction process.

Going forward, the government has to consider various strategic options for building capacity

Options to support implementation include: buying capacity for the government; building capacity in the government (temporary or long-term); and direct execution of development activities by donors using implementing partners without reference to the government. These choices have different implications for the state-building agenda, sustainability of the capacity created, and speed, effectiveness and efficiency of implementation. Clearly, different implementation arrangements need to be established for the different national programmes based on the nature of public and private capacities over time. The overall government strategy has been to buy capacity to execute development activities in the short run while striving to build capacity in the government to increasingly handle these functions over time.

In the early stages of reconstruction, some donors preferred to bypass government capacity and engage in direct execution of development activities. This may have been justified to increase speed of implementation; however, such an approach is detrimental to the state-building agenda and undermines the building of long-term capacity in the government.



Similarly, the Afghan private sector, while impressively entrepreneurial in activities like trade, lacked the experience and expertise for implementation of development activities, particularly on sizable projects such as road construction. Reconstruction can and should provide valuable experience. Opportunities for growth and development by the domestic private sector need to be provided, although there should be international competitive bidding for large and complex projects.

More broadly, capacity ultimately depends on a nation's human resources. Over the longer term, investments in education are critical to augment national capacity in both public and private sectors. In addition to primary education, secondary and tertiary education will be crucial, and all of these must ensure the full participation of women.

During the past two years, good progress has been made both in creating capacity and in implementation of important parts of the reconstruction programme (Box 13.1). There has been substantial progress in implementing programmes in some sectors but less in others, and many are still in the initial start-up stages.

Box 13.1: Recent achievements in implementation of reconstruction projects

- ◆ Primary school enrollment increased from very low levels to more than four million in 2003-04;
- ◆ Five million children were vaccinated against measles and six million vaccinated for polio in 2003 achieving over 95% national coverage;
- ◆ Close to 900 km of major roads rebuilt or at an advanced stage of construction;
- ◆ Nearly US\$100m of private sector investment attracted for the telecoms market and the conduct of a fully transparent licensing tender for mobile phone operators;
- ◆ Generation of 2.3 million labor days of employment and rehabilitation of rural roads and building of other infrastructure assets under the National Emergency Employment Programme (NEEP); and
- ◆ Initiation of the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) in 31 of Afghanistan's 32 provinces, with more than 3,500 villages having participated in election of 600 community development councils with participation of both women and men, 21 NGOs and one UN agency mobilised as implementation partners, some 350 projects approved for implementation, and the first block grants provided to local communities in early December 2003.

- Source: Government of Afghanistan (2004)

While these accomplishments are gratifying, the results achieved fall short of popular expectations and what is needed to generate rapid progress on reconstruction, economic growth, and achieving the MDG targets. Progress in capacity building in the Government has a very long way

to go, the capacity of the Afghan private sector needs to be strengthened; and much too large a share of external funding for Afghanistan's reconstruction still goes through channels, which do not help build sustainable capacity in the Government and Afghan private sector.

IMPROVING THE DATABASE AND STATISTICAL CAPACITY¹⁴⁸

After almost two decades of war and conflict and the ensuing devastation, the Government of Afghanistan together with its development partners is attempting to rebuild and rehabilitate the nation and its institutions. To pursue an evidence-based approach to making far reaching decisions covering the entire span of economic and social dimensions, the Government and its partners are in need of reliable, comprehensive and timely data. Two decades of war and conflict have left Afghanistan's institutional systems devastated. The Central Statistical Office (CSO), as with most government agencies and institutions in Afghanistan, has suffered destruction. The CSO is confronted by serious human resource, material and physical constraints. Other Ministries and agencies responsible for the compilation of administrative and other data at the sector level face much the same situation.

- Statistical Master Plan Report (2004)

As the Statistical Master Plan has highlighted, getting reliable data for policy-making has been a big constraint. In addition, there are a number of cross-cutting issues that have made the database extremely weak.

Afghanistan does not have a complete census

Afghanistan must be one of the few countries that has never completed a full census. The last census was in 1979 and was only partially completed. Overall CSO has used a 1.92% compound multiplier for the data that was collected or estimated in 1979 to estimate current populations with a lower multiplier for rural areas and a higher multiplier for urban areas. Given the massive movement of people in the intervening years, this constant multiplier is unlikely to be accurate, particularly at a sub-national level.

This leaves data collectors with two big problems: (i) unreliable sub-national population estimates at province and district levels, and (ii) an absence of a sampling frame for deriving random samples and weighting schemes for sample surveys. There is no complete village list in Afghanistan that could have acted as some sort of sampling frame, even without population data.

Without geo-references to villages in Afghanistan, they are often difficult to find in the field because of various versions and interpretations of village names. Many villages have been abandoned and others have been newly formed as a result of war and security. Without up-to-date census information, sampling based on old village list is often problematic.

There are no clear official district and provincial boundaries

Provincial and district boundaries have changed rapidly. Currently there are an estimated 398 districts and 34 provinces for which there are still no official district and provincial boundaries. These boundaries have changed, and data from previous surveys was often fixed to the older scheme of 328 districts and 32 provinces. Without official boundaries and geo-references, the villages, a complete translation from one provincial/district scheme to another is not possible. Work is currently underway to map out enumeration areas within the latest province and district boundaries, which will become the standard ones to be used for elections and future data collection and record keeping.

Once the pre-census household listing has been successfully completed and data released in line with the latest districts, this will provide the best population estimates and also the sampling frames.

Surveys face huge difficulties in getting gender-disaggregated data

Women are often the custodians of essential data on dietary diversity, consumption health care seeking practices, vaccination history, morbidity history of infants, and of course are the access point for any anthropometric measurement on under-five children.

Both the MICS survey and NRVA 2003 experienced challenges in finding sufficient women enumerators to go to the southern and eastern Pashtun dominated areas. NRVA 2003 only used male enumeration teams in those areas, MICS 2003 survey also had similar problems. Even asking women their names can appear culturally insensitive. Getting women's ages in Afghanistan is also particularly difficult. NRVA 2005 has increased the number of women's surveyors by insisting the male surveyors will be hired only if they present as part of a couple willing to work together to numerate both male and female questionnaires. This should set a trend for future surveys, gradually, increasing both the number of female enumerators, and the willingness of female household residents to respond openly and frankly to questions posed by them.

Security


Lack of access to certain regions of Afghanistan has dogged data collection since the first national census in 1979. That survey was only about 40% complete in rural areas because of security concerns, and 80 government staff died during its enumeration. Two CSO staff have died in the recent pre-census household listing exercise during 2003. NRVA 2003 did not go to large areas in three provinces as a result of security concerns (Map 13.1).

NRVA 2005 has made a concerted effort to try and

enumerate the selected villages in every district in Afghanistan, and has negotiated with various Taliban dominated local elites to ensure the safety of the enumeration teams. This underscores the challenge of conducting national surveys in Afghanistan, as many surveys in the recent past have drawn samples only from those areas which they consider safe to enumerate, creating inevitable bias in the results and subsequent programme implementation. Improvements in the security climate and in the confidence of the Afghan people in the government's commitment to deliver programmes and support to hitherto insecure areas will ensure that future survey teams will be freely able to sample across all districts and provinces, and provide truly national estimates with appropriate sub-national statistics.

The reluctance on the part of many women enumerators to go to various areas of Afghanistan, is partially cultural, but often compounded by about security fears.

Map 13.1: Women not enumerated in most southern provinces during NRVA 2003



Often there is lack of coordination among different surveys, causing respondent fatigue in over-surveyed areas

Despite a lack of data in many areas, many villages that are not very remote, complain bitterly when another survey visits their community. They complain they have seen many surveys in the past three years but with a little impact on their livelihoods. Few if any of these surveys have been the national government's, but those of various NGO or other aid organisations working at a sub-national level. In contrast, members of villages that have not been over-sampled often collaborate enthusiastically in surveys in the hope that the results will bring programmes such as the National Solidarity Programme to their area soon.

This highlights the need for coordination of surveys and the use of national data sets wherever they can possibly supply NGOs with needed data. Proper coordination and sequencing of surveys using credible sampling frame, will

ensure that the convenient communities are not over sampled and frequency is no more than expected rate of change in the value of the indicators being measured.

Building statistical capacity

Moving towards the development of a sustainable statistical capacity to be able to measure and monitor MDGs will require the development and adaptation of a strategic plan with clearly identified outputs and goals. Key elements of this are an internationally credible statistics law, the formation of the National Statistics Council, and restructuring and reform within CSO and other line ministries collecting sector data.

CSO should have responsibility to coordinate statistical activities, set standards, and act as a clearing-house for data collected by other agencies. It should not attempt to become the sole collector of data, an approach that was adopted in the past when central planning was the norm. The CSO should also avoid seeking to play a role as a monopolistic provider of official data. In a modern statistical system, the national statistical agency cannot be the sole

agency for data collection and dissemination. To this end, the statistical law should clearly spell out the range of functions it needs to carry out. In its coordinating role, the CSO should be guided by a National Statistics Council.

The National Statistics Council could take a very important role in ensuring that there is a rational schedule of surveys covering a range of agreed indicators that are standardised for Afghanistan, that address both MDGs and local development planning needs across the various sectors.

Clearly, there needs to be a scheduling of surveys in relation to the rate of expected change in the statistics. Typically three to five years is a time interval that both finances permit and allows for some significant change in many key indicators to take place in response to prevailing conditions, but indicators have to be examined on a sector by sector basis and a rational schedule for surveys developed that does not overload the capacity of CSO in any one year. For this MDGR, the main data instruments used to inform on progress are indicated in Table 13.1.

Table 13.1: Main data sources used in the MDG Report

Data source	Agency	Data for Goals	Quality of the recent survey information	Can this data source be used as a baseline?	Frequency
NRVA 03	MRRD, WFP, UNDP, FAO	Poverty and hunger (#1); Primary education (#2); Gender equality (#3); Health (#6); Environment (#7)	Reliable	Yes	2003; 2005; 2006; 2007
MICS 03	UNICEF, CSO	Primary education (#2); Gender equality (#3); Child mortality (#4); Maternal mortality (#5)	Some women data collection issues; overall variable quality	Yes	Not before 2007
NMNS 04	CSC/UNICEF, Ministry of Health	Poverty and hunger (#1)	Good	Yes	Not before 2008

Monitoring the MDGs

Table 13.2 is a quality assessment of the current state of expertise and capacity within the Afghan government to perform the various elements of assessment and monitoring system.

While CSO has been involved in recent survey initiatives by the international community, it has been at an implementation and enumeration level, for which CSO does have valid recent experience and expertise. What is

missing is expertise and recent experience of survey design and especially analysis of survey data. A concerted programme of technical assistance must be designed to ensure of a significant increase in analytical capacity of members of the CSO and the line ministries involved in collating analysing data.

Certain ministries are very committed to data-based policy development and programme monitoring and evaluation, while others, with less active programmes, do not seem to




Table 13.2: Assessment of the data gathering capacities

Elements of monitoring system	Strong	Fair	Weak	Comments
Data gathering capacity	X			Significant experience in Afghanistan
Quality of recent survey information		X		Access to women & insecure areas. Lack of sampling frame
Statistical tracking capacity			X	Priority restructuring & reform important
Statistical analysis capacity			X	Priority restructuring & reform important
Capacity to incorporate analysis into policy, planning, & resource allocation	X	X	X	Capacity varies across different ministries
Management information system or rapid assessments methods available	X	X	X	Capacity varies across different ministries

be so committed to the collection and analysis of appropriate statistical products for their policy and programme development. Where there are large amounts of money going through government ministries for programmes, there is also a considerable demand for analytical product and a readiness to incorporate them in any discussion of performance and policy. Where ministries do not have such programmes, the need and the demand for such data and analytical products is less or non-existent.

It is hoped that this Millennium Development Goal Report and forthcoming interim and full Afghan National Development Strategy (IPRSP and PRSP) processes will both underscore the need for medium-term planning, resourcing and capacity building for data management and monitoring to support both the reporting on MDGs and to be able to report on progress against the plans developed in the interim and full ANDS.

The process of developing the interim and full ANDS will ensure continued focus on the quality and type of data collection activity is to ensure sufficient and reliable data is collected to inform policy-making.


In short, the Statistical Master Plan or some variant of it needs to be implemented with the full support of all sectors of the Afghan government, to ensure that the government is reliably and frequently updated on the key indicators all quiet to monitor its actual performance on the lives of Afghans. The National Statistics Council, once formed, needs to take the lead on bringing all stakeholders together to formulate a survey data collection schedule that reflects existing data sources and the appropriate time intervals for various different indicators.

BUILDING INFRASTRUCTURE¹⁴⁹

Investments in physical infrastructure underpins growth directly. In the case of agriculture, reduction in farm to market times encourages greater productivity through specialisation in crops with a competitive advantage and opens the way for diversification into new products for new markets. Infrastructure investments also environment for economic growth. Investments in transport infrastructure bring the country closer together, allowing for a more effective and cost efficient deliver of security. Investments in clean water and sanitation are considered to be some of the most cost effective in delivering health outcomes - ensuring both a higher standard of living and a more productive workforce.

Development of Afghanistan's physical infrastructure is essential for achieving sustained economic growth, and for political and social progress based on national integration:

- ◆ Infrastructure directly contributes to economic growth since it comprises a significant proportion of GDP, and also because infrastructure services are essential inputs for other services, agriculture, and industry. Infrastructure is crucial for market integration, for attracting private investment, and for trade and other international economic ties;
- ◆ Infrastructure provides critical basic services to the people, contributing to their well-being, not just their economic productivity. The importance of, for example, electricity and clean water in people's daily lives cannot be overstated. A better urban environment makes enormous difference to the life of city dwellers;
- ◆ More broadly, infrastructure promotes national integration in a number of ways. Telecommunications,



movements of goods, and movements of people all facilitate positive interactions between different parts of the country, and can support a development-oriented government's efforts to reach out to the people; and

- ◆ Infrastructure provides a highly visible index of government performance, whose functioning and efficiency are readily apparent to all.

The government has focused on urgent infrastructure rehabilitation from the beginning of its tenure, and good progress has been made in several areas. The rehabilitation of existing major national highways is well underway, and large numbers of other roads have been repaired under the NEPP. Successful initial development of telecommunications has been achieved mainly with significant private investment. Air transport has resumed and expanded despite constraints. In other sectors rehabilitation of key facilities has occurred or is underway. However, in general, progress in rehabilitation of infrastructure has fallen short of the public's high expectations. Most of the large new investments that are required to support the Afghan economy and society in the future, including irrigation, power, additional roads, and civil aviation infrastructure have not yet begun.

STRENGTHENING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE¹⁵⁰

In earlier times there were lengthy discussions on whether one country or another was yet 'fit for democracy'. This changed only recently, with the recognition that the question was itself wrong-headed: a country does not have to be judged fit for democracy, rather it has to become fit through democracy. This is truly a momentous change.¹⁵¹

- Nobel Laureate, Amartya Sen

Parliamentary elections due in September 2005 will end the round of elections under the Bonn Agreement. Although Afghanistan has made great strides in establishing the basic foundations for democracy and new state institutions, it is still far short of completing this ambitious project. Rather, the long-term project of democratic state building has only begun. From addressing critical gaps in human capacity across all levels of the civil service to "deepening democracy" and expanding citizen participation, Afghanistan's governance reform agenda is immense. Without a sound strategy and concerted effort to overcome these significant structural impediments, increased donor assistance will fail to translate into improved living conditions for Afghan citizens. Specifically, the transformation of Afghanistan's governance system from a paradoxically fragmented, yet authoritarian model to a better managed, participatory and responsive arrangement is fundamental to realising the promise of the MDGs. It is also central to establishing a just and durable peace in the war-ravaged country.

Expansion of political freedoms through democratisation is a desirable outcome. But democratic institutions and


practice can also contribute to achieving the MDGs and securing broader human development objectives. Indeed, politics matters for achieving the goals outlined in this report. The question is: Will Afghans, and particularly the most poor and vulnerable, empower themselves through the new system of governance in order to tackle their most urgent needs?

Measured against the Bonn benchmarks, agreed upon on 5 December 2001, political institution-building in Afghanistan has witnessed several successes: the convening of the Emergency and Constitutional *Loya Jirgas* resulting in both a transitional and permanent governance framework; the establishment of governmental bodies to revive the economy, manage the civil service, and promote human rights; and the holding of the historic 2004 presidential election. By many objective standards, the Afghan people and their international partners have enjoyed forward momentum towards the construction of an open and accountable polity. An updated set of benchmarks with concrete indicators are now required for the "post-Bonn era" to build on and make permanent the recent gains. By building further trust and co-operation through strengthening democratic structures in Kabul, the provinces, the districts, and in communities, Afghans will be better equipped to take up the challenge of broad-based social and economic development.

Despite the progress achieved, Afghanistan's governance structure will remain weak unless those with political power are held increasingly accountable by citizens and power is shared among multiple official authorities; further steps are initiated to improve transparency and efficiency in the public and private sectors; and access to justice is improved. If the over-arching aims of the new Constitution are to be enforced, the full democratic potential of new institutions, including the National Assembly and Provincial Councils, needs to be realised. This also involves the recognition of non-state actors (in the Islamic faith, civil society, private sector, the media, and academic institutions) as "key democratic governance leaders," who should be regarded as partners of government even when they openly advocate alternative viewpoints. For example, by engaging in constructive policy dialogue with government and monitoring the implementation of laws that seek to reduce corruption or improve the functioning of the judicial system, non-state actors can provide creative solutions to many systemic challenges rooted in under-resourced ministries and agencies, over-lapping mandates, and the overall weak operating procedures and behavioural practices of state institutions.

Four policy and institutional reform priority areas that can help make democracy work for human development in Afghanistan include:

- ◆ *Strengthening the legislative, representative, and*




oversight roles of the National Assembly and Provincial Councils: Important democracy-building activities, such as promoting civic education, women's rights, and the creation of an economic middle class, can take several years if not decades to bring about progressive changes. To ensure proper checks-and-balances, open competition for power, and citizen participation in the crucial early stage of Afghanistan's democratic development, serious investments must be made to train and equip the members of the National Assembly, Provincial Councils, and political parties, as well as to further encourage effective watchdog bodies in the media and civil society.

- ◆ **Building the human and institutional capacity at central, provincial and district-level:** The capacities to plan, manage, and implement public sector activities, both at national and sub-national levels, lie at the heart of achieving Afghanistan's MDGs. Responses to fulfil this objective should involve the specialised targeting of gaps in the government's technical or sector-specific human, technical and financial capacities, as well as the rationalisation and strengthening of ministries and agencies through public administration reform.
- ◆ **Combating corruption through prevention, enforcement, and public awareness:** Several legislative and practical measures are required to establish an appropriate legal and institutional environment for the prevention of corruption in Afghanistan. These include strengthening existing and establishing possible new bodies to deter and prosecute those engaged in corrupt activities, and undertaking a successful anti-corruption campaign as part of a larger effort to build civic ideals and create conditions that foster higher living standards across Afghanistan.


- ◆ **Reforming the judicial system at central and local levels, aiming to increase access to justice to ensure that the rights of Afghans are enshrined in the constitution:** This will require a "transitional legal framework" that defines the relationship between formal and traditional legal mechanisms, followed by further efforts to address structural challenges in the form of limited administrative capacity, political interference from the executive branch, poor salaries, physical security, poor judicial infrastructure, and a severe lack of qualified justice system personnel.

Afghanistan's road to establishing a resilient democracy that serves the basic needs of all its citizens remains long and arduous. Yet the agenda for governance reform is increasingly clear. Reducing poverty, securing peace, and achieving the Afghanistan MDGs depend as much on whether poor people have political power as on their opportunities for economic progress. Efforts to accommodate existing social and political realities, through, for example, the convening of *Loya Jirgas* and *Shuras*, must continue as Afghans steadily embrace democratisation through active participation, internalising basic norms, and accepting their own process and institutions as legitimate.

Overall, the government's tasks after the September 2005 elections are huge, and so are the peoples' expectations. The international community needs to provide sustained political support as well as increased financial support to the government to deliver. Without that support, the risk that expectations will not be met is high, and carries with it the threat of a return to instability.



Chapter 14:
ACHIEVING THE
MILLENNIUM
DEVELOPMENT
GOALS







ACHIEVING THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS

The most effective strategy for making steady, sustainable progress on achieving the Millennium Development Goals is to address all the goals in an integrated way. There is no hierarchy among the MDGs and each goal needs a well-defined strategy for success. Pursuing each goal separately without acknowledging its interlinkages with others will reduce the complex process of human and economic development to a series of fragmented, conflicting, and unsustainable interventions. A comprehensive and harmonious development approach is necessary.

Overcoming constraints to achieving the MDGs requires policies and programmes that stimulate economic growth while ensuring equity

Pro-poor growth would have to be accompanied by government policies that assure that the poorest and most vulnerable benefit from it. Much of this growth will have to come from (non-poppy) agriculture, which contributes more than 50% of the licit GDP and provides employment to two-thirds of the workforce. Investment in rural infrastructure will increase access to markets and provide impetus to the rural economy, thereby reducing hunger and malnutrition. A massive rural public works programme to build a reliable rural road system and restore irrigation systems will help generate rural employment and wages, connect the rural population to the market and create necessary conditions for poverty reduction. At the same time, government policies will have to target asset and employment creation for the most vulnerable in the rural areas. They will also have to ensure that investment in the social sectors is protected.

Investing in the social sectors is not only a matter of meeting immediate social needs; it is also about combating poverty

The fight against poverty requires the creation of new wealth, in households, in communities and nationally, by better equipping Afghans to respond to the requirements and opportunities posed by a recovering economy. Social capital is the fabric of networks, relationships, norms and institutions that bind a society together and enable it function and grow dynamically. Human capital refers to the acquired knowledge, skills and capacities that allow individuals to operate within this fabric. In Afghanistan, both have been severely affected by years of conflict. Rebuilding

social and human capital will require sustained investment and nurturing to restore capacity, confidence and trust within society.

Social sector investment will eventually lead to a transformation in the outlook, expectations, and motivations of Afghans to generating increased demands for improvements in local and national governance, the rule of law, observance of human rights, and political participation which together will encourage efficient public administration and a dynamic, competitive private sector.

Investment in universal primary education, especially the education of girls, is a priority. Girls that have been to school transform their country as they grow up. They tend to marry later and have fewer, healthier children. They help increase household income and in turn they insist on access to education and health care for their own children. Likewise, increasing access to affordable and quality health care not only saves and improves lives but also produces enormous economic gains. Thus, human capital development is central to achieving the MDGs as it will also contribute to meeting the other national targets to be identified in the ANDS.

Women in Afghanistan have significant catching up to do to overcome a history of socially-sanctioned discrimination which starts early in life. Gender discrimination was further exacerbated during the years of Taliban rule. Allocation of seats in the national parliament is a welcome first step, but it needs to be followed up by extending women's representation at the provincial and district levels, and by taking steps to increase women's access to justice.

Security must be significantly improved for Afghanistan to have a realistic prospect of achieving the MDGs

It is recognised that without the presence of international military forces (ISAF and Coalition), the likelihood of a resumption of violence and the country's re-emergence as a haven for international terrorists is high. However, dedicating approximately US \$12.5 billion per year to combat insecurity is an unsustainable burden for the international community. Consequently, security sector reforms will have to be a central priority, to ensure the



Chapter 14

continuation of the state building process. This requires putting Afghanistan back in the driver's seat with regard to security policy and coordination, under the overall leadership of the Office of the National Security Council.

However, without enhanced coordination among the various security sector pillars, personal security will remain invisible to the poor, as will the pace of reconstruction, undermining the early political gains that have been made. Improving personal security (including protecting assets) of groups below the poverty line will also require improved policing and serious judicial reforms. Security of land tenure will also be another important facet, increasing the security of farm production.

International assistance has been essential, but the current mechanisms of aid provision are not optimal

The way in which assistance is provided is of equal importance to the overall amount. Non-integrated, project-based planning and delivery modalities weaken the coherence of investments, producing overlaps, variations and gaps in service delivery. Funding provided directly to the government's budget and to national programmes, subject to international standards of transparency and accountability, supports the development of an effective and accountable state that provides basic services to its citizens. It reinforces the budget as the central tool of policy, promotes transparency in procurement and in the choice of implementing partners, ensures geographic and ethnic equity as it supports the government's national programmes. Most importantly, it strengthens the service delivery capacity, both centrally, and through local government, and with it, the legitimacy of the state. Accordingly, increasing the proportion of external aid required for project financing through government accounts will strengthen the state and further enhance its legitimacy.

Given the continued existence of humanitarian needs, and the large volume of humanitarian assistance still being provided, it is vital that relief assistance be supportive of the development process. Each year, about 100,000 MT of food aid is provided to Afghanistan, alongside cash based transfers, to fill the immediate needs of citizens living on or below the poverty line. There is a danger that continuing subsidies of this sort will create a never-ending cycle of dependency. Moving from post conflict recovery to a more sustainable path of development requires the adoption of supportive policies and programmes that do not undermine, but rather support, people's own efforts to escape from poverty.

Development can often be insensitive to the risk of drought and to the importance of protecting vulnerable households against risk

If humanitarian assistance and development can be "linked" as supportive strategies, then food aid, for example, can be

used to build durable productive assets such as small scale irrigation schemes and rural access roads. Improving development reduces the need for humanitarian relief long term, while more effective humanitarian support in the short term can also contribute to development.

The government sees the key to linking relief and development from the development point of view as a way to reduce the frequency and intensity of emergencies, for example through drought proofing, so that household assets are protected. Reducing the negative impact of shocks on households, both natural and man-made, requires making individuals, households and economies less vulnerable and more resilient. Through programmes such as the NSP and Rural Credit, the Afghan Government is investing in people to further enhance the Afghan peoples' already high levels of resilience.

An additional factor in maintaining productive and non-productive assets is the establishment of public and private sector and core public sector management capacities

Good governance results when top down (centre - province) and bottom up (community - district) accountability is created, combined with competent human resources and a management culture that is focused on service delivery and the rule of law. Education is central to the attainment of such an objective, and investments to this end are reflected in the government's back-to-school policy.

Devolving decision-making power to local levels of government and encouraging their participation is important for improved governance and accountability. The establishment of Community Development Councils in villages across Afghanistan is an effort in that direction. These councils are key to social integration between and across communities; through such structures the government can respond directly to the needs of the people and make it accountable to them. Providing resources to establish and sustain such structures is vital if communities are to play a decisive role in their own development and in maintaining community assets that enhance quality of life and access to services. Just as the private sector is expected to be the engine of growth, community groups too are expected to be the focus for enhancing access to community level public assets such as rural roads, small-scale irrigation systems, rural electrification, and small structures for health and education.

The preferred mechanism for the delivery of basic services also needs to be determined, but ideally, it should enhance the interface between local communities and local government. The Community Development Council model would constitute such an approach, whereby Community Development Councils work closely with local government to deliver services that are demand-driven. The transformation of Afghanistan's governance system toward



a better managed, participatory and responsive arrangement is fundamental to realising the promise of the MDGs. It is also central to establishing a just and durable peace in this war-ravaged land.

Attaining the MDGs requires harmonisation between MDG targets and those that will be set in the ANDS as well as within the medium term fiscal and annual budget frameworks

Currently, the majority of investments in support of the MDGs are delivered through projects, and without coherent sector wide programmes focused on cost efficiency and effectiveness. In the long term, direct budget support mechanisms will be required to allow a more equitable programme to be developed, for example in the areas of education and health, that can set and meet service delivery targets, in order for poverty to be tackled in systematic and non-ad hoc way.

Afghanistan's prospects of achieving the MDGs hinge on successfully navigating the transition from post-conflict

recovery to sustainable pro-poor growth. This will require a focus that: (i) enhances national and personal security; (ii) builds an accountable state capable of providing law and order; (iii) strengthens the agriculture sector and generates employment for the poor; (iv) makes large-scale investments in the education and health sectors; (v) creates an environment for improving women's access to justice and eliminating discrimination against women; (vi) increases access to improved water and sanitation, thereby making a difference to the quality of life for urban slum dwellers, and (vii) reduces the contribution of opium to the national economy without increasing poverty in the short-term.

The MDG targets can be met only if all the actions needed come together within a common frame and individually and collectively provide the necessary results. The challenges are immense but Afghanistan cannot afford to lose another generation or even another year in the task of re-building the country and improving the well-being of its people.



ANNEXURE 1

"AFGHANISATION" OF GLOBAL MDGs, TARGETS AND INDICATORS

Afghanised MDGs, targets and indicators

Global MDGs, targets and indicators	Afghanised MDGs, targets and indicators
<p>Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger <i>Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than US \$1 a day</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Proportion of population below US \$1 per day (1993 PPP values) ◆ Poverty gap ratio (incidence x depth of poverty) ◆ Share of poorest quintile in national consumption 	<p><i>The proportion of people whose income is less than US \$1 a day decreases by 3% per annum until the year 2020</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Proportion of population below US \$1 per day (1993 PPP values) ◆ Proportion of population below national poverty line ◆ Poverty gap ratio (incidence x depth of poverty) ◆ Share of poorest quintile in national consumption
<p><i>Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Prevalence of underweight children under 5 years of age ◆ Proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption 	<p><i>The proportion of people who suffer from hunger decreases by 5% per annum until the year 2020</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Prevalence of underweight children under 5 years of age ◆ Proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption
<p>Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education <i>Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Net enrolment ratio in primary education ◆ Proportion of pupils starting Grade 1 who reach Grade 5 ◆ Literacy rate of 15- to 24-year-olds 	<p><i>Ensure that, by 2020, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Net enrolment ratio in primary education ◆ Proportion of pupils starting Grade 1 who reach Grade 5 ◆ Literacy rate of 15- to 24-year-olds
<p>Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women <i>Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Ratio of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education ◆ Ratio of literate females to males (15- to 24-year-olds) ◆ Share of women in wage employment in non-agricultural sector ◆ Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament 	<p><i>Eliminate gender disparity in all levels of education no later than 2020</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Ratio of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education ◆ Ratio of literate females to males (15- to 24-year-olds)
<p><i>Reduce gender disparity in economic areas by 2020</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Ratio of female to male government employees 	<p><i>Reduce gender disparity in economic areas by 2020</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Ratio of female to male government employees
<p><i>Increase female participation in elected and appointed bodies at all levels of governance to 30% by 2020</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Proportion of seats held by women in national, provincial and district representative bodies 	<p><i>Increase female participation in elected and appointed bodies at all levels of governance to 30% by 2020</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Proportion of seats held by women in national, provincial and district representative bodies
<p><i>Reduce gender disparity in access to justice by 50% by 2015 and completely (100%) by 2020</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Adoption, review and amendment of legislation that protects the rights of women, particularly in employment, family rights, property and inheritance and in accordance with the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan ◆ Adoption of legislation that criminalizes all forms of gender and sexual-based violence 	<p><i>Reduce gender disparity in access to justice by 50% by 2015 and completely (100%) by 2020</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Adoption, review and amendment of legislation that protects the rights of women, particularly in employment, family rights, property and inheritance and in accordance with the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan ◆ Adoption of legislation that criminalizes all forms of gender and sexual-based violence
<p>Goal 4: Reduce child mortality <i>Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-5 mortality rate</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Under-5 mortality rate ◆ Infant mortality rate ◆ Proportion of 1-year-old children immunised against measles 	<p><i>Reduce by 50%, between 2003 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate, and further reduce the USMR to 1/3 of the 2003 USMR by 2020</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Under-5 mortality rate ◆ Infant mortality rate ◆ Proportion of 1-year-old children immunised against measles

"AFGHANISATION" OF GLOBAL MDGs, TARGETS AND INDICATORS

Afghanised MDGs, targets and indicators

Global MDGs, targets and indicators	Afghanised MDGs, targets and indicators
<p>Goal 5: Improve maternal health</p> <p><i>Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Maternal mortality ratio ◆ Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel 	<p><i>Reduce by 50% between 2002 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio, and further reduce the MMR to 25% of the 2002 level by 2020</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Maternal mortality ratio ◆ Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel ◆ Reduce total fertility rate (births per woman) by 30% by 2020 ◆ Proportion of women receiving professional ante-natal care
<p>Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases</p> <p><i>Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ HIV prevalence among 15- to 24-year-old pregnant women ◆ Condom use rate of the contraceptive prevalence rate ◆ Contraceptive prevalence rate ◆ Ratio of school attendance by orphans to school attendance of non-orphans aged 10 to 14 years 	<p><i>Have halted by 2020 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ HIV prevalence among blood donors ◆ Condom use rate of the contraceptive prevalence rate ◆ % of population aged 15-49 with comprehensive correct knowledge of HIV/AIDS ◆ Contraceptive prevalence rate ◆ Proportion of blood samples screened for HIV/AIDS and STDs ◆ Proportion of women's unmet needs for family planning met ◆ Proportion of IV drug users are in treatment by 2015
<p><i>Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Prevalence and death rates associated with malaria ◆ Proportion of population in malaria risk areas using effective malaria prevention and treatment measures (e.g. bed nets) ◆ Prevalence and death rates associated with tuberculosis ◆ Proportion of TB cases detected and cured under DOTS 	<p><i>Have halted by 2020 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Prevalence and death rates associated with malaria ◆ Proportion of population in malaria risk areas using effective malaria prevention and treatment measures (e.g. bed nets) ◆ Prevalence and death rates associated with tuberculosis ◆ Proportion of TB cases detected and cured under DOTS
<p>Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability</p> <p><i>Integrate the principles of sustainable development into policies and programmes and reverse the loss of the environmental resources</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Proportion of land area covered by forest ◆ Ratio of area protected to maintain biological diversity to surface area ◆ Energy use (kg. oil equivalent) per US\$1,000 GDP ◆ Carbon dioxide emissions (per capita) and consumption of ozone-depleting CFCs ◆ Proportion of population using solid fuels 	<p><i>Integrate the principles of sustainable development into policies and programmes and reverse the loss of the environmental resources</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Proportion of land area covered by forest ◆ Ratio of area protected to maintain biological diversity to surface area ◆ Energy use (kg. oil equivalent) per US\$1,000 GDP ◆ Carbon dioxide emissions (per capita) and consumption of ozone-depleting CFCs ◆ Proportion of population using solid fuels
<p><i>Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and sanitation</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Proportion of population with sustainable access to an improved water source, urban and rural ◆ Proportion of population with access to improved sanitation, urban and rural 	<p><i>Halve, by 2020, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and sanitation</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Proportion of population with sustainable access to an improved water source, urban and rural ◆ Proportion of population with access to improved sanitation, urban and rural
<p><i>By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Proportion of households with access to secure tenure 	<p><i>By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of all slum dwellers</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Proportion of households with access to secure tenure

"AFGHANISATION" OF GLOBAL MDGs, TARGETS AND INDICATORS

Afghanised MDGs, targets and indicators

Global MDGs, targets and indicators

<p>Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development</p> <p><i>Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system</i></p> <p><i>Address the special needs of the Least Developed Countries</i></p> <p><i>Address the special needs of landlocked developing countries and Small Island Developing States</i></p> <p><i>Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Net ODA, total and to LDCs, as percentage of OECD/DAC donors' Gross National Income [targets of 0.7% in total and 0.15% for LDCs] ◆ Proportion of total bilateral, sector-allocable ODA of OECD/DAC donors to basic social services (basic education, primary health care, nutrition, safe water and sanitation) ◆ Proportion of bilateral ODA of OECD/DAC donors that is untied ◆ ODA received in landlocked developing countries as a proportion of their GNIs ◆ ODA received in Small Island Developing States as proportion of their GNIs ◆ Proportion of total developed country imports (by value and excluding arms), from developing countries and from LDCs, admitted free of duty ◆ Average tariffs and quotas on agricultural products and textiles and clothing from developing countries ◆ Agricultural support estimate for OECD countries as percentage of their GDP ◆ Proportion of ODA provided to help build trade capacity ◆ Total number of countries that have reached their Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) decision points and number that have reached their HIPC completion points (cumulative) ◆ Debt relief committed under HIPC initiative. ◆ Debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and services <p><i>In cooperation with developing countries, develop and implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Unemployment rate of young people aged 15-24 years, each sex and total <p><i>In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Proportion of population with access to affordable essential drugs on a sustainable basis <p><i>In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Telephone lines and cellular subscribers per 1000 population ◆ Personal computers in use per 1000 population and Internet users per 100 population 	<p><i>Deal comprehensively and influence the provision of foreign aid through appropriate measures to enable Afghanistan develop sustainably in long-term</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Proportion of total bilateral, sector-allocable ODA of OECD/DAC donors to basic social services (basic education, primary health care, nutrition, safe water and sanitation) ◆ Proportion of bilateral ODA of OECD/DAC donors that is untied ◆ ODA received as proportion of its GNI ◆ Proportion of ODA provided to help build trade capacity <p><i>Develop an open, rule-based predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system including a commitment to good governance, development and poverty reduction</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Percentage of total export to countries with which Afghanistan has a preferential trade agreement
<p><i>In cooperation with developing countries, develop and implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Unemployment rate of young people aged 15-24 years, each sex and total <p><i>In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Proportion of population with access to affordable essential drugs on a sustainable basis <p><i>In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Telephone lines and cellular subscribers per 1000 population ◆ Personal computers in use per 1000 population and Internet users per 100 population 	<p><i>In cooperation with developing countries, develop and implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Unemployment rate of young people aged 15-24 years, each sex and total <p><i>In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Proportion of population with access to affordable essential drugs on a sustainable basis <p><i>In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Telephone lines and cellular subscribers per 1000 population ◆ Personal computers in use per 1000 population and Internet users per 100 population

"AFGHANISATION" OF GLOBAL MDGs, TARGETS AND INDICATORS

Global MDGs, targets and indicators

Afghanised MDGs, targets and indicators

Goal 9: Enhance security

<p>Reform and professionalise the Afghan National Army by 2010</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP ◆ Professionally trained ANA ◆ Nationwide fielding of the ANA ◆ Operational capability of the ANA and ability to operate independently or with less support from Coalition/ISAF forces 	<p>Reduce the misuse of weapons and the proportion of illegally-held weapons by 2010</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Number of weapons licensed under the gun law ◆ Gun-related crime as a proportion of total crime
<p>Reform, restructure and professionalise the Afghan National Police by 2010</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Citizen's confidence in ANP's ability to provide security and access to justice comparable to other countries coming out of conflict ◆ Reported crime to conviction ratio 	<p>All employed antipersonnel mines destroyed by 2013. All other explosive contaminants destroyed by 2015</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Number of high impacted communities ◆ Total number of impacted communities ◆ Number of Afghans directly impacted ◆ Number of mine/UXO victims (injured or dead)
<p>All stockpiled antipersonnel mines destroyed by 2007. All other abandoned or unwanted explosive stocks destroyed by 2020</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Number of stockpiled antipersonnel mines destroyed ◆ Number of ERW stockpiles remaining to be destroyed 	<p>Reduce the contribution of opium to the total economy to less than 5% by 2015, and to less than 1% by 2020</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Eliminate poppy cultivation by 2020 ◆ Reduce the number of Afghans dependent on opium for their livelihoods by 75% by 2015 and by 90% by 2020 from the 2004 level

ANNEXURE 2 SUMMARY STATISTICS ON THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS

MDG	Indicator	Baseline Year	Baseline value	Targets	
				2015	2020
Eradicate extreme hunger and poverty	Population below US \$1 a day	2005	No data		
	Poverty gap ratio	2005	No data		
	Share of poorest quintile in consumption	2005	No data		
	Underweight children under 5 years of age	2002	41%	15%	
	Population below minimum level of dietary energy	2003	20.4%	11%	9%
Achieve universal primary education	Net enrolment ratio in primary education	2003	54%*		100%
	Proportion of pupils starting Grade 1 who reach Grade 5	2003	45%		100%
	Literacy rate of 15- to 24-year olds	2003	34%		100%
	Ratio of boys to girls in primary education	2003	0.6		1.0
	Ratio of boys to girls in secondary education	2003	0.33		1.0
Promote gender equality and empower women	Ratio of boys to girls in tertiary education	2003	0.21		1.0
	Ratio of literate females to males (15- to 24-year olds)	2003	0.34		1.0
	Ratio of female to male government employees		29% (central); 17% (provincial)		50% at all levels
	Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament	2005	25% (minimum)		
	Proportion of seats held by women in provincial and district representative bodies		No data		
Reduce child mortality	Under-5 mortality rate	2003	230	115	76
	Infant mortality rate	2003	140	70	46
	Proportion of 1-year old children immunised against measles	2003	75	90	100
Improve maternal health	Maternal mortality ratio	2002	1600	800	400
	Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel	2002	14.3%	50%	75%
	Fertility rate	2002	6.3	4.7	3.1
	Proportion of women receiving professional ante-natal care	1999	12%	25%	50%
	HIV prevalence amongst blood donors		No data		
	Proportion of blood samples screened for HIV/AIDS		No data		
Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, TB and other diseases	Condom use rate of the contraceptive prevalence rate	2003	5%		
	Contraceptive prevalence rate	2003	National - 10% Rural - 6%; Urban - 21%		
	Percentage of population aged 15-49 years with comprehensive and correct knowledge of HIV/AIDS		No data		
	Proportion of women's unmet needs for family planning met		No data		
	Proportion of IV drug users in treatment		No data		
	Malaria	2003	2.67% (reported cases)		
	Tuberculosis	2005	333 per 100,000 active)		
	Proportion of TB cases detected and cured under DOTS	2005	24% of population detected and cured	70% detected and 85% treated	

MDG	Indicator	Baseline Year	Baseline value	Targets		
				2015	2020	
Ensure environmental sustainability	Proportion of land area covered by forest	1993	2.1%	3-4%		
	Ratio of area protected to maintain biological diversity to surface area	2004	0.34%	0.50%		
	Energy use (kg oil equivalent) per US \$1,000 GDP (PPP)		No data			
	Carbon dioxide emissions (per capita) and consumption of ozone depleting CFCs	1999	0.046 metric tonnes			
	Proportion of population using solid fuels	2003	100% (rural)			
	Proportion of population with sustainable access to an improved water source, urban and rural	2003	23%		61.5%	
	Proportion of population with sustainable access to an improved sanitation, urban and rural	2003	12%		66%	
	Proportion of urban population with secure access to land tenure		No data			
	Develop a global partnership for development	Bilateral ODA that is untied	2004-05	26%		
		ODA as percentage of GDP	2004-05	49%		
Military spending as % of GDP		2005	17%	3-5%	3-5%	
Professionally trained ANA		2005	42%	100%	100%	
Nation-wide fielding of the ANA		2005	46%	100%	100%	
Operational capability of the ANA and ability to operate independently or with reduce support from Coalition/ISAF forces		2005	0%	100%	100%	
Citizen's confidence in the ANP			No data			
Enhance security	Reported crimes to conviction ratio		No data			
	Number of weapons licensed under the new gun law		No data			
	Gun crime as a proportion of overall crime		No data			
	Number of highly impact communities	2005	281	0	0	
	Number of Afghans directly affected	2005	4.2 million	0	0	
	Number of mine/UXO victims	2005	100 per month (approx.)	0	0	
	Number of stockpiled antipersonnel mines destroyed	2005	28,895	0	0	
	Number of Afghans dependent upon poppy for their livelihoods		No data			
	* - Gross enrolment ratio					

ANNEXURE 3

Glossary of Indicators

Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger

1. Proportion of population below US\$1 per day (1993 PPP values)

The percentage of the population living on less than \$1.08 a day at 1993 international prices. The \$1 a day poverty line is compared to consumption or income per person and includes consumption from own production and income in kind. Because this poverty line has fixed purchasing power across countries or areas, the \$1 a day poverty line is often called an "absolute poverty line".

2. Poverty gap ratio (incidence x depth of poverty)

The mean distance below the \$1 (1993 PPP US\$) a day poverty line, expressed as a percentage of the poverty line. The mean is taken over the entire population, counting the non-poor as having zero poverty gap. The measure reflects the depth of poverty as well as its incidence.

3. Share of poorest quintile in national consumption

The share of consumption or, in some cases, income that accrues to the poorest 20 percent of the population.

4. Prevalence of underweight children under 5 years of age

The percentage of children under five years old whose weight for age is less than minus two standard deviations from the median for the international reference population ages 0-59 months. The international reference population was formulated by the National Center for Health Statistics as a reference for the United States and later adopted by the World Health Organization (WHO) for international use (often referred to as the NCHS/WHO reference population).

5. Proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption

The percentage of the population whose food intake falls below the minimum level of dietary energy requirements. This is also referred to as the prevalence of under-nourishment, which is the percentage of the population that is undernourished.

Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education

6. Net enrolment ratio in primary education

The ratio of the number of children of official school age (as defined by the national education system) who are enrolled in primary school to the total population of children of official school age. Primary education provides children with basic reading, writing, and mathematics skills along with an elementary understanding of such subjects as history, geography, natural science, social science, art, and music.

7. Proportion of pupils starting Grade 1 who reach Grade 5

The survival rate to grade 5, is the percentage of a cohort of pupils enrolled in grade 1 of the primary level of education in a given school year who are expected to reach grade 5.

8. Literacy rate of 15- to 24-year-olds

The percentage of the population ages 15-24 years-old, who can both read and write with understanding a short simple statement on everyday life, of total population in the same age group. The definition of literacy sometimes extends to basic arithmetic and other life skills.

Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women

9. Ratio of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education

The ratio of the number of female students enrolled at primary, secondary and tertiary levels in public and private schools to the number of male students.

10. Ratio of literate females to males (15- to 24-year-olds)

The ratio of the female literacy rate to the male literacy rate for the age group 15-24.

11. Ratio of female to male government employees

The ratio of the number of female employees to the number of male employees in government services.

12. Proportion of seats held by women in national, provincial and district representative bodies

The number of seats held by women expressed as a percentage of all seats.

13. Adoption, review and amendment of legislation that protects the rights of women, particularly in employment, family rights, property and inheritance and in accordance with the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

The rights of women in employment; share of women in employment, both wage and self-employment, by type and gender gaps in earnings in wage and self-employment. Property and inheritance rights; land ownership by male, female, or jointly held and housing title, disaggregated by male, female, or jointly held.

14. Adoption of legislation that criminalizes all forms of gender and sexual-based violence

Gender-Based Violence (GBV) is violence that is directed against a person on the basis of gender or sex. It includes acts that inflict physical, mental, or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion, and other deprivations of liberty. Examples of gender-based violence are sexual violence, domestic violence, emotional and psychological abuse, trafficking, forced prostitution, sexual exploitation, sexual harassment, and harmful traditional practices (e.g. female genital mutilation, forced marriage, or widow cleansing). Sexual violence is usually gender-based.

Goal 4: Reduce child mortality

15. Under-5 mortality rate

The probability of dying between birth and exactly five years of age, expressed per 1,000 live births.

16. Infant mortality rate

The probability of dying between birth and exactly one year of age, expressed per 1,000 live births.

17. Proportion of 1-year-old children immunized against measles

The percentage of children under one year of age who have received at least one dose of measles vaccine.

Goal 5: Improve maternal health

18. Maternal mortality ratio

The annual number of deaths of women from pregnancy-related causes per 100,000 live births.

19. Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel

The percentage of deliveries attended by personnel (including doctors, nurses and midwives) trained to give the necessary care, supervision and advice to women during pregnancy, labour and the postpartum period, to conduct deliveries on their own and to care for newborns.

20. Total fertility rate (births per woman)

The number of children that would be born to each woman if she were to live to the end of her child-bearing years and bear children at each age in accordance with prevailing age-specific fertility rates.

21. Proportion of women receiving professional ante-natal (prenatal) care

The percentage of women attended at least once during pregnancy by skilled health personnel for reasons related to pregnancy.

Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases

22. HIV prevalence among blood donors

The percentage of blood donors whose blood samples test positive for HIV

23. Condom use rate of the contraceptive prevalence rate

The number of women ages 15-49 in marital or consensual unions who are practicing contraception by using condoms as a proportion of all of women of the same age group in consensual unions who are practicing, or whose sexual partners are practicing, any form of contraception.

24. Population aged 15-49 with comprehensive correct knowledge of HIV/AIDS

The share of women and men ages 15-49 who correctly identify the two major ways of preventing the sexual transmission of HIV (using condoms and limiting sex to one faithful, uninfected partner), who reject the two most common local misconceptions about HIV transmission and who know that a healthy-looking person can transmit HIV.

25. Contraceptive prevalence rate

The percentage of women who are practicing, or whose sexual partners are practicing, any form of contraception. It is usually reported for women ages 15-49 in marital or consensual unions.

26. Proportion of blood samples screened for HIV/AIDS and STDs

The percentage of blood samples screened for HIV/AIDS and STDs of all blood samples.

27. Proportion of women's unmet needs for family planning met

This indicator is based on the contraceptive prevalence rate (CPR) and the level of unmet needs (LUN). Specifically, it is the ratio of the CPR to the sum of the CPR and the LUN. The Needs Being Met (NBM) thus assumes that all current users of contraception want to space or limit their births, and takes those users as a proportion of all women who say they want to space or limit their births. The met need for family planning can be considered as those currently married women who are using family planning methods. By implication the Unmet need is defined as those currently married women who do not want any more children or want to wait before having another child but are not using contraception.

28. Proportion of IV drug users in treatment

The number of intravenous drug users in treatment as of total drug users.

29. Prevalence and death rates associated with malaria

Prevalence of malaria is the number of cases of malaria per 100,000 people. Death rates associated with malaria are number of deaths caused by malaria per 100,000 people.

30. Proportion of population in malaria risk areas using effective malaria prevention and treatment measures (e.g. bed nets)

Malaria prevention is measured as the percentage of children ages 0-59 months sleeping under insecticide-treated bednets. Malaria treatment among children is measured as the proportion of children ages 0-59 months who were ill with fever in the two weeks before the survey and who received appropriate antimalarial drugs.

31. Prevalence and death rates associated with tuberculosis

Tuberculosis prevalence is the number of cases of tuberculosis per 100,000 people. Death rates associated with tuberculosis are deaths caused by tuberculosis per 100,000 people. A tuberculosis case is defined as a patient in whom tuberculosis has been bacteriologically confirmed or diagnosed by a clinician.

32. Proportion of tuberculosis cases detected and cured under DOTS

The Tuberculosis Detection rate is the percentage of estimated new infectious tuberculosis cases detected under the directly observed treatment, short course (DOTS) case detection and treatment strategy. The Tuberculosis cure rate is the percentage of new, registered smear-positive (infectious) cases that were cured or in which a full course of DOTS was completed.

Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability

33. Proportion of land area covered by forest

Forest areas as a share of total land area, where land area is the total surface area of the country less the area covered by inland waters, like major rivers and lakes. As defined in the FAO Global Forest Resources Assessment 2000, forest includes both natural forests and forest plantations. It refers to land with an existing or expected tree canopy of more than 10 % and an area of more than 0.5 hectare where the trees should be able to reach a minimum height of 5 meters. Forests are identified both by the presence of trees and the absence of other land uses. Land from which forest has been cleared but that will be reforested in the foreseeable future is included. Excluded are stands of trees established primarily for agricultural production, such as fruit tree plantations.

34. Ratio of area protected to maintain biological diversity to surface area

The nationally protected area as a percentage of total surface area of a country. The generally accepted IUCN-World Conservation Union definition of a protected area is an area of land or sea dedicated to the protection and maintenance of biological diversity and of natural and associated cultural resources and managed through legal or other effective means.

35. Energy use (kg. oil equivalent) per US\$1,000 GDP (PPP)

Commercial energy use measured in units of oil equivalent per \$1,000 of GDP converted from national currencies using purchasing power parity (PPP) conversion factors.

36. Carbon dioxide emissions (per capita) and consumption of ozone-depleting CFCs (ODP tonnes)

Total amount of carbon dioxide emitted by a country as a consequence of human (production and consumption) activities, divided by the population of the country. In the global carbon dioxide emission estimates of the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center of Oak Ridge National Laboratory in the United States, the calculated country emissions of carbon dioxide include emissions from consumption of solid, liquid and gas fuels; cement production; and gas flaring. Consumption of ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) in tons (ozone-depleting potential) is the sum of the consumption of the weighted tons of the individual substances in the group-metric tons of the individual substance (defined in the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer) multiplied by its ozone-depleting potential. Ozone-depleting substances are any substance containing chlorine or bromine that destroys the stratospheric ozone layer. The stratospheric ozone absorbs most of the biologically damaging ultraviolet radiation.

37. Proportion of population using solid fuels

The proportion of the population that relies on biomass (wood, charcoal, crop residues and dung) and coal as the primary source of domestic energy for cooking and heating.

38. Proportion of population with sustainable access to an improved water source, urban and rural

The percentage of the population who use any of the following types of water supply for drinking: piped water, public tap, borehole or pump, protected well, protected spring or rainwater. Improved water sources do not include vendor-provided waters, bottled water, tanker trucks or unprotected wells and springs.

39. Proportion of population with access to improved sanitation, urban and rural

The percentage of the population with access to facilities that hygienically separate human excreta from human, animal and insect contact. Facilities such as sewers or septic tanks, poor-flush latrines and simple pit or ventilated improved pit latrines are assumed to be adequate, provided that they are not public. To be effective, facilities must be correctly constructed and properly maintained.

40. Proportion of households with access to secure tenure

Secure tenure refers to households that own or are purchasing their homes, are renting privately or are in social housing or subtenancy. Households without secure tenure are defined as squatters (whether or not they pay rent), the homeless and households with no formal agreement.

Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development

41. Proportion of total bilateral, sector-allocable ODA of OECD/DAC donors to basic social services (basic education, primary health care, nutrition, safe water and sanitation)

Official development assistance (ODA) comprises grants or loans to developing countries and territories on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) list of aid recipients that are undertaken by the official sector with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective and at concessional financial terms (if a loan, having a grant element of at least 25 percent). Technical cooperation is included. Grants, loans and credits for military purposes are excluded. Also excluded are aid to more advanced developing and transition countries as determined by the DAC. Bilateral official development assistance is from one country to another. Basic education comprises primary education, basic life skills for youth and adults and early childhood education. Primary health care includes basic health care, basic health infrastructure, basic nutrition, infectious disease control, health education and health personnel development.

42. Proportion of bilateral ODA of OECD/DAC donors that is untied

Is assistance from country to country for which the associated goods and services may be fully and freely procured in substantially all countries.

43. ODA received as proportion of its GNI

Recipient countries' gross national income (GNI) at market prices is the sum of gross primary incomes receivable by resident institutional units and sectors. GNI at market prices was called gross national product (GNP) in the 1953 System of National Accounts. In contrast to gross domestic product (GDP), GNI is a concept of income (primary income) rather than value added.

44. Proportion of ODA provided to help build trade capacity

ODA directed to activities intended to enhance the ability of the recipient country to formulate and implement a trade development strategy and create an enabling environment for increasing the volume and value added of exports, diversifying export products and markets and increasing foreign investment to generate jobs and trade; stimulate trade by domestic firms and encourage investment in trade-oriented industries; or participate in and benefit from the institution, negotiations and processes that shape national trade policy and the rules and practices of international commerce.

45. Percentage of total export to countries with which Afghanistan has a preferential trade agreement

Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) are agreements among a set of countries involving preferential treatment of bilateral trade between any two parties to the agreement relative to their trade with the rest of the world. Preferences, however, need not extend to all trade between the two, and the coverage could depend on the type of PTAs.

46. Unemployment rate of young people aged 15-24 years, each sex and total

Unemployment of 15-24 year-olds is the number of unemployed people ages 15-24 divided by the labour force of the same age group. Unemployed people are all those who are not employed during a specified reference period but are available for work and have taken concrete steps to seek paid employment or self-employment. In situations where the conventional means of seeking work are of limited relevance, where the labour market is largely unorganized or of limited scope, where labour absorption is temporarily inadequate or where the labour force is largely self-employed, a relaxed definition of unemployment can be applied, based on only the first two criteria (without work and currently available for work). The labour force consists of those who are employed plus those who are unemployed during the relevant reference period. It is the economically active portion of the population. Employment refers to being engaged in an economic activity during a specified reference period or being temporarily absent from such an activity, while economic activity refers to the production of goods and services for pay or profit or for use by own household.

47. Proportion of population with access to affordable essential drugs on a sustainable basis

The percentage of the population that has access to a minimum of 20 most essential drugs. Access is defined as having drugs continuously available and affordable at public or private health facilities or drug outlets that are within one hour's walk of the population. Essential drugs are drugs that satisfy the health care needs of the majority of the population. WHO has developed the Model List of Essential Drugs, which is regularly updated through widespread consultations with member states and other partners. Progress in access to essential medicines is thus the result of combined effort by governments, strategic partners such as UN agencies, public-private partnerships, non-government organizations and professional associations.

48. Telephone lines and cellular subscribers

Telephone lines refer to the number of telephone lines connecting subscribers' terminal equipment to the public switched network and that have a dedicated port in the telephone exchange equipment. Cellular subscribers refers to users of cellular telephones who subscribe to an automatic public mobile telephone service that provides access to the public switched telephone network using cellular technology.

49. Personal computers in use and Internet users

Personal computers (PCs) are computers designed to be operated by a single user at a time. The Internet is a linked global network of computers in which users at one computer, if they have permission, get information from other computers in the network.

Goal 9: Enhance security

50. Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP

Military expenditures data from SIPRI are derived from the NATO definition, which includes all current and capital expenditures on the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces; defense ministries and other government agencies engaged in defense projects; paramilitary forces, if these are judged to be trained and equipped for military operations; and military space activities. Such expenditures include military and civil personnel, including retirement pensions of military personnel and social services for personnel; operation and maintenance; procurement; military research and development; and military aid (in the military expenditures of the donor country). Excluded are civil defense and current expenditures for previous military activities, such as for veterans' benefits, demobilization, conversion, and destruction of weapons. This definition cannot be applied for all countries, however, since that would require much more detailed information than is available about what is included in military budgets and off-budget military expenditure items. (For example, military budgets might or might not cover civil defense, reserves and auxiliary forces, police and paramilitary forces, dual-purpose forces such as military and civilian police, military grants in kind, pensions for military personnel, and social security contributions paid by one part of government to another).

51. Professionally trained ANA

Attrition rate is defined as the percentage of personnel's departure from service for non-punitive reasons of total personnel. Examples include: end of contract, wounded in action, killed in action, administrative discharges, dropping from roles. Absent Without Leave (AWOL) personnel do not contribute to the attrition rate until they are classified as deserters.

52. Nation-wide fielding of ANA

Establishment of Brigade garrisons and Forward Operating Bases of the ANA.

53. Operational capability of the ANA and ability to operate independently or with less support from Coalition/ISAF forces

Complete and validate basic tactical capabilities of the ANA at the battalion level. Develop its maneuver, mobility, fire support and sustainability capabilities, as well as specialized elements such as Special Operations forces, Military Intelligence and Military Engineers.

54. Citizen's confidence in ANP's ability to provide security and access to justice comparable to other countries coming out of conflict

Citizens of Afghanistan (across lines of gender, ethnicity, urban-rural, or economic class) who agree/feel that Afghan National Police is able to provide security and provide them with the ability to use various public and private services on demand, measured through the public participation in community policing through public consultation and input.

55. Reported crime to conviction ratio

The proportion of reported crimes (which demonstrates an increase in public confidence in the police and willingness to report to the police without fear), which result in a successful conviction.

56. Number of weapons licensed under the gun law

Number of weapons licenses issued by Ministry of Interior (MOI) as a proportion of the estimated number of (civilian-owned) weapons in the country.

57. Gun-related crime as a proportion of total crime

Number of crimes committed with the use of, or the threat of the use of a firearm

58. Number of high impacted communities

The number of communities with higher rates of landmines casualties and restricted access to vital resources such as water, agriculture and grazing lands.

59. Total number of impacted communities

The number of communities with areas contaminated with mines directly impacting the safety and life of these communities and has resulted in death or injury within the last two years.

60. Afghans directly impacted

Impact is the level of social and economic suffering experienced by the community resulting from the harm or risk of harm caused by mine and UXO hazards and hazardous areas. Note: Impact is a product of: a) the presence of mine/UXO hazards in the community; b) intolerable risk associated with the use of infrastructure such as roads, markets etc; c) intolerable risk associated with livelihood activities such as use of agricultural land, water sources etc; and d) number of victims of mine and UXO incidents within the last two years.

61. Mine/UXO victims/survivors (injured or dead)

Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) is an Explosive Ordnance (EO) that has been primed, fuzed, armed or otherwise prepared for use or used. It may have been fired, dropped, launched or projected yet remains unexploded either through malfunction or design or for any other reason. Survivor (landmine/UXO) are persons either individually or collectively who have suffered physical, emotional and psychological injury, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights through acts or omissions related to the use of mines and UXO. Mine survivors or victims include directly impacted individuals, their families, and communities affected by landmines and UXO. Victim is an individual who has suffered harm as a result of a mine or UXO accident. In the context of victim assistance, the term victim may include dependants of a mine casualty, hence having a broader meaning than survivor.

62. Stockpiled antipersonnel mines destroyed

Anti-Personnel Mine (APM) is a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. Stockpile destruction is the physical destructive procedure towards a continual reduction of the national stockpile. (Source: International Mine Action Standards 2004)

63. ERW stockpiles remaining to be destroyed

Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) are Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) and Abandoned Explosive Ordnance (AXO). Stockpile destruction is the physical destructive procedure towards a continual reduction of the national stockpile.

64. Eliminate illicit opium poppy cultivation

The elimination of opium poppy plant, which may be used for the cultivation of opium poppy with a view of producing opium

65. Reduce % of Afghans dependant on poppy for their livelihoods

Reducing the share of Afghans who are dependant on illicit cultivation of opium poppy, with a view of producing opium, or its trafficking as the means needed to support their life.

Sources: *UNDG (2003), HDR (2003), WDI (2005), International Mine Action Standards (2004), UNHCR, WHO Expert Committee on Essential Drugs (1999), UN Inter-Agency and Expert Meeting on MDG Indicators, Gender Indicators Sub-group (2004), National Security Council*

¹ The National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (2005) will collect data on 66 food items and 20 non-food items in both rural and urban areas. CSO with ADB is developing a household income and expenditure survey that will provide data on household income and expenditure.

² Narayan *et al* (2000)

³ World Bank (2005b)

⁴ Fleshman (2001)

⁵ Government of Afghanistan (2004a)

⁶ Lipton (2005)

⁷ For example, by the World Food Programme, including: WFP and MRRD (2004)

⁸ The figure of 20.4% assessed by NRVA(2003) may be an under-estimate as it was taken soon after a good harvest and the proportion of population with permanent access to the minimum nutrition level may be smaller.

⁹ This is in spite of changes in the methodology over the years.

¹⁰ Nutritional outcomes are determined by mean caloric intake and dietary diversity. Dietary diversity is the number of different foods or food groups consumed over a given reference period. Despite the well-recognized importance of dietary diversity there is still a lack of consensus about what dietary diversity represents. There is no official definition in the literature of dietary quality either. Historically it refers to nutrient adequacy, which means that the diet meets both caloric and essential nutrient requirements.

¹¹ UNICEF and MoPH (2003)

¹² IbnSina (1999/2000); ACF (2002); ACF(2003)

¹³ UNICEF (2001/2002)

¹⁴ UNICEF and MoPH (2002)

¹⁵ Assefa *et al* (2001); Cheung *et al* (2003)

¹⁶ To be conducted by CSO/ADB

¹⁷ Collier and Hoeffler (2002)

¹⁸ Guimbert (2004)

¹⁹ Lipton (2005)

²⁰ Mellor (2005)

²¹ WFP and MRRD (2004)

²² UNICEF (2005)

²³ UNICEF (2005)

²⁴ UNICEF (2005)

²⁵ UNICEF (2005)

²⁶ Involving religious leaders and using mosques and prayer rooms as alternative learning spaces does not only provide learning spaces close to children's homes, but also helps overcome cultural resistance seen towards education of girls in some parts of the country. (UNICEF/CSO MICS 2003)

²⁷ UNICEF ACO and CSO (2003)

²⁸ World Bank (2005c)

²⁹ World Bank (2005c)

³⁰ World Bank (2005c)

³¹ World Bank (2005c)

³² Hunte (1996)

³³ Nassery (2004)

³⁴ Hunte (1996)

³⁵ Bruns *et al* (2003)

³⁶ UNESCO *et al* (2000)

³⁷ Human Rights Watch (2004)

³⁸ Sachs *et al* (2004)

³⁹ Government of Afghanistan (2004e)

⁴⁰ CSO (2003)

⁴¹ WFP and MRRD (2004)

⁴² Khalilzad (2004)

⁴³ Government of Afghanistan (2004b)

⁴⁴ CSO (2002)

⁴⁵ UNDP HDR website (<http://hdr.undp.org>); Data from 2002

⁴⁶ There is an unexpectedly large regional variation in both the U5MR and IMR, which has been linked to the difficulties surveyors experienced in gaining access to women for the survey. In recognition of these limitations, UNICEF developed a best estimate scenario, which accepts 1997 MICS results, but suggests an increase in infant and under-five mortality rates between 1997-2001 as a consequence of drought and war. This trend is demonstrated by the MICS (2003), which suggests that the mortality rates for 2001 would have been very close to those of 1990.

⁴⁷ Government of Afghanistan (2004b)

⁴⁸ UNICEF ACO and CSO (2003)

- ⁴⁹ Such as giardiasis, amoebiasis, or intestinal helminth infections
- ⁵⁰ UNICEF ACO and CSO (2003)
- ⁵¹ Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Haiti, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Timor Leste. Data from United Nations Statistics Division – Millennium Indicators.
- ⁵² Lawn *et al* (2005)
- ⁵³ The others are Bangladesh, China, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Tanzania.
- ⁵⁴ The CDC/UNICEF study found that 87.2% of women surveyed had delivered their last child at home.
- ⁵⁵ Government of Afghanistan (2004b), Ministry of Public Health (2004)
- ⁵⁶ All data on immunisation from MICS (2003).
- ⁵⁷ World Bank (2004)
- ⁵⁸ UNICEF ACO and CSO (2003)
- ⁵⁹ Bartlett *et al* (2005)
- ⁶⁰ WHO (2004)
- ⁶¹ Ministry of Public Health and Management Sciences for Health (2002)
- ⁶² World Bank (2005)
- ⁶³ World Bank (2005)
- ⁶⁴ Waldman and Hanif (2002)
- ⁶⁵ Bartlett *et al* (2005)
- ⁶⁶ Bartlett *et al*
- ⁶⁷ Ministry of Public Health (2003)
- ⁶⁸ UNICEF ACO and CSO (2003)
- ⁶⁹ Marie Stopes International (2004)
- ⁷⁰ Feinstein International Famine Center (2004)
- ⁷¹ UNAIDS and WHO (2002)
- ⁷² Information provided verbally by the Director of the Central Blood Bank, Kabul, Afghanistan.
- ⁷³ IRIN (2002)
- ⁷⁴ IRIN (2002)
- ⁷⁵ UNODC (2003)
- ⁷⁶ Strathdee *et al* (2003)
- ⁷⁷ UNEP (2003)
- ⁷⁸ Government of Afghanistan (2004a); UNEP (2003); and Christian Science Monitor (2005)
- ⁷⁹ UNEP (2003)
- ⁸⁰ Christian Science Monitor (2005)
- ⁸¹ Christian Science Monitor (2005)
- ⁸² CSO (2004)
- ⁸³ Data from NRVA (2003)
- ⁸⁴ The combination of drought and a loss of vegetation are contributory factors to the increased dust levels.
- ⁸⁵ Institute for War and Peace Reporting (2004)
- ⁸⁶ Institute for War and Peace Reporting (2004)
- ⁸⁷ Institute for War and Peace Reporting (2004)
- ⁸⁸ UN-DESA/UN Statistical Division
- ⁸⁹ An "improved" water source is one that is likely to provide "safe" water, such as a household connection, borehole, public standpipe, protected dug well, protected spring, or through rainwater collection. However, this is not necessarily the case in Afghanistan.
- ⁹⁰ The estimate is from MICS (2003), but is lower than the original figure, based on the assumption that the drought of 2003 dried up the surface water and people used safer water sources more than they would do in non-drought years.
- ⁹¹ World Bank (2004)
- ⁹² UNICEF (2005)
- ⁹³ UN HABITAT, Kabul Country Office, (2005)
- ⁹⁴ Government of Afghanistan (2004a)
- ⁹⁵ According to UNDP's Regional Energy Programme for Poverty Reduction, Bangkok.
- ⁹⁶ Information from ToR for a rapid regional assessment and mapping exercise of the UNDP Regional Energy Programme for Poverty 96 Reduction (REP-PoR) for the Asia-Pacific region.
- ⁹⁷ UNDP (2003)
- ⁹⁸ Figures from Ministry of Finance. Status as of 23 March 2005
- ⁹⁹ It can be assumed from the 16 programmes under the National Development Budget that around 30% of resources were allocated to social sectors (MoF).
- ¹⁰⁰ This includes US \$478 million spent by UNHCR to bring back 3.8 million refugees; US \$11 million spent by UN-Habitat to provide, among other things, 12,241 shelters; US \$222 million spent by UNICEF for its emergency programme components of health and nutrition (including immunisation), water and sanitation, education and child protection; US\$ 200 million spent on mine action to clear 290 million square metres of land from mines and UXOs; and US \$400 million spent by WFP to provide much-needed food to 3.4 million chronically

food-insecure and 3.2 million seasonally food-insecure people.

¹⁰¹ Birdsall and Clemens (2003)

¹⁰² Government of Afghanistan (2004a)

¹⁰³ UNESCAP/UNDP (2005)

¹⁰⁴ Ahady and Delawari (2005)

¹⁰⁵ Ahady and Delawari (2005)

¹⁰⁶ This money is used to fund part of the government's expenses under its Operational Budget.

¹⁰⁷ Ahady and Delawari (2005)

¹⁰⁸ fDi Magazine (2005)

¹⁰⁹ OHRLLS (<http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrls/lldc/default.htm>)

¹¹⁰ fDi Magazine (2005). Figures quoted from government sources.

¹¹¹ Afghanistan, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Uganda and Zambia are the 16 landlocked least developed countries. Switzerland and Austria are the landlocked most developed countries.

¹¹² United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developed Countries and Small Island Developing States (OHRLLS). See website <http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrls/ohrls/default.htm> (accessed on 1 August 2005)

¹¹³ UNESCAP/UNDP (2005)

¹¹⁴ WHO (2005)

¹¹⁵ WHO (2005)

¹¹⁶ The interviewees can choose from four levels of access by the population to essential drugs: less than 50%; between 50-80%; 80-95%; and above 95%.

¹¹⁷ Kofi Annan's IT challenge to Silicon Valley, accessed on 5 November 2002, <http://news.com.com/2010-1069-964507.html?tag=lh>

¹¹⁸ Government of Afghanistan (2004a)

¹¹⁹ Government of Afghanistan (2004a)

¹²⁰ Donini *et al* (2005)

¹²¹ A sample of 155 people were interviewed, including tribal elders, university students, rural aid beneficiaries, small businessmen, professional women, destitute widows and day labourers. Some were interviewed on an individual basis, others in focus groups. Some responses were received electronically.

¹²² Government of Afghanistan (2004f)

¹²³ Estimate from the Coalition Forces in Afghanistan (2005)

¹²⁴ Rubin (2003)

¹²⁵ Ponzio (2005)

¹²⁶ The new programme for Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) focuses on disarming organised armed units, rather than individuals.

¹²⁷ Katzman (2005)

¹²⁸ Ponzio (2005)

¹²⁹ CFC presentation *Afghan National Police Programme (2005)*

¹³⁰ UN (2002)

¹³¹ UNDP Afghanistan (2004)

¹³² UNDP Afghanistan (2004)

¹³³ This score is based on: (i) the number of recent victims (within the previous 24 months); (ii) the presence of different types of socioeconomic and institutional blockages; and (iii) the nature of the munitions (landmines and/or UXO) present.

¹³⁴ 0-5 points = low impact; 6-10 points = medium impact; and 11 or more points = high impact.

¹³⁵ ALIS (2005)

¹³⁶ UNMAS, UNDP, UNICEF, (2005), "Portfolio of Mine Action Projects"

¹³⁷ Government of Afghanistan (2005)

¹³⁸ Ward and Byrd (2004)

¹³⁹ UNODC (2004). See also Ward and Byrd (2004).

¹⁴⁰ A new Ministry for Counter-Narcotics has been established and is charged with the coordination, monitoring and evaluation of the strategy. A Counter-Narcotics Trust Fund has also been initiated, and the Ministry will be responsible for identifying spending priorities.

¹⁴¹ UNDP (2005)

¹⁴² Rubin (2001)

¹⁴³ Chalmers (2004)

¹⁴⁴ Katzman (2005)

¹⁴⁵ IMF (2005) and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. *Fourth review under the Staff-Monitored Programme*. July 2005.

¹⁴⁶ Ahady (2005)"

¹⁴⁷ This section draws heavily upon the Government of Afghanistan's "Securing Afghanistan's Future". See Government of Afghanistan (2004a)

¹⁴⁸ Dr. Andrew Pinney has contributed substantially to this section

¹⁴⁹ This section draws heavily upon the Government of Afghanistan's "Securing Afghanistan's Future". See Government of Afghanistan (2004a)

¹⁵⁰ Richard Ponzio has contributed substantially to this section

¹⁵¹ Sen (1999)

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
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